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“I believe the decision of the Court . . . entails harmful consequences for 
the country at large. How serious these consequences may prove to be only 
time can tell. . . . The social costs of crime are too great to call the new 
rules anything but a hazardous experimentation.” 
—Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 
“When we get a little distant, some things get clearer.” 
—THE INDIGO GIRLS, It’s Alright, on SHAMING OF THE SUN (Epic Records 
1997). 
INTRODUCTION 
The fiftieth anniversary of Miranda v. Arizona1 offers a chance to assess how 
the decision has played out in the real world and, in particular, to determine 
whether it has harmed law enforcement. On the day the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision, four dissenters predicted that its price would be reduced 
police effectiveness in solving crimes. In dissent, Justice Harlan warned that the 
decision would produce social costs, the size of which “only time can tell.”2 
Justice White, also dissenting, predicted that “[i]n some unknown number of 
cases the Court’s rule will return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets 
and to the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it 
pleases him.”3 
Since then, the Miranda warnings and the associated procedures have 
“become part of our national culture.”4 But what effect have they actually had 
on law enforcement effectiveness? In this Article, we take advantage of the time 
since the Miranda decision—now a little more than fifty years—to see whether 
 
1 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).  
2 Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
3 Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting).  
4 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000); accord Tracey Maclin, The Right 
to Silence v. The Fifth Amendment, 2016 U. CHI. L.F. 255, 256 (discussing entrenchment of 
the Miranda decision).  
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it has produced the predicted harmful consequences. In particular, we survey the 
available empirical evidence. We collect confession rate data, both from the time 
of Miranda and since, to assess whether Miranda caused confession rates to fall. 
We also review the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)’s nationwide data 
on crime clearance rates to shed light on any changes in the ability of police to 
solve crimes. Building on research we first published in 1998,5 we capitalize on 
additional data and new statistical techniques to more fully assess whether 
Miranda “handcuffed the cops.” 
Our focus in this Article is a quantitative one. Many academic commentators 
have offered their qualitative assessments regarding Miranda’s effects on law 
enforcement based on their understandings of doctrinal developments since 
Miranda. These qualitative views have generally been that Miranda has not 
harmed law enforcement.6 But this question is, ultimately, a quantitative one that 
is best assessed, if possible, quantitatively.  
Our Article proceeds in eight parts. In Part I, we describe different approaches 
to gauging Miranda’s effect on law enforcement. Ideally, the issue would be 
approached by evaluating whether confession rates fell after the decision. The 
limited evidence available suggests that they did. But because only limited 
confession rate data exist, particularly for recent years, other measures of 
Miranda’s effects need to be examined. 
In Part II, we explain why crime clearance rate data become the inevitable 
second-best measure for evaluating Miranda’s long-term effects. Specifically, 
we report the results of regression equations on crime clearance rates from 1950 
to 2012, controlling for factors apart from Miranda that might be responsible for 
changes in clearance rates. Even controlling for these factors, we find 
statistically significant reductions in crime clearance rates after Miranda for 
violent and property crimes, as well as for robbery, larceny, and vehicle theft. 
We also quantify the number of lost clearances that appear to be due to Miranda. 
In Part III, we take advantage of recent advances in statistical modeling to 
respond to the critique (advanced by John Donohue,7 among others) that 
discovering a “MIRANDA effect” depends on the variables that a researcher 
includes or excludes from regression models. Using Bayesian model averaging 
(“BMA”), we conclude that our findings are not generally subject to model 
specification problems but rather are extremely robust. Indeed, we are able to 
replicate many of our most important findings using Donohue’s own 
specifications. 
 
5 Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on 
Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1059-60 (1998). 
6 See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Spider Web, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1215, 1233 
(2017) (“The more I think about it, the more I believe that we have achieved interrogation 
nirvana with the current Court’s interpretation of Miranda.”).  
7 John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1147, 1157-71 (1998).  
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In Part IV, we respond to arguments (raised by Floyd Feeney8) that the post-
Miranda decline in crime clearance rates is some sort of statistical artifact caused 
by record-keeping issues or other similar problems. Here we review not only 
national data but also data from some of the nation’s largest cities as well as 
from California. Properly understood, the data from all of these sources tend to 
confirm our hypothesis that Miranda shackled American law enforcement. 
In Part V, we respond to another argument (again raised by Feeney9) that 
clearance rates are not responsive to Miranda’s restrictions. We explain that 
while clearance rates will inherently understate Miranda’s harmful effects, they 
could provide partial measures of these effects. We also explain that lost 
clearances due to Miranda are not confined to so-called “secondary” clearances. 
We conclude this Part by discussing how police interrogations remain important 
to law enforcement even in an era of advancing forensic science. 
In Part VI, we review the reasons for believing that our 1966-to-1968 
“MIRANDA effect” is attributable to significant restrictions placed on police by 
the Miranda decision rather than some other event occurring at exactly that time. 
We explain that police reports contemporaneous with Miranda pointed to the 
decision as a cause and that other competing potential causes do not appear to 
be strong candidates for explaining the pattern of clearance rate reductions we 
have found. 
In Part VII, we present an alternative approach to regulating police 
interrogation that would ameliorate Miranda’s harmful effects on law 
enforcement while protecting suspects from unconstitutional coercion. In 
particular, we propose that the Miranda warnings-and-waiver procedure be 
modified so as to avoid giving suspects the option to block all police questioning. 
We also propose that, in exchange for these modified rules, police should be 
required to record custodial interrogations. This alternative reduces Miranda’s 
harms to law enforcement while better protecting suspects from abusive 
questioning. 
In Part VIII, we briefly conclude by encouraging the Supreme Court, as well 
as commentators and policy makers, to consider alternative ways of regulating 
police interrogation that do not have such detrimental effects on police efforts to 
apprehend potentially dangerous criminals. 
I. GAUGING MIRANDA’S EFFECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
How are we to assess Justice Harlan’s prediction that Miranda would produce 
social costs the size of which “only time can tell”?10 Accurately and 
quantitatively measuring Miranda’s effect on law enforcement is no simple 
matter. We start from the premise that because Miranda imposed new rules 
restricting police interrogation, its direct effect would be changes in the results 
 
8 Floyd Feeney, Police Clearances: A Poor Way to Measure the Impact of Miranda on the 
Police, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 18-41 (2000). 
9 Id. at 42-60.  
10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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of those interrogations—i.e., changes (presumably a reduction) in the number of 
confessions that police obtain from suspects. This confession rate decline (if 
any) is the initial subject of interest. Any such decline might then have additional 
collateral effects, such as possible reductions in the clearance rate (i.e., the rate 
at which police solve crimes) because Miranda causes police to gain less 
information from criminals about crimes they may have committed, or causes 
reductions in convictions because prosecutors lack evidence they need to 
persuade juries to convict suspects. 
While the approach to measuring Miranda’s effects through confession rate 
changes is theoretically straightforward, the empirical information needed for 
such an assessment is unfortunately hard to come by. When Miranda was 
decided, law enforcement agencies did not regularly track the percentage of 
cases in which suspects confessed. In fact, they still do not. Interestingly, the 
Miranda decision itself rested on no direct evidence or empirical studies of how 
police questioned suspects.11 
One would think that in the fifty years since the decision, social scientists and 
legal scholars of an empirical bent would have collected data on Miranda’s real 
world impact. But little research has been done in this area. Indeed, writing in 
1988, Richard Uviller aptly described us as living in an “empirical desert” with 
regard to hard data12—a characterization that still is largely accurate.13 
This lack of data has left some scholars free to speculate that Miranda’s 
harmful effects must have diminished over time. For instance, Steven Duke has 
written that while Miranda might permit some suspects to block questioning 
entirely, Miranda might also lead other suspects to confess by “sound[ing] 
chords of fairness and sympathy at the outset of the interrogation.”14 Duke goes 
on to “speculate . . . that after four decades of living with Miranda, the small 
number of suspects who are induced to remain silent by the administration of 
the warnings is getting even smaller while the number encouraged to talk is at 
least remaining stable.”15 
Duke’s speculation is, of course, theoretically possible. But what does the 
(limited) empirical evidence tell us about Miranda’s effects, both at the time of 
the decision and more recently? In this Part, we consider two empirical measures 
of Miranda’s possible harmful effects on law enforcement: (1) the before-and-
 
11 Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Question Kids, 
23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 412 (2013). 
12 H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR’S YEAR ON THE 
STREETS WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 198-99 (1988). Not much data existed before 
Miranda either. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 501 (Clark, J., dissenting) (describing the “almost 
total lack of empirical knowledge on the practical operation of requirements truly comparable 
to those announced by the majority”).  
13 See Feld, supra note 11, at 398 (“Despite the importance of interrogation, we know 
remarkably little about what actually happens when police question suspects.”).  
14 Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 
551, 559 (2007).  
15 Id. at 560. 
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after studies of confession rate changes conducted at the time of Miranda; and 
(2) a “second generation” of studies on confession rate changes conducted in the 
decades following Miranda. 
A. The Before-and-After Miranda Confession Rate “Impact” Studies 
In the months and years immediately following Miranda, researchers 
attempted to collect information on Miranda’s impact on confession rates (and, 
to a lesser extent, clearance rates). The studies of most interest for quantifying 
Miranda’s costs are the before-and-after “impact” studies—i.e., studies of single 
cities in which scholars collected data on confessions before Miranda and after 
Miranda to see if anything changed. 
One of this Article’s authors, Paul Cassell, collected these studies in a 1996 
Northwestern University Law Review article.16 The article presents data from ten 
general studies (and an eleventh dealing with homicide crimes only) in which 
researchers gathered before-and-after information about confession rates in the 
United States.17 Unfortunately, for some of the studies, there were major 
problems in methodology that prevented any useful information from being 
derived from them. Discarding data from the studies with major problems, 
Cassell concluded that the remaining studies showed a confession rate reduction 
of 16.1%—i.e., there was a confession rate change, or “delta,” of 16.1 
percentage points following Miranda, as shown in Table 1.18 
  
 
16 Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 
387, 417 (1996).  
17 Id. at 395-418.  
18 Id. at 416-18 tbl.1.  
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Pittsburgh 48.5% 29.9% -18.6% - 
New York County 49.0% 14.5% -34.5% - 
Philadelphia 45% (est./der.) 20.4% (der.) -24.6% - 
“Seaside City” 68.9% 66.9% -2.0% ? 
New Haven-1960-66 58-63% (est.) 48.2% -10-15% (est.) Yes 
New Haven-
calculated 
? ? -16.0% - 
Washington, D.C. 21.5% (der.) 20.0% (der.) -1.5% Yes 
Kansas City ? ? -6% (der.) ? 
Kings County 45% (est./der.) 29.5% (der.) -15.5% - 
New Orleans 40% (est.) 28.2% -11.8% ? 
Chicago (homicides) 53% (der.) 26.5% (der.) -26.5% ? 
Los Angeles 40.4% 50.2% +9.8% Yes 
Average of Studies 
Without Major 
Problems 
 -  - -16.1% - 
Est. = estimated 
Der. = derived 
 
It is possible to take the 16.1 percentage point delta in confession rates and 
derive a measure of lost convictions. Collecting all the relevant data on the 
importance of confessions to convictions, Cassell concluded that a confession is 
required to convict in about 23.8% of all cases.19 Multiplying these two figures, 
the article concluded that Miranda led to loss of a conviction in about 3.8% of 
all cases—or a total loss of about 28,000 cases for violent crimes and 79,000 
cases for property crimes (extrapolated across 1993 crime data, the most recent 
then available).20 
These conclusions were not universally accepted. Stephen Schulhofer wrote 
a response, questioning which studies should be deemed reliable and how the 
lost confessions should be calculated. Recalculating a confession rate drop by 
excluding some of the studies used by Cassell and including one excluded by 
Cassell (the Los Angeles study), Schulhofer ultimately concluded that 
Miranda’s impact on law enforcement was “vanishingly small”—i.e., a 
confession rate drop of not 16.1%, but rather between 6.7% and 9.1%.21 Cassell 
responded at length to Schulhofer’s criticisms in another article.22 
Since then, various scholars have kibitzed on the Cassell-Schulhofer debate 
offering their views on who “won.” For example, two scholars sympathetic to 
 
19 Id. at 434 tbl.2. 
20 Id. at 440.  
21 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly 
Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 538-47 (1996). 
22 See generally Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s 
Defenders, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084 (1996).  
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Miranda’s approach (George Thomas and Richard Leo) regarded Schulhofer’s 
response as a “decisive refutation”23 of the claim that Miranda harmed law 
enforcement. But another scholar, Chris Slobogin, has pointed out that, even 
accepting Schulhofer’s recalculation of the confession rate changes at face 
value, the figures would still show that Miranda noticeably harmed police efforts 
to obtain confessions.24 Moreover, many of the kibitzers confined their attention 
to the three original articles written by Cassell, Schulhofer, and then Cassell in 
turn. Many of them did not notice another paper by Cassell that shed important 
light on the debate. 
The quantitatively single most significant difference between Cassell’s and 
Schulhofer’s positions on confession rates was whether to include a figure from 
the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office reporting that the confession rate in 
Los Angeles rose ten percentage points in the three weeks after Miranda—
allegedly from about 40% before the decision to about 50% after.25 Cassell 
excluded the Los Angeles figure as unreliable, finding the increase to be an 
outlier from all the other studies (which showed clearance rate declines) and 
concluding that it was far-fetched to believe that confessions from suspects 
dramatically increased within three weeks of the decision.26 Cassell thought the 
survey result was attributable not to some sudden rise in the loquaciousness of 
criminal suspects, but rather to a problem with the survey instruments.27 Cassell 
explained that the Los Angeles prosecutors received an “after” questionnaire that 
had been redesigned so that it swept in more statements (including 
nonincriminating statements) than did the “before” questionnaire.28 In response 
to Cassell, Schulhofer characterized the Los Angeles effort as “[a] careful 
study”29 and claimed that Cassell’s disparagement rested only on the “‘summary 
sheets’ used by the law clerk who subsequently tabulated these questionnaires,” 
not the questionnaires themselves.30 Schulhofer further argued that there was no 
indication that the law clerk recorded different things in the before and after 
surveys or even that the forms were redesigned.31 Schulhofer ultimately 
concluded that the Los Angeles number was “one of the least vulnerable” to 
criticism of the figures available for analysis.32 
 
23 George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: 
“Embedded” in Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 240 (2002).  
24 Christopher Slobogin, An Empirically Based Comparison of American and European 
Regulatory Approaches to Police Investigation, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 423, 448 (2001). 
25 See Cassell, supra note 22, at 1097-98. 
26 Id. at 1097-101. 
27 Id. at 1098 (“The underlying methodology renders the study unusable.”). 
28 Id. at 1097-101.  
29 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Pointing in the Wrong Direction, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, 
at 21.  
30 Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 535.  
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 538.  
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To resolve the competing perspectives on the study, Cassell tracked down the 
law clerk who tabulated the data—United States Court of Appeals Judge Trott.33 
As discussed in a later article, directly contrary to Schulhofer’s assessment of 
the situation, Judge Trott reported that his collection of both the before and after 
data was “extremely haphazard” and that he paid little, if any, attention to 
securing representative samples or consistent survey instruments.34 The forms 
were completed and collected under “chaotic” conditions and “ended up 
measuring apples and oranges.”35 No controls were maintained over who was 
given the forms and who completed them; many prosecutors simply ignored 
them.36 Judge Trott stated that he reported these and other problems to his 
supervisors at the time, suggesting that the whole process was badly flawed.37 
His supervisors replied that, because nothing else was available, the data 
collected would have to be used.38 Judge Trott concluded that the Los Angeles 
figures “prove nothing” and that researchers should “not draw any conclusions” 
about Miranda’s effects from them.39 
Later reviewers of the Cassell-Schulhofer debate siding with Schulhofer (such 
as Thomas and Leo, writing elsewhere) need to explain why they continue to 
cite the Los Angeles study with favor40 and, more broadly, why they believe that 
a post-Miranda confession-rate-decline figure is rendered more accurate by 
 
33 Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s “Negligible” Effect on Law Enforcement: Some Skeptical 
Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 327, 331 (1997). 
34 Id. at 331-32.  
35 Id. at 331. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 331-32. 
38 Id. at 332. 
39 Id.  
40 See, e.g., Thomas & Leo, supra note 23, at 237. Curiously, Thomas had previously 
written that he “reject[ed] out of hand” using the Los Angeles data in determining Miranda’s 
effects on police. George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A 
“Steady-State” Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933, 942 (1996).  
Writing in this Symposium, Albert Alschuler opines that “Schulhofer had the better of the 
argument on most points [in the debate] but not all.” Albert W. Alschuler, Miranda’s Fourfold 
Failure, 97 B.U. L. REV. 849, 882 (2017). Alschuler then specifically discusses only two 
points in the debate. Alschuler agrees with Cassell that the Los Angeles study was 
“appropriately disregarded.” Id. at 884 n.157. Alschuler goes on to argue, however, contrary 
to Cassell’s position (and also contrary to the position of others, see, for example, Stephen J. 
Markman, The Fifth Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to “Reconsidering 
Miranda,” 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 938, 946-47 (1987)), and consistent with Schulhofer’s position, 
that the New York County study should be disregarded. Alschuler, supra, at 884 n.157. 
According to Alschuler, the inclusion/exclusion of these two studies “appeared to explain 
most of the difference in their conclusions.” Id. But in fact, following Alschuler’s apparent 
view of the debate and excluding both the Los Angeles and New York County studies 
produces an average post-Miranda confession rate decline of 13%, not much lower than 
Cassell’s calculated decline of 16.1%, but well above Schulhofer’s 6.7%. 
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including the obviously flawed Los Angeles data. But ultimately, it is hard to do 
much more with the before-and-after studies than conclude that they establish a 
tentative range on the immediate, post-Miranda confession rate decline. For 
example, citing Cassell’s and Schulhofer’s assessments, a 2005 report by the 
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences could do little 
more than conclude that the “[s]ummaries of Miranda effect studies suggest that 
the warning as it is actually delivered may have resulted in a reduction in 
confessions of between 4 and 16 percent.”41 
B. The “Second Generation” Miranda Studies 
A more serious problem surrounding the before-and-after studies is that they 
were conducted around 1966. Miranda’s defenders can argue that the studies all 
reported data within a year or two of the decision, and thus do not offer a current 
perspective on Miranda’s impact.42 Recent articles by Miranda’s academic 
defenders have claimed that cops later “learned to live” with Miranda43—and, 
more particularly, that police have learned techniques for working around the 
Miranda rules.44 These developing techniques have eliminated, the argument 
goes, any harmful effect that Miranda may have initially had.45 
What do the later empirical studies actually show about Miranda’s more 
recent impact? Here we begin to encounter the “empirical desert” problems 
noted earlier.46 There are surprisingly few “second generation” Miranda studies, 
 
41 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS 
IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 256-57 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004).  
42 See, e.g., Thomas & Leo, supra note 23, at 245-46 (arguing that even if Miranda had an 
immediate impact on law enforcement, that impact diminished over time).  
43 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A 
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 45 (1991); Charles Weisselberg & Stephanos Bibas, Debate, The Right 
to Remain Silent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 69, 77-81 (2010). 
44 Tonja Jacobi, Miranda 2.0, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 16 (2016) (“Nowadays, the police 
are used to Miranda and no longer consider it a major hurdle to their investigative 
techniques.”).  
45 See, e.g., Duke, supra note 14, at 560 (“[A]fter four decades of living with Miranda, the 
small number of suspects who are induced to remain silent by the administration of the 
warnings is getting even smaller while the number encouraged to talk is at least remaining 
stable.”); Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Love-Hate Relationship with Miranda, 101 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 375, 440 (2011) (noting that “the multiple ways in which the police 
have adapted to and accommodated Miranda over the years and the overwhelming rate of 
Miranda waivers” have perhaps rendered Miranda “a dead letter”); Richard A. Leo & Welsh 
S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the 
Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 433-39 (1999) (concluding that 
investigators are “often” able to overcome Miranda’s obstacles to successful interrogation); 
Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1592 (2008) (“As a 
prophylactic device to protect suspects’ privilege against self-incrimination, I believe that 
Miranda is largely dead.”). 
46 See Feld, supra note 11, at 398 (discussing the lack of available empirical studies 
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as authors in this Symposium and others have acknowledged.47 But, properly 
read, these “second generation” studies provide further support for the view that 
Miranda initially harmed law enforcement—and continues to harm law 
enforcement. In this Section, we first discuss the post-Miranda studies on police 
questioning of adult suspects, and then turn to questioning of juvenile suspects. 
1. Questioning of Adults 
One (imperfect) way to attempt to assess the continuing validity of the before-
and-after studies would be to compare confession rates before Miranda with 
confession rates after. Unfortunately, we have only limited information on 
confession rates, but what little we do have suggests confession rates have 
remained depressed since Miranda. 
The project of comparing confession rates across time must be approached 
with some caution. Unlike the before-and-after studies just discussed, a 
comparison across time may not compare apples-to-apples in a single 
jurisdiction. Instead, the comparison involves taking the confession rates 
reported in particular studies in particular cities before Miranda and then 
comparing them to later-conducted studies in other cities after Miranda. This 
potentially involves an apples-to-oranges comparison if the cities being 
compared are not similarly situated. In addition, because the various pre- and 
post-Miranda studies have been conducted by different researchers, they may 
apply different definitions and methodologies. For example, a “confession” rate 
is likely to be much lower than an “incriminating statement” rate—and different 
researchers may have applied different definitions to determine these rates. 
Different researchers may also have collected their data at different points in the 
criminal justice process. A researcher collecting data by watching police 
interrogations actually conducted, for example, will necessarily miss cases in 
which the police did not question anyone—presumably producing a higher 
confession rate than a sample that collects data on suspects who have not been 
questioned. 
With these caveats in mind, first consider what the pre-Miranda interrogation 
rate was. Although broad generalizations are hazardous, before Miranda, 
confession rates in this country were probably somewhere around 55% to 65%.48 
 
analyzing what occurs in interrogation rooms).  
47 See, e.g., id. at 416-17; Thomas & Leo, supra note 23, at 238-39; see also Christopher 
Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and Unrecorded Questioning: After Fifty Years of 
Miranda Jurisprudence, Still Two (or Maybe Three) Burning Issues, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1157, 
1163-64, 1182-87 (2017) (discussing lack of reliable research of various interrogation 
techniques).  
48 Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical 
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 871 (1996); see also CHRISTOPHER 
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF POLICE INVESTIGATION: LEGAL, 
HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS 6 (Supp. 1995) (concluding that a 
64% confession rate is “comparable to pre-Miranda confession rates”). But cf. Thomas, supra 
note 40, at 935-36 (deriving a lower estimate of the pre-Miranda confession rate with which 
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The earliest academic study in this country reported confession rates of 88.1% 
and 58.1% in two cities in California in 1960.49 Similarly, a 1961 survey in 
Detroit reported a 60.8% confession rate, which fell slightly to 58% in 1965.50 
In New Haven, the confession rate was about 58% to 63% in 1960.51 These 
figures deserve special attention in calculating a pre-Miranda confession rate, 
because they avoid the problem of “anticipatory” implementation of Miranda in 
various jurisdictions. In particular, confession rates after June 1964 might have 
been dampened by the Supreme Court’s decision in Escobedo v. Illinois,52 which 
led some police to adopt Miranda-style procedures even before the Miranda 
decision.53 The available data from the before-and-after studies, discussed 
earlier in this Article,54 also show confession rates immediately before Miranda 
and can be factored in. 
Next let’s consider the available data on confession rates in this country after 
Miranda. Although broad generalizations are hazardous here as well, these 
studies generally report confession rates lower than the 55% to 65% pre-
Miranda rate. A 1977 study of six cities reported a confession rate of 40.3%.55 
A 1979 National Institute of Justice study conducted by Floyd Feeney and two 
colleagues in Jacksonville, Florida and San Diego, California reported 
confession rates of 32.9% and 19.5% respectively and, adding in statements 
admitting being at the scene, overall statement rates of 51.3% and 35.1% 
respectively.56 
The two most recent studies of adult confession rates in this country were 
done in the 1990s. In 1993, Leo examined police interrogations in Berkeley, 
California. Leo found an in-custody questioning success rate by detectives of 
64%.57 Leo’s “success” percentage, when adjusted so as to be comparable to 
 
to compare studies). 
49 Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Police Practices and the Law—From Arrest to Release or 
Charge, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 11, 43-44 (1962).  
50 Theodore Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search—The Use and Misuse of 
Euphemisms, 57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 251, 264 (1966).  
51 Cassell, supra note 16, at 406 (discussing Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New 
Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1573, 1644 (1967)).  
52 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964). 
53 Cassell, supra note 16, at 403 (noting that the confession rate fell in Philadelphia after 
Escobedo, and fell again after a pre-Miranda decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit); see also Cassell, supra note 22, at 1101-04 (discussing Escobedo’s effect on 
confession rates).  
54 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.  
55 Gary D. LaFree, Adversarial and Nonadversarial Justice: A Comparison of Guilty Pleas 
and Trials, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 289, 298 tbl.2 (1985). 
56 FLOYD FEENEY, FORREST DILL & ADRIANNE WEIR, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARRESTS WITHOUT 
CONVICTION: HOW OFTEN THEY OCCUR AND WHY 142-43 (1983) (reporting confession and 
admission rates). 
57 Richard Angelo Leo, Police Interrogation in America: A Study of Violence, Civility and 
Social Change 270 (Aug. 1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at 
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earlier studies, by accounting for suspects not questioned and the greater efficacy 
of questioning by detectives of suspects in custody, translates into an overall 
confession rate of about 39%.58 
Remarkably, the most current study of adult confession rates dates back more 
than two decades to 1994, when one of the present authors (Cassell, joined by 
his colleague, Bret Hayman) collected data from Salt Lake County, Utah.59 
Cassell and Hayman reported an overall incriminating statement rate of only 
33.3%—comprised of 21.5% confessions and 11.9% incriminating statements—
as shown in Figure 1.60 
 
Since the Leo and Cassell/Hayman studies of the mid-1990s, it appears that 
essentially no empirical work has been done in this country to determine overall 
confession rates of adults.61 
 
Berkeley) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Leo, Police Interrogation in America]. Leo later 
published his dissertation, in part, in two articles. See generally Richard A. Leo, Inside the 
Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, Inside the 
Interrogation Room]; Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L & 
CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited].  
58 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 926-30 (discussing Leo, Police Interrogation 
in America, supra note 57, at 255-68). For criticism of the downward adjustment of Leo’s 
figures, see Thomas, supra note 40, at 953-54. 
59 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 850. 
60 Id. at 869. 
61 We have located one study that reported “confession” rates. The study examined child 
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Taken together, the limited data suggest that confession rates from the years 
after Miranda are lower than confession rates from the years before Miranda, 
implying that Miranda has in fact impeded law enforcement.62 For example, the 
Leo success figure (adjusted) and the Cassell/Hayman incriminating statement 
figure are both below 40%—which appears to be lower than most of the pre-
Miranda figures. But as with the before-and-after studies, the second-generation 
data can be criticized because they rest on studies from individual cities that may 
not be generalizable across the country.63 And the data are also growing stale, 
because no new data have been collected in the last twenty years. 
2. Questioning of Juveniles 
One last source of confession rate data remains to be considered. Several 
recent studies have been conducted regarding police questioning of juvenile 
offenders. While these studies tend to show high confession rates, they cannot 
be directly compared to studies of adults because of juveniles’ high waiver and 
confession rates. 
A 2005 study by Jodi Viljoen found that juvenile delinquents (including pre-
adolescent juveniles) retrospectively reported a confession rate of approximately 
55.3%.64 
 
sex abuse cases from 1997 to 2000 and reported “confession” rates of between 19% and 37%, 
although it did not provide much information about the source of those figures. Margaret-
Ellen Pipe et al., Factors Associated with Nondisclosure of Suspected Abuse During Forensic 
Interviews, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: DISCLOSURE, DELAY, AND DENIAL 77, 92 (Margaret-
Ellen Pipe et al. eds., 2007). 
Some qualitative research has been conducted, which shows that police officers use various 
techniques to minimize the importance of Miranda waivers to suspects. See, e.g., DAVID 
SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 102 (1991). These studies can be read to 
show that Miranda remains of concern to police because it illustrates how hard police work 
to prevent suspects from “lawyering up.” But for purposes of quantitatively determining an 
interrogation success rate, these studies are of little use.  
62 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 871-76. Writing in this Symposium, Alschuler 
argues that it is impossible to ensure exact comparability between the Salt Lake County data 
and earlier studies. Alschuler, supra note 40, at 884. While this point is surely true, it is 
possible to try and reach some general comparisons, and Cassell and Hayman have “shown 
their math” so that anyone who disagrees with their calculations can simply make appropriate 
adjustments. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 926-30. Alschuler also suggests that it 
is unclear how Miranda could have caused a reduction in confessions given the relatively 
limited number of suspects who invoked their rights in the Salt Lake County study. Alschuler, 
supra note 40, at 884. But, in fact, there are several possible mechanisms, including the 
possibility that Miranda forced police to move questioning to relatively less productive, 
noncustodial settings. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 881-85.  
63 See Thomas, supra note 40, at 954-56 (raising this possibility). 
64 Jodi L. Viljoen, Jessica Klaver & Ronald Roesch, Legal Decisions of Preadolescent and 
Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, Pleas, Communication with Attorneys, 
and Appeals, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 261 (2005).  
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Barry Feld has conducted the most detailed juvenile studies. In 2006, Feld 
collected video recordings contained in prosecutors’ files of police questioning 
of sixty-three sixteen- and seventeen-year-old suspects.65 He found that “80% of 
the juveniles waived their Miranda rights.”66 He further found that the juveniles 
confessed and admitted all the elements of the offense in less than one-fifth of 
the cases (17%), but “provided some statements of evidentiary value in about 
half (53%) of the cases.”67 
In 2013, Feld extended his research by publishing his analysis of recordings 
from 307 files in which police questioned juveniles.68 In this sample, 92.8% of 
the juveniles waived Miranda.69 He further found that a majority (58.6%) of the 
juveniles confessed.70 In addition, about one-third (29.8%) provided statements 
of some evidentiary value to police.71 
Finally, the most recent quantitative study of police interrogation in this 
country appears to be one conducted by Hayley Cleary based on videotapes of a 
sample of fifty-eight youths from across the country, including both custodial 
and noncustodial questioning.72 The juveniles interviewed were on average 
fifteen and a half years old.73 Of this sample of juveniles, 37% fully confessed 
to the allegations, 31% made incriminating admissions—a success rate of 
68%—while 24% denied the charges, and 7% went unresolved.74 
This research on juveniles generally shows high confession rates, but the 
confession rate figures cannot be directly compared to the adult studies 
discussed above. Unlike the studies noted above, these studies involved suspects 
who had already been charged with crimes or who had already been interrogated, 
among other features likely to inflate confession rates.75 But the most 
 
65 Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and 
Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 250, 288-95 (2006).  
66 Id. at 255-56. 
67 Id. at 286.  
68 Feld, supra note 11, at 399. See generally BARRY C. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND 
CONFESSIONS: INSIDE THE INTERROGATION ROOM (2013); Barry C. Feld, Questioning Gender: 
Police Interrogation of Delinquent Girls, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1059 (2014) [hereinafter 
Feld, Questioning Gender]; Barry C. Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When 
Cops Question Kids, 47 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1 (2013).  
69 Feld, supra note 11, at 429.  
70 Id. at 440.  
71 Id. at 442.  
72 Hayley M. D. Cleary, Police Interviewing and Interrogation of Juvenile Suspects: A 
Descriptive Examination of Actual Cases, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271, 273-76 (2014). 
73 Id. at 275. 
74 Id. at 280. 
75 See Cleary, supra note 72, at 279-81 (noting that all recordings involved suspects who 
had waived Miranda and that because the study was based on recordings mailed to 
researchers, caution is warranted in generalizing from the study’s findings because it is not 
apparent how the agencies selected the recordings); Feld, supra note 11, at 420 (noting that 
the 307 juvenile cases studied reflect sample selection bias because they all involved charged 
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fundamental reason these juvenile studies cannot be compared to studies of adult 
suspects is that they involve, by construction, juveniles. It appears that juveniles 
waive rights more readily than do adults.76 In addition, juveniles are more likely 
to confess than adults.77 The extent of these distortions is not known, and 
therefore it is not possible to compare these juvenile studies to the adult studies 
described above. 
C. The Need to Move Beyond Confession Rates 
In this Section, we collected every scrap of hard data we could find in this 
country78 about confession rates both before and after Miranda—the one direct 
 
cases, more serious delinquents, cases more likely to go to trial, and perhaps more juveniles 
who waived Miranda); Feld, supra note 65, at 287 n.207 (noting that Cassell and Hayman 
attributed a higher confession rate to certain studies due to exclusion of suspects not 
questioned, exclusion of noncustodial questioning, and inclusion of only questioning 
conducted by detectives); Viljoen, Klaver & Roesch, supra note 64, at 255 (studying already-
detained suspects).  
76 Feld, supra note 11, at 429 (“Juveniles waive Miranda at higher rates than do adults—
around 90%.”); A. Bruce Ferguson & Alan Charles Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 53 (1970) (reporting that over 90% of juveniles interrogated waived 
their rights, perhaps due to lack of understanding); J. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter, 
Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights 
Waiver, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 339 (1977) (finding that juveniles invoked their rights 
in about 9% to 11% of cases compared with 40% for adults); Thomas Grisso & Melissa Ring, 
Parents’ Attitudes Toward Juveniles’ Rights in Interrogation, 6 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 211, 
214 (1979) (noting the Grisso and Pomicter study in which 90% of juveniles complied with 
police requests). See generally THOMAS GRISSO, INSTRUMENTS FOR ASSESSING 
UNDERSTANDING & APPRECIATION OF MIRANDA RIGHTS (1998). 
77 See Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 
Cases, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2000, at 26, 28-33 (identifying various reasons for why juveniles 
might be particularly responsive to questioning); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to 
Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1160-62 (1980) 
(discussing that juveniles are less likely to understand the adverse consequences of 
confessing); cf. J. Pearse et al., Police Interviewing and Psychological Vulnerabilities: 
Predicting the Likelihood of a Confession, 8 J. COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 9-
10 (1998) (finding English suspects under the age of twenty-five more likely to confess than 
English suspects over the age of twenty-five). The available evidence also suggests that police 
do not question juveniles with less aggressive techniques than adults. See Hayley M. D. Cleary 
& Todd C. Warner, Police Training in Interviewing and Interrogation Methods: A 
Comparison of Techniques Used with Adult and Juvenile Suspects, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
270, 276 (2016) (finding that data suggest that officers use a variety of techniques, including 
those “considered to be more aggressive or manipulative,” in similar ways when questioning 
both adults and juveniles).  
78 Another paper is underway which will attempt to discuss foreign confession rate data. 
See generally Paul G. Cassell, Further Evidence That Miranda Is Handcuffing the Cops: A 
Comparison of American and Selected Foreign Confession and Clearance Rates (Feb. 23, 
2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).  
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measure of Miranda’s effect on law enforcement. We have offered our reasons 
for believing that both the “impact” studies and the later “second generation” 
studies support the conclusion that Miranda harmed law enforcement. But we 
have also noted that these conclusions are subject to criticism for various 
reasons. Responding to such criticisms is difficult because it is quite true that 
existing data on confession rates are limited (having been collected in only a 
handful of cities) and are now beginning to show some age. 
Given that the existing empirical research on confession rates has not resolved 
the question of whether Miranda has hampered law enforcement over the long 
haul, the question arises as to whether any alternative approach can be pursued. 
Ideally we would want a measure (1) that is consistently collected, as opposed 
to a patched-together comparison, (2) that reflects the entire country rather than 
just a few individual cities, and (3) that extends into current years rather than 
several decades past. Whether such a measure can be found is the subject of the 
next Section. 
II. CLEARANCE RATES AS AN INDIRECT MEASURE OF MIRANDA’S EFFECT ON 
CONFESSION RATES 
A. How Clearance Rates Could Affect Confession Rates 
Since regularly collected, long-term data on confession rates are unavailable, 
we must search for a second-best alternative. The strongest candidate for such a 
statistic is the crime “clearance” rate, i.e., the rate at which police “clear” or 
solve crimes. Since at least 1950, the FBI has collected clearance rate figures 
from around the country and reported them annually in its Uniform Crime 
Reports (“UCR”).79 Because of this extended range of data, clearance rates 
might permit a long-term perspective on Miranda’s effects. 
The clearance rate appears to be a reasonable (if understated) surrogate 
measure for the confession rate.80 Sometimes police officers, lacking evidence 
to clear a case, will bring a suspect in, deliver Miranda warnings, interrogate, 
and—if no confession results—release him, leaving the police officers with 
insufficient evidence to clear the case.81 If Miranda prevented the confession, 
 
79 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2015 [hereinafter UCR-[year]]. Crime clearance rates for 1950 to 1974 are helpfully 
collected in JAMES ALAN FOX, FORECASTING CRIME DATA: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 83-
86 tbl.A-1 (1978). 
80 See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 30 (2008) 
(“[C]onfessions allow detectives to ‘clear’ crimes (i.e., close the file and classify the case as 
solved by arrest) . . . .”); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 328 (1991) (“[O]ne of the ways in which police are often evaluated 
is through the ‘clearance’ rate . . . . One of the major ways this occurs is through 
confessions.”). For an explanation of how clearance rates understate the effect on confessions, 
see infra notes 364-525 and accompanying text. 
81 Obtaining statistics on the frequency of such interrogations is difficult. See Cassell & 
Fowles, supra note 5, at 1063 n.38 (collecting the available data). 
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by discouraging the suspect from talking or otherwise, the crime may never be 
cleared. As the leading police interrogation manual explains, “[m]any criminal 
cases, even when investigated by the best qualified police departments, are 
capable of solution only by means of an admission or confession from the guilty 
individual or upon the basis of information obtained from the questioning of 
other criminal suspects.”82 Field research on police interrogations found that 
“virtually every detective . . . insisted that more crimes are solved by police 
interviews and interrogations than by any other investigative method.”83 And 
Leo’s book on police interrogations reports “that police solve more crimes with 
interrogation-induced confessions than they do with virtually any other type of 
evidence.”84 
Interrogation of a suspect for one crime may also lead to a confession of a 
more serious crime. For example, a drug dealer might be interrogated about a 
narcotics offense and end up confessing to a homicide.85 Confessions are also 
sometimes necessary to solve multiple crimes committed by the same 
perpetrator. For example, even if police can arrest and convict a robber for one 
robbery, without a confession, they may not be able to clear four other robberies 
the robber also committed.86 
In the first several decades following Miranda, clearance rates were generally 
viewed as a statistic that would reveal Miranda’s effects—particularly by 
Miranda’s defenders.87 For example, Stephen Schulhofer’s influential 1987 
article praising Miranda claimed that while some of the before-and-after studies 
suggested declining confession rates after Miranda, “within a year or 
two . . . [clearance rates] were thought to be returning to pre-Miranda levels.”88 
 
82 FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, at xii (5th ed. 
2013). 
83 Leo, Police Interrogation in America, supra note 57, at 376.  
84 LEO, supra note 80, at 187.  
85 See Graham C. Ousey & Matthew R. Lee, To Know the Unknown: The Decline in 
Homicide Clearance Rates, 1980-2000, 35 CRIM. JUST. REV. 141, 153 (2010). 
86 See Wald et al., supra note 51, at 1595 (giving examples of such clearances). The issue 
of multiple clearances from a single arrest is discussed at greater length below. See infra notes 
454-501 and accompanying text. 
87 See, e.g., Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh—A 
Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 20 (1967) (discussing clearance rates as a measure of 
Miranda’s effects); James W. Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the Administration of 
Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 320, 330-31 (1973) (same); cf. Yale Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-
Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436, 466-67 (1964) (discussing 
claims by critics that the Supreme Court’s decision in Mallory v. United States reduced 
clearance rates by restricting D.C. police questioning).  
88 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 456 (1987) 
[hereinafter Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda] (linking the supposedly rebounding 
clearance rates to the notion that Miranda “posed no barrier to effective law enforcement”); 
see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Fifth Amendment at Justice: A Reply, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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Many other Miranda supporters argued that post-Miranda clearance rates 
demonstrated that Miranda had only benign effects.89 Accordingly, we head 
down the path of investigating clearance rates as a measure of Miranda’s effects 
because Miranda’s defenders suggested it.90 
While a possible consensus exists that clearance rates at least partially gauge 
Miranda’s impact, one note of caution should be sounded. As we discuss at 
greater length below,91 police can record a crime as “cleared” when they have 
identified the perpetrator and placed him under arrest, even where the evidence 
is insufficient to convict, or even to indict. Therefore, clearance rates are a quite 
conservative measure of Miranda’s harmful effects on the conviction of 
criminals. 
In theory, one could begin to measure the understatement of Miranda’s harms 
by measuring the rate at which cleared cases are later charged. If confession rates 
fell after Miranda, prosecutors might charge fewer suspects because the lack of 
a confession made the prosecution more difficult.92 This theoretical possibility 
is, in practice, a moot point because of the lack of charging data. The FBI’s data 
on charging decisions are woefully inadequate for statistical analysis, swinging 
wildly from year to year during the 1960s.93 The FBI stopped reporting charging 
figures in the 1970s.94 
 
950, 954 & n.17 (1987) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Fifth Amendment] (arguing that apparently 
steady clearance rates, coupled with other evidence, refute the notion that Miranda has 
harmed law enforcement). 
89 See SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOC’Y, AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE IN CRISIS 63-64 n.53 (1988) (collecting evidence, including clearance rates, that 
Miranda has not harmed law enforcement); Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to 
Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18 n.93, 19 n.99 (1986) (citing clearance and 
confession rates to argue Miranda did not harm law enforcement); cf. Leo, The Impact of 
Miranda Revisited, supra note 57, at 645 (suggesting that Miranda has not significantly 
affected crime clearance rates, although “in some instances,” clearance rates may have 
dropped). 
90 Curiously, Alschuler, writing in this Symposium, criticizes our decision to rely on 
clearance rates as a measure of Miranda’s effects. Alschuler, supra note 40, at 885. But that 
criticism should be directed at others, such as Schulhofer, who proposed the idea in the first 
instance.  
91 See infra notes 366-69 and accompanying text.  
92 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 908-09 tbl.15 (finding a statistically significant 
difference in prosecutorial charging decisions between suspects who were successfully 
interrogated and those who were not). 
93 Compare UCR-1965, supra note 79, at 103 tbl.12 (noting that 50,980 persons were 
charged with violent crimes, derived by summing four violent crime categories), and UCR-
1966, supra note 79, at 104 tbl.16 (noting that 44,641 persons were charged with violent 
crimes, derived by summing four violent crime categories), with UCR-1967, supra note 79, 
at 109 tbl.16 (noting that 41,515 persons were charged with violent crimes, derived by 
summing four violent crime categories). 
94 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1065. 
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One other theoretical possibility for measuring Miranda’s impact would be to 
investigate conviction rates. Convictions have the advantage of resting on 
presumably more reliable court adjudications of actual guilt or innocence.95 
However, conviction rates would probably miss many of Miranda’s effects.96 
Conviction rates typically rest on percentages of prosecutions that end in 
conviction, and thus miss cases in which the evidence is too slim to warrant a 
prosecution. More significant, conviction rate data in this country are 
notoriously bad.97 The basic problem is that police agencies, the source for FBI 
data, are poorly situated to report on ultimate court outcomes. Perhaps for this 
reason, the FBI stopped reporting conviction rate figures in 1978.98 The Bureau 
of Justice Statistics has since picked up the task and currently reports some 
conviction rate data for the nation’s seventy-five largest counties.99 But because 
that series does not extend back to the time of Miranda, it is of no use for present 
purposes. Through a process of elimination, then, the choice for a long-term 
evaluation of Miranda boils down to the understated measure of clearance rates. 
B. What Clearance Rates Tell Us About Miranda’s Effects 
In this Section, we analyze what the available FBI clearance rate data tell us 
about Miranda’s effects on law enforcement. We begin by looking at national 
crime clearance rate trends, which show clear downward movement in the 
several years immediately following Miranda. We then turn to the issue of 
whether those trends can be explained by other things going on during the late 
1960s, such as rising crime rates. The standard tool for sorting through such 
issues is multiple regression analysis. We develop a model of crime clearance 
rates that includes potential confounding variables, and then report the results of 
our regression analysis on clearance rates. Our equations suggest that the sharp 
downward trends in clearance rates immediately after Miranda cannot be 
explained by the other factors conventionally understood to affect crime 
clearances. 
 
95 See Monica A. Walker, Do We Need a Clear-Up Rate?, 2 POLICING & SOC’Y 293, 304 
(1992) (suggesting that in England and Wales, conviction data are better than clearance data 
because they rest on known offenders as opposed to suspects). 
96 See Cassell, supra note 16, at 396-98 (discussing why conviction rates cannot show how 
Miranda hinders the investigative process). 
97 See Isaac Ehrlich & George D. Brower, On the Issue of Causality in the Economic Model 
of Crime and Law Enforcement: Some Theoretical Considerations and Experimental 
Evidence, 77 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 99, 104 (1987) (finding conviction rate data 
“highly questionable”). 
98 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1066 & n.53. 
99 See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 243777, STATE COURT PROCESSING 
STATISTICS: FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 
(2013). 
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1. The National Clearance Rate Trend 
Did clearance rates fall after Miranda? Before 1998, the conventional 
academic wisdom was that Miranda had no noticeable effect on crime clearance 
rates.100 That wisdom was perhaps most prominently embodied in Stephen 
Schulhofer’s 1987 article, “Reconsidering Miranda,” which argued that 
clearance rates “were thought to be returning to pre-Miranda levels” shortly 
after the decision and that “[s]tudy after study confirmed this trend.”101 Although 
Schulhofer was forced to later repudiate his position,102 his 1987 article was 
cited repeatedly as proof that Miranda had not hampered law enforcement. For 
example, Yale Kamisar, perhaps Miranda’s leading academic supporter and a 
keynote speaker in this Symposium, wrote that Schulhofer’s article “effectively 
refutes [the] contention” that Miranda has harmed law enforcement.103 Other 
scholars likewise relied on Schulhofer’s assessment of clearance rate data to 
rebut claims that Miranda had handcuffed the cops.104 
While scholars such as Schulhofer were happily citing clearance rate theory 
to defend Miranda, they had not collected any actual data. For example, 
Schulhofer’s footnotes referenced only two studies with clearance rate data.105 
Neither of these studies provided support for the thesis that clearance rates have 
returned to pre-Miranda levels.106 Indeed, the few other statistical analyses of 
post-Miranda clearance rates that existed suggest that clearance rates fell. In 
New York City, in February 1967, the Deputy Commissioner of the New York 
 
100 See Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, supra note 57, at 645-46 (concluding that 
the proposition that Miranda “has exercised only a negligible effect on the ability of police to 
elicit confessions [and] solve crimes . . . ha[s] become the conventional wisdom among 
scholars”). 
101 Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 88, at 456. 
102 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 278, 278-
80 (1996) (arguing that while clearance rates did, in fact, decline after Miranda, the decline 
was due to other factors apart from Miranda). 
103 Yale Kamisar, Remembering the “Old World” of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to 
Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 537, 586-87 n.164 (1990). 
104 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1066 n.57.  
105 Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 88, at 456 n.52 (“Elsewhere declining 
confession rates were noted at first, but within a year or two, both clearance and conviction 
rates were thought to be returning to pre-Miranda levels. Study after study confirmed this 
trend.”); see also Schulhofer, Fifth Amendment, supra note 88, at 954 n.17 (“Apparently, this 
is seldom the case because, as my article stressed, falling confession rates have not 
significantly reduced clearance and conviction rates.”). 
106 One of the studies found exactly the opposite of Schulhofer’s claim. See NEAL A. 
MILNER, THE COURT AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE IMPACT OF MIRANDA 217 (1971) 
(finding substantial decreases in clearance rates in early 1967 in three of four Wisconsin 
cities). The other study, the Pittsburgh study, offered mixed results, noting at one point that 
“there has been a decline in the clearance rate from the first half of 1966. One of several 
possible explanations for this is the imposition of the Miranda requirements on the Pittsburgh 
police.” Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 87, at 24. 
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Police Department (“NYPD”) reported that clearance rates dropped about 10% 
in 1966.107 He attributed the drop, “in part, to recent Supreme Court decisions 
that had limited the admissibility of confessions in court.”108 In “Seaside City,” 
California, which is defined as “an eight-square-mile enclave in the Los Angeles 
metropolitan area,” crime clearance rates dropped about 3% in the three years 
immediately after Miranda.109 
Remarkably, as of the mid-1990s, no one had carefully examined the FBI’s 
national data on crime clearance rates to see whether they had been affected by 
Miranda.110 We set out to change that with several articles we published around 
1998.111 Contrary to the implications of Miranda’s defenders, the national data 
from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports showed that, in fact, crime clearance 
rates fell sharply all over the country immediately after Miranda and have 
remained at these lower levels ever since. In 1965, the year preceding Miranda, 
the UCR noted that the national clearance rate for the “grand total” crimes112 
was “virtually unchanged from 1964.”113 In June of the following year, the 
Supreme Court handed down its Miranda opinion. At the end of 1966, the UCR 
(which usually describes police performance in decidedly upbeat terms) 
acknowledged a substantial drop in clearances.114 Indeed, the UCR observed that 
the drop in clearance rates from 1965 to 1966 was equal to the entire drop in 
clearance rates from 1961 to 1965.115 The 1966 drop in clearances was 
“universally reported by all population groups and by all geographic 
divisions.”116 In the following year, 1967, the UCR continued to report 
 
107 See Bernard Weinraub, Crime Reports Up 72% Here in 1966; Actual Rise Is 6.5%, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1967, at A1. New York City data on clearance rates at the time of 
Miranda is discussed at greater length at infra notes 252-90 and accompanying text.  
108 Weinraub, supra note 107, at A1. 
109 Witt, supra note 87, at 322, 330-31; see also Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1067 
& n.62 (collecting other information on reports of post-Miranda clearance rate changes).  
110 Research on many aspects of clearance rates is generally lacking. See Marc Riedel, 
Homicide Arrest Clearances: A Review of the Literature, 2 SOC. COMPASS 1145, 1147-48 
(2008).  
111 See, e.g., Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1057-60.  
112 The FBI’s national clearance rate accounted for “grand total” crimes. Cassell & Fowles, 
supra note 5, at 1133. This included the UCR’s seven “index crimes” (i.e., murder, rape, 
robbery, assault, burglary, larceny $50 and over, and auto theft) as well as negligent 
manslaughter and larceny under $50. Id. 
113 UCR-1965, supra note 79, at 18 (citing a 24.6% clearance rate for “grand total” crimes 
and a 26.3% clearance rate for index crimes). 
114 See UCR-1966, supra note 79, at 27 (“Whereas police, nationally, cleared 26.3 percent 
of [Crime Index] offenses in 1965, in 1966 this dropped to 24.3 percent. The decrease was 
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widespread bad news.117 Again a clearance rate drop was “universally reported 
by all population groups and by all geographic divisions.”118 In 1968, the UCR 
acknowledged another fall in clearance rates.119 In 1969, the UCR reported that 
most clearance rates declined slightly,120 and in 1970, the UCR reported that 
clearance rates were unchanged.121 Clearance rates have remained roughly the 
same since 1970. 
A long-term perspective on clearance rates comes from plotting the FBI’s 
annual figures. Figure 2 depicts the national crime clearance rate from 1950 to 
2012 for violent crimes (i.e., nonnegligent homicides, forcible rapes, aggravated 
assaults, and robberies).  
 
117 See UCR-1967, supra note 79, at 30 (“Whereas police nationally cleared 24.3 percent 
of these offenses in 1966, this dropped to 22.4 percent in 1967. The decrease was noted in 
every Crime Index offense with auto theft solutions having the sharpest decline . . . .”). 
118 Id. 
119 See UCR-1968, supra note 79, at 30 (“Whereas police nationally cleared 22.4 percent 
of these offenses in 1967, this dropped to 20.9 percent in 1968. The decrease was noted in 
every Crime Index offense.”). 
120 See UCR-1969, supra note 79, at 28 (“Whereas police nationally cleared 20.9 percent 
of these offenses in 1968, this dropped to 20.1 percent in 1969. This decrease was noted in 
every Crime Index offense except murder and forcible rape.”). 
121 See UCR-1970, supra note 79, at 30 (“Law enforcement agencies in the nation cleared 
20 percent of Index Crimes during 1970. It is to be noted this is the same percentage of 
clearances as experienced during 1969.”). 
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As can be seen, violent crime clearance rates were fairly stable from 1950 to 
1965, generally hovering above 60%. They even increased slightly from 1962 
to 1965. Then, in the three years following Miranda, the rates fell dramatically—
to 55% in 1966, to 51% in 1967, and to 47% in 1968.122 Violent crime clearance 
rates have hovered around 45% ever since. Because Miranda probably took 
effect over several years—while both police practices and suspect volubility 
adjusted to the new rules123—simple visual observation of the long-term trends 
suggests that Miranda substantially harmed police efforts to solve violent 
crimes. Moreover, contrary to the notion that clearance rates returned to pre-
Miranda levels,124 violent crime clearance rates in fact have been permanently 
depressed since the decision. 
 
122 To be clear, 1965 is the last pre-Miranda data point, as indicated by the vertical line 
marked between “Before Miranda” and “After Miranda.” Because the FBI figures are 
reported annually, the 1966 number is the first to reflect Miranda’s effects.  
123 See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text. 
124 See Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 88, at 456. 
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A similar pattern appears in property crime clearance rates, as shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
As with violent crimes, the property crime data suggest that clearance rates fell 
sharply immediately after Miranda and have remained at lower rates ever since. 
2. Using Regression to Sort Through Competing Causes 
A more thorough analysis of the hypothesis that Miranda caused the declines 
in crime clearance rates must contend with other competing causes. If another 
factor—call it the “X factor”—caused clearance rates to fall in the years 1966 to 
1968, then Miranda would be absolved of responsibility.125 
The standard technique for sorting through such competing possibilities is 
multiple regression analysis. In 1998, we published an initial multiple regression 
analysis of the clearance rate data available at the time.126 In this Article, we 
extend our earlier multiple regression equations for crime clearance rates, 
relying on the additional data that have appeared since then as well as on 
additional statistical tools that have become available to address issues related 
to both parameter and model uncertainty. 
 
125 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda Is Unjustified—And Harmful, 20 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 364-72 (1997); Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 280-85. 
126 See generally Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5.  
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The statistical technique we use is an interrupted time series design. 
Specifically, we analyze whether, controlling for other relevant factors, there 
was a detectable change in clearance rates at the time of Miranda. Before diving 
into the complexities of multiple regression equations, however, one important 
point must be emphasized. Although sophisticated econometric techniques are 
available for analyzing the data, simple visual observation has its place as 
well.127 The graphs in the previous Section demonstrate that there was a sharp, 
post-Miranda drop in clearance rates, and that overall picture nicely fits the 
handcuffing-the-cops theory advanced by Miranda’s critics. We wonder 
whether the many defenders of Miranda who concluded that the decision had no 
adverse effects on the basis of a posited stable post-Miranda clearance rate128 
will now, consistent with their methodological approach, rethink their position 
and agree that Miranda was indeed harmful to police efforts. 
We turn to time series analysis of national data out of necessity, because the 
Miranda decision precludes the use of other common statistical techniques. The 
preferred methodology for assessing a social policy is experiment design, in 
which two jurisdictions (at a minimum) are compared, one that is subject to the 
new policy with another “control” jurisdiction that is not.129 Unfortunately, such 
research is not possible with Miranda. On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court 
required all jurisdictions across the country to follow the prescribed 
interrogation procedures.130 Since then, police agencies have generally followed 
the Miranda requirements with little deviation.131 Comparison of a control group 
 
127 See Gary A. Mauser & Richard A. Holmes, An Evaluation of the 1977 Canadian 
Firearms Legislation, 16 EVALUATION REV. 603, 604 (1992) (“Although unsophisticated, a 
visual inspection has the advantage of being able to assess trends across time, so that possible 
links . . . may be identified.”); Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL 
L. REV. 721, 759 n.183 (2017) (noting that a visual “analysis of raw trends [in criminal justice 
data] can be useful”). See generally COREY L. LANUM, VISUALIZING GRAPH DATA (2017). 
Various scholars have illustrated this technique. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1071 
n.80; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1365-69 (2008) (praising the simple before-and-after assessments 
made in Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 665 (1970)).  
128 See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text. 
129 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 127, at 740 (“‘The preferred methodology for assessing 
a social policy’ is an analysis which involves ‘a true experiment in which one jurisdiction at 
random is subjected to the new policy, while another ‘control’ jurisdiction is not.’” (quoting 
Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1072)); see also Stephanie R. deLusė & Sanford L. Braver, 
A Rigorous Quasi-Experimental Design to Evaluate the Causal Effect of a Mandatory 
Divorce Education Program, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 66, 69 (2015) (comparing a group of couples 
enrolled in an education program with another comparable “control” group of couples not 
enrolled in the education program); Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, Credible Causal 
Inference for Empirical Legal Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17, 20 (2011) (collecting 
illustrations of this approach). 
130 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 488-89 (1966). 
131 See Paul G. Cassell, The Costs of the Miranda Mandate: A Lesson in the Dangers of 
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with a subject group is thus not possible. Indeed, it seems fair to number among 
Miranda’s costs the fact that the “constitutionalization” of police integration law 
has prevented controlled experimentation in this area.132 
We also used time series analysis because another similar and commonly used 
statistical technique, cross-sectional or panel analysis, is unavailable to us.133 In 
this “quasi-experimental” technique, the impact of legal rules is analyzed state-
by-state, where data from states following one legal regime are compared with 
data from states that do not follow that regime.134 For example, one of us 
(Richard Fowles) recently conducted a detailed analysis of the changes in 
(among other things) motorcycle helmet laws in various states to determine 
whether these legal changes reduced motorcycle fatalities,135 and has previously 
conducted analyses of varying state speed limits and drunk driving laws on 
vehicle fatalities.136 When investigating Miranda’s effects, however, despite 
what Schulhofer has previously suggested,137 it would make no sense to apply a 
state-by-state methodology. No “control” jurisdictions unaffected by Miranda 
exist. As Stephen Rushin and Griffin Edwards have explained: “[W]hen the U.S. 
Supreme Court handed down transformational regulations of American law 
 
Inflexible, “Prophylactic” Supreme Court Inventions, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 311 (1996) 
(noting the reluctance of police agencies to explore alternatives to Miranda). 
132 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 48, at 922 (concluding that Miranda prevented 
research on important interrogation questions). 
133 See generally MARC NERLOVE, ESSAYS IN PANEL DATA ECONOMETRICS 1-70 (2002) 
(discussing the history of panel data econometrics).  
134 See, e.g., Abhay Aneja, John J. Donohue III & Alexandria Zhang, The Impact of Right-
to-Carry Laws and the NRC Report: Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy, 
13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 565, 566 (2011) (discussing JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS 
CRIME (2d ed. 2000)); Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure 
on Crime Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46 J.L. & ECON. 
157, 167-68 (2003) (describing the parameters of a cross-sectional analysis regarding the 
effects of Mapp v. Ohio on crime rates); Nadia Greenhalgh-Stanley & Shawn Rohlin, How 
Does Bankruptcy Law Impact the Elderly’s Business and Housing Decisions?, 56 J.L. & 
ECON. 417, 425 (2013) (“In order to identify and isolate the causal effect of bankruptcy law, 
we use both a cross-sectional and a panel approach.”). 
135 See generally Richard Fowles & Peter D. Loeb, Sturdy Inference: A Bayesian Analysis 
of U.S. Motorcycle Helmet Laws, 55 J. TRANSP. RES. F. 41 (2016) (finding that the existence 
of universal motorcycle helmet laws reduced fatalities from motorcycle crashes). 
136 Gail Blattenberger, Richard Fowles & Peter D. Loeb, Determinants of Motor Vehicle 
Crash Fatalities Using Bayesian Model Selection Methods, 43 RES. TRANSP. ECON. 112, 115-
16 (2013); see also Gail Blattenberger, Richard Fowles, Peter D. Loeb & Wm. A. Clarke, 
Understanding the Cell Phone Effect on Vehicle Fatalities: A Bayesian View, 44 APPLIED 
ECON. 1823, 1823-24 (2012) (analyzing the effects of certain factors on motor vehicle fatality 
rates using panel data and classical regression analysis).  
137 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1072 (noting Schulhofer’s suggestion of a state-
by-state “cross-sectional” analysis approach to research Miranda, but also noting that one of 
Schulhofer’s citations for the proposition that this is an “almost invariable” practice is, in fact, 
a national time series analysis similar to ours).  
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enforcement like Miranda . . . , their decisions bound all state and local law 
enforcement agencies equally. This made it impossible for researchers to 
compare a police agency burdened by Miranda . . . with a similarly situated 
police department unburdened by these decisions over the same time period,”138 
at least in this country.139 Moreover, as a practical matter, obtaining appropriate 
cross-sectional data for the variables in our equations appears to be impossible, 
and such data, as it exists, might be contaminated by other problems.140 
In any event, interrupted time series analysis is quite appropriate for assessing 
the effect of a legal reform.141 This statistical technique is commonly used to 
 
138 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 127, at 726 n.5. In theory, such research might be 
possible if some jurisdictions followed Miranda rules before the decision and some did not. 
Then it would be possible to compare changes in these differing groups. See, e.g., Atkins & 
Rubin, supra note 134, at 158 (arguing that because some states already had an exclusionary 
rule when the Supreme Court imposed one in Mapp v. Ohio, a control group exists for 
statistical analysis); Abraham N. Tennenbaum, The Influence of the Garner Decision on 
Police Use of Deadly Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 241, 247-48, 255-56 (1994) 
(supplementing national interrupted time series data with state comparison data); see also 
Scott DeVito & Andrew W. Jurs, “Doubling-Down” for Defendants: The Pernicious Effects 
of Tort Reform, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 543, 583-84 (2014) (using fixed effects analysis in time 
series analysis of tort reform); Benjamin Steiner & Emily Wright, Assessing the Relative 
Effects of State Direct File Waiver Laws on Violent Juvenile Crime: Deterrence or 
Irrelevance?, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1451, 1460-64 (2006) (using a quasi-
experimental multiple interrupted time series design by finding similar states to use as controls 
in time series analysis); cf. Matthew Desmond, Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, 
Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 857, 
862 (2016) (using interrupted time series analysis on police 911 calls with various control 
comparisons via nonequivalent and nonaffected dependent variables); Andrew Jurs & Scott 
DeVito, The Stricter Standard: An Empirical Assessment of Daubert’s Effect on Civil 
Defendants, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 675, 677-88 (2013) (comparing state adoption of rules on 
expert witness testimony after federal adoption of Daubert compared to state adoption of rules 
before federal adoption of Daubert). However, such possibilities are unavailable to us here. 
Before Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), no state had adopted anything approaching 
the full set of Miranda rules. Even during the 1964 to 1966 period, only a few states moved 
in the direction of Miranda, and they did not impose all of the Miranda rules. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 519-20 n.17, 521 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases and 
concluding that no “State [has] chosen to go nearly so far on its own”); see also Cassell, supra 
note 16, at 493-96 (discussing efforts to warn suspects after Escobedo and concluding that the 
largest drop in confession rates came from Miranda’s novel imposition of waiver 
requirements). 
139 It might be possible to compare American confession rates with overseas confession 
rates. See supra note 78. 
140 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1073 & nn.90-91. 
141 D.J. Pyle & D.F. Deadman, Assessing the Impact of Legal Reform by Intervention 
Analysis, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 193, 213 (1993) (“Legal reform should be an area in which 
intervention analysis is widely used.”); see also Anthony Biglan, Dennis Ary & Alexander C. 
Wagenaar, The Value of Interrupted Time-Series Experiments for Community Intervention 
Research, 1 PREVENTION SCI. 31, 31 (2000) (“Time-series designs enable the development of 
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assess the effects of legal changes.142 Standard statistical texts suggest that this 
technique is well suited for such issues, provided that care is used in analyzing 
the data and other factors not included in the regressions are considered.143 
3. A Model of Crime Clearance Rates 
The first step in developing any time series model is to identify relevant 
variables for inclusion in the model. In our 1998 article, we set out both our 
variables and our justifications for using them at some length.144 We refer those 
interested in details to our earlier article. In this Article, we will just very briefly 
summarize our general approach. 
For our dependent variable, we are obviously interested in clearance rates for 
the reasons just discussed. To get a broad picture, we use national clearance rate 
data from the FBI. We discuss possible problems in the FBI data at greater length 
below.145 As a first effort, we use composite, national clearance rate data because 
they may have the effect of minimizing “noise” that would result from smaller 
aggregations. The FBI also reports clearance rate data in various subgroupings 
of cities varying by population size. We discuss those groupings below as 
well.146 
 
knowledge about the effects of community interventions and policies in circumstances in 
which randomized controlled trials are too expensive, premature, or simply impractical.”). 
142 See, e.g., Jessica Dennis et al., Helmet Legislation and Admissions to Hospital for 
Cycling Related Head Injuries in Canadian Provinces and Territories: Interrupted Time 
Series Analysis, BMJ, May 2013, at 2 (studying helmet laws and hospital admissions); David 
K. Humphreys, Antonio Gasparrini & Douglas J. Wiebe, Evaluating the Impact of Florida’s 
“Stand Your Ground” Self-Defense Law on Homicide and Suicide by Firearm: An Interrupted 
Time Series Study, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 44, 45 (2017) (“We used the years that have 
elapsed since the enactment of the Florida law as a natural experiment to assess its impact on 
rates of homicide and homicide by firearm.”); Ted Joyce, A Simple Test of Abortion and 
Crime, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 112, 112-13 (2009) (assessing effects of the Supreme Court’s 
Roe v. Wade decision on crime rates); H. Laurence Ross, Richard McCleary & Gary LaFree, 
Can Mandatory Jail Laws Deter Drunk Driving? The Arizona Case, 81 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 156, 161 (1990) (“We analyzed the data by applying an interrupted time series 
quasi-experimental research design in order to verify whether alcohol-related fatalities had 
decreased significantly at the time of the law’s inception.”); Bob Edward Vásquez, Sean 
Maddan & Jeffery T. Walker, The Influence of Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Laws in the United States: A Time-Series Analysis, 54 CRIME & DELINQ. 175, 182-86 (2008) 
(assessing effects of Megan’s Law on rape); Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: 
The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4. J. LEGAL STUD. 133, 171-94 (1975) (using time series 
analysis to study the impact of the Gun Control Act).  
143 See, e.g., WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, 
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 
103-34 (2002).  
144 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1074-82. The issue of whether we have properly 
“specified” the equation is discussed at greater length in Part III, infra.  
145 See infra notes 274-310 and accompanying text.  
146 See infra notes 310-25 and accompanying text.  
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Our regression equations also contain various independent or explanatory 
variables for clearance rates. Identifying those factors, however, remains 
somewhat of a challenge because the literature on clearance rates is surprisingly 
thin, particularly regarding assessing clearance rates over time.147 The available 
research suggests that much remains to be done to explain clearance rates.148 
The available research does, however, offer a few possible control variables. 
The factor most commonly cited as affecting the clearance rate is the crime 
rate. The standard argument is that as police officers have more crimes to solve, 
they will be able to solve a smaller percentage of them149—variously called the 
“overload” theory,150 the “overtaxing” theory,151 or the “caseload strain” 
theory.152 Although the theory has strong theoretical and intuitive appeal, the 
empirical support is not completely uniform.153 Moreover, crime rates rose 
 
147 See Edward R. Maguire et al., Why Homicide Clearance Rates Decrease: Evidence 
from the Caribbean, 20 J. POLICING & SOC’Y 373, 379-80 (2010) (noting that a 2010 study 
was the first English-language survey examining clearance rates in developing nations); 
Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 142 (“[T]he homicide clearance literature is incompletely 
developed . . . .”); David Schroeder, DNA and Homicide Clearance: What’s Really Going 
On?, 7 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 279, 279 (2007) (noting the “dearth of research” on 
homicide clearances).  
148 See, e.g., John P. Jarvis & Wendy C. Regoeczi, Homicides Clearances: An Analysis of 
Arrest Versus Exceptional Outcomes, 13 HOMICIDE STUD. 174, 174 (2009) (noting that 
homicide clearance rates have escaped significant scholarly attention); Kenneth J. Litwin, A 
Multilevel Multivariate Analysis of Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances, 41 J. RES. CRIME 
& DELINQ. 327, 328-37 (2004) (noting competing theories on crime clearance rates and that 
“literature on factors affecting homicide clearances is limited and yields somewhat 
inconsistent results”); Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine et al., Can Social Disorganization or Case 
Characteristics Explain Sexual Assault Case Clearances?, 7 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 255, 255-
56 (2012) (“Understanding factors related to the clearing of criminal cases by law 
enforcement is an important, but understudied, issue in criminal justice.”). 
149 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1076-77 (discussing the relationship between crime 
and clearance rates); see also Maguire et al., supra note 147, at 388-90. 
150 Michael Geerken & Walter R. Gove, Deterrence, Overload, and Incapacitation: An 
Empirical Evaluation, 56 SOC. FORCES 424, 429-31 (1977). 
151 Daniel Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, in 
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON 
CRIME RATES 95, 119 (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen & Daniel Nagin eds., 1978). 
152 Kenneth J. Litwin & Yili Xu, The Dynamic Nature of Homicide Clearances: A 
Multilevel Model Comparison of Three Time Periods, 11 HOMICIDE STUD. 94, 101 (2007). 
153 Compare JAN M. CHAIKEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, R-1777-DOJ, THE CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION PROCESS VOLUME II: SURVEY OF MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY POLICE 
DEPARTMENTS 41 (1975) (supporting theory), and Hyunseok Jang, Larry T. Hoover & Brian 
A. Lawton, Effect of Broken Windows Enforcement on Clearance Rates, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 
529, 536 (2008) (same), and Maguire et al., supra note 147, at 388-90 (same), and Gorazd 
Meško, Darko Maver & Ines Klinkon, Urban Crime and Criminal Investigation in Slovenia, 
in URBANIZATION, POLICING, AND SECURITY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 301, 317 (Gary Cordner, 
AnnMarie Cordner & Dilip K. Das eds., 2010) (reporting data supporting theory from 
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significantly throughout the 1960s and later, and then began declining 
significantly in the early 1990s, a pattern that does not correspond to the sharp 
1966-to-1968 decline in clearance rates. To control for the number of crimes, 
we collected FBI data on the estimated number of FBI “violent” crimes 
committed across the country each year from 1950 through 2012.154 This 
variable, converted to a crime rate by dividing the number of “violent” crimes 
by the resident population of the country, is identified as VIOLENT CRIME 
RATE.155 
Apart from the crime rate, the factors most often cited as influencing 
clearance rates are law enforcement personnel and expenditures on law 
enforcement.156 With more personnel and resources available, the argument 
goes, more crimes should be cleared, although (once again) despite the intuitive 
appeal of the hypothesis, the studies are mixed.157 To control for any influences 
 
Slovenia), and Ko-Hsin Hsu, Homicide Clearance Determinants: An Analysis of the Police 
Departments of the 100 Largest U.S. Cities 58 (2007) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University 
of Maryland, College Park) (on file with authors) (“In the end, having more sworn officers 
significantly changed (increased) the homicide clearance rates of low-clearance 
departments.”), with William M. Doerner & William G. Doerner, Police Accreditation and 
Clearance Rates, 35 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 6, 18 (2012) (concluding 
that rising crime rates put greater pressure on police to solve crimes), and Litwin & Xu, supra 
note 152, at 108 (finding slim support for the theory), and Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 150 
(finding little evidence for overload theory), and Paul-Philippe Paré, Richard B. Felson & 
Marc Ouimet, Community Variation in Crime Clearance: A Multilevel Analysis with 
Comments on Assessing Police Performance, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 243, 252 
(2007) (describing a Canadian study that found workload only affected clearance of 
misdemeanors, not clearance of violent or property crimes), and Janice L. Puckett & Richard 
J. Lundman, Factors Affecting Homicide Clearances: Multivariate Analysis of a More 
Complete Conceptual Framework, 40 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 183 (2003) (finding that 
detective workload had no effect on homicide clearance), and Aki Roberts, The Influences of 
Incident and Contextual Characteristics on Crime Clearance of Nonlethal Violence: A 
Multilevel Event History Analysis, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 61, 68-69 (2008) (finding no significant 
effects of police resources on clearance rates). For more information, see Cassell & Fowles, 
supra note 5, at 1077 n.113 (collecting earlier research on this issue).  
154 In the FBI crime reports, “violent” crimes are murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated 
assault.  
155 In our earlier paper, we used the total crime rate as the measure of workload on the 
system. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1077. In this Article, in an effort to minimize 
differences between our approach and John Donohue’s approach, we use the violent crime 
rate. See Donohue, supra note 7, at 1153-55, 1164-65 (justifying violent crime rate as the 
appropriate workload measure).  
156 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1077-78.  
157 Id. at 1077-78 & n.117; see also Charles Wellford & James Cronin, Clearing Up 
Homicide Clearance Rates, 243 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 2, 6 (2000) (finding that assigning 
multiple detectives to investigate is among those factors linked to high homicide clearance 
rates); Inimai M. Chettiar, More Police, Managed More Effectively, Really Can Reduce 
Crime, ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2015), 
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these factors may have, we collected data on the number of law enforcement 
employees per capita (“POLICE PERSONNEL”) and the dollars spent on police 
protection per capita by state and local governments, adjusted for inflation by 
the consumer price index (“POLICE DOLLARS (REAL)”).158 
Because our focus is on policing, we did not include any variables for later 
stages in the criminal justice process, such as sentencing. How changes in 
imprisonment rates affect crime rates is a subject of debate.159 Because we are 
focusing on the “front end” of the criminal justice process—police investigative 
activities—controlling for events at the back end did not strike us as particularly 
important. 
Criminal justice variables are not the only ones that might affect clearance 
rates. The criminal justice literature identifies other variables, including 
demographic variables, as having some bearing on clearance rates or, more 




158 Schulhofer has previously suggested that clearance rates would respond not simply to 
changes in law enforcement manpower and expenditures, but also to interactions between 
these variables and the overall number of crimes—what he calls the “capacity” of the system. 
Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 291. To test his theory, in our previous article, we added to the 
equations PERSONNEL CAPACITY, which was defined as the rate of police employees per 
capita divided by the crime rate for index crimes, and DOLLAR CAPACITY (REAL), which 
was defined as the number of inflation-adjusted dollars spent on police protection per capita 
divided by the crime rate for index crimes. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1078. However, 
these artificial variables had little influence on our earlier equations, so we did not include 
them again here. Id. at 1083 tbl.I.  
159 Compare BARRY LATZER, THE RISE AND FALL OF VIOLENT CRIME IN AMERICA 249 
(2016) (citing a “revivified criminal justice system” as an important cause of downward crime 
trends in the 1990s), and BERT USEEM & ANNE MORRISON PIEHL, PRISON STATE: THE 
CHALLENGE OF MASS INCARCERATION 51-80 (2008) (offering evidence for the proposition 
“more prison, less crime”), with OLIVER ROEDER, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & JULIA BOWLING, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE? 3-4 (2015), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-caused-crime-decline 
[https://perma.cc/4SRA-NGAA]. 
160 In our earlier article, we explained that we did not include any racial variables in our 
equations because, among other reasons, long-term racial changes are unlikely to explain 
short-term clearance rate fluctuations and the empirical support for an association with 
clearance rates is thin. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1078 n.121 (citing Peggy S. 
Sullivan, Determinants of Crime and Clearance Rates for Seven Index Crimes 163-64 (Dec. 
1985) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Vanderbilt University) (on file with authors)). Since 
then, a few studies have suggested race might have a connection to clearance rates, although 
this conclusion is disputed. See, e.g., Lynn A. Addington, Using National Incident-Based 
Reporting System Murder Data to Evaluate Clearance Predictors, 10 HOMICIDE STUD. 140, 
148 (2006) (finding murders of white victims more likely to be cleared than murders involving 
nonwhite victims); Catherine Lee, The Value of Life in Death: Multiple Regression and Event 
History Analyses of Homicide Clearance in Los Angeles County, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 527, 530 
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research about “overmodeling” demographic variables,161 we believe some 
limited variables could be appropriately included. Perhaps the most salient of 
these factors is the number of persons in the crime-prone juvenile years. Most 
crimes are committed by persons who are in adolescence or early adulthood.162 
Increases in the number of young persons, particularly in connection with the 
post-World War II “baby boom,” have been linked with changes in crime 
rates.163 The age band commonly identified with this effect is fifteen to twenty-
four,164 which also corresponds to readily available census data. In addition, 
there is some mixed evidence of age-related effects on clearance rates.165 Since 
 
(2005) (finding homicide cases involving nonwhite victims less likely to be cleared); Yili Xu, 
Characteristics of Homicide Events and the Decline in Homicide Clearance: A Longitudinal 
Approach to the Dynamic Relationship, Chicago 1966-1995, 33 CRIM. JUST. REV. 453, 465-
66 (2008) (finding that Latino victims and, in some models, African American victims 
associated with lower likelihood of clearance); cf. Litwin, supra note 148, at 339 (finding 
homicides with African American victims not less likely to be cleared, but homicides with 
Latino victims less likely to be cleared). But see Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 149 (finding 
no effect on homicide clearance rates from racial composition of the population). Because we 
continue to believe long-term racial demography is likely to have low predictive power in our 
equations, we did not include any racial variables here.  
More broadly, criminologists have been debating whether “discretionary” factors (such as 
the social position of victims) or “nondiscretionary” factors (such as police workloads) 
explain crime clearance rates. See Brian Lockwood, What Clears Burglary Offenses? 
Estimating the Influences of Multiple Perspectives of Burglary Clearance in Philadelphia, 37 
POLICING 746, 748 (2014) (collecting citations to the literature). Because the empirical support 
for such theories is “decidedly mixed,” and because such general attitudinal variables are 
unlikely to explain a sudden shift from 1966 to 1968, we did not include any such variables 
here. See id. at 748-49. 
161 Compare LOTT, supra note 134, at 146-48, 187 (defending use to avoid omitted variable 
problem), with Aneja, Donohue & Zhang, supra note 134, at 593 (criticizing use of thirty-six 
demographic controls in “right-to-carry” firearms research). 
162 The seminal article on this point remains Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age 
and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. SOC. 552 (1983). 
163 See, e.g., LATZER, supra note 159, at 243-52; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT 
AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 56-63 (2007). But cf. Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime 
Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 163, 171-72 (2004) (arguing that an aging population might account for decline in 
property crime rates in the 1990s but that it was not an important factor for decline in violent 
crime rates).  
164 Yale Kamisar, How to Use, Abuse—And Fight Back with—Crime Statistics, 25 OKLA. 
L. REV. 239, 246 (1972) (identifying the fifteen to twenty-four age band as having the most 
influence on crime rates); see also PATSY KLAUS & CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NCJ 190104, AGE PATTERNS IN VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION, 1976-2000, at 1 (2002) 
(discussing the rate of nonfatal violent victimization by age groups). 
165 See Lee, supra note 160, at 530 (finding homicide cases involving old victims less 
likely to be solved); Litwin, supra note 148, at 341 (finding cases with child victims more 
likely to be cleared than cases with older victims); Litwin & Xu, supra note 152, at 104 (“The 
victim’s age has a significant negative relationship with homicide clearances . . . .”). 
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it is conceivable that changes in the proportion of the population in the juvenile 
age band might be associated with changes in clearance rates, we included a 
variable to take into account this factor (“JUVENILES”). 
Changes in various socioeconomic variables are also plausible candidates for 
affecting clearance rates. For example, criminal justice literature identifies 
variances in the unemployment rate as a possible explanation for crime rate 
fluctuations.166 Similarly, changes in income levels and labor force participation 
might be associated with crime rates167 and clearance rates,168 particularly since 
such factors might be viewed as a measure of the opportunity cost of committing 
a crime. While the evidence regarding effects on clearance rates of such 
variables is mixed,169 we included variables for the labor force participation 
(“LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION”), unemployment rate 
(“UNEMPLOYMENT”), and disposable per capita real income (“PER CAPITA 
INCOME (REAL)”).170 
As a measure of changing social circumstances that might be related to crime, 
we also added a variable that measured live births to unmarried mothers171 and 
converted it to a per capita rate by dividing by resident population (“BIRTHS 
TO UNMARRIED WOMEN”). 
 
166 See, e.g., ROEDER, EISEN & BOWLING, supra note 159, at 48-53 (“Consistent with the 
larger body of research, this report finds that the decrease in unemployment in the 1990s was 
responsible for about 0 to 5 percent of that decade’s crime drop.”). For additional literature 
on this issue, see Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1079 n.127. 
167 See ROEDER, EISEN & BOWLING, supra note 159, at 49-51 (“In line with the past body 
of research, this report finds that increases in per capita income were responsible for 5 to 10 
percent of the decreases in crime in both the 1990s and the 2000s.”); Richard Fowles & Mary 
Merva, Wage Inequality and Criminal Activity: An Extreme Bounds Analysis for the United 
States, 1975-1990, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 163, 179-80 (1996) (finding robust linkages between 
wage inequality and murder and assault rates). 
168 See Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 151 (finding contrary-to-expectation positive 
association between economic deprivation and homicide clearance rates); Xu, supra note 160, 
at 468 (finding a significant negative effect of median household income on clearance rates 
in one model).  
169 See Mustaine et al., supra note 148, at 258-62, 272-73; Roberts, supra note 153, at 67 
(finding unemployment rate had a statistically significant negative effect on robbery and 
aggravated assault clearance rates, but not rape clearance rates).  
170 It has very recently been suggested that there is a clear link between interest rates and 
crimes. See James Austin & Gregory D. Squires, The ‘Startling’ Link Between Low Interest 
Rates and Low Crime, CRIME REPORT (Dec. 6, 2016), 
http://thecrimereport.org/2016/12/06/the-startling-link-between-low-interest-rates-and-low-
crime/ [https://perma.cc/H6XB-9UMF] (“When interest rates go up, crime goes up. When 
interest rates go down, crime goes down.”). Because this possible linkage came to our 
attention so late in the process of our research, we were not able to explore it further.  
171 Cf. Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 151 (finding no statistically significant relationship 
between homicide clearances and measure of family breakdown); Sullivan, supra note 160, 
at 165 (finding a relationship between murder clearances and the percentage of families with 
single mothers).  
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It has also been suggested that increasing urbanization during the 1960s was 
an explanation for rising crime rates.172 Conceivably, urbanization could have 
some bearing on clearance rates as well.173 For instance, clearance rates for index 
crimes are generally higher in smaller cities.174 A few studies of clearance rates, 
however, have found slim predictive power in urbanization.175 To control for the 
possible effects of urbanization, we added a variable for the percent of the 
resident population residing in urban areas (“URBANIZATION”). 
Schulhofer has also suggested that a control variable should be included for 
the distribution of crimes committed in large and small cities.176 Because smaller 
cities have higher clearance rates, Schulhofer reasons that a shift in the 
distribution of crimes could bias our results.177 To test this hypothesis, we 
controlled for the percentage of violent crimes committed in small cities, as 
reported in the UCR (“CRIME IN SMALL CITIES”). 
As a final control, we added a standard time trend variable, identified as 
“TREND OVER TIME.” Although some cautions have been raised about such 
a variable,178 we thought it might be useful to control for long-term, time-related 
trends apart from Miranda. 
We believe we included the most important variables that might have 
influenced crime clearance rates over the years 1950 to 2012, along with the 
Miranda variable.179 To capture the effects of the Miranda decision, we included 
 
172 See Kamisar, supra note 164, at 247. See generally LATZER, supra note 159, at 50-56 
(discussing African American urbanization and crime rates); URBANIZATION, POLICING, AND 
SECURITY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 153, at 4; Ajaz Ahmad Malik, Urbanization and 
Crime: A Relational Analysis, 21 J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 68, 69-70 (2016) (reviewing literature 
on the connection between crime and city size). 
173 See Schulhofer, supra note 125, at 366-68 (noting that “[c]learance rates are 
consistently lower in the larger cities” and suggesting that as a greater percentage of the 
population exists in large cities, and therefore a greater percentage of crimes are committed 
in large cities, the national clearance rate will be affected). 
174 See UCR-2010, supra note 79, at 317 tbl.25 (reporting that violent crime clearance rates 
were 39.9% for cities with populations larger than 250,000, 47.6% for cities with populations 
of 50,000 to 99,999, and 56.5% for cities with populations smaller than 10,000). 
175 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1080 n.133 (collecting studies). 
176 See Schulhofer, supra note 125, at 366-67 (suggesting this control for violent crimes). 
177 Id. at 367. 
178 See, e.g., Charles R. Nelson & Heejoon Kang, Pitfalls in the Use of Time as an 
Explanatory Variable in Regression, 2 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 73, 80 (1984). 
179 We were intrigued by the possibility that increased cell phone usage might have had 
some effect on clearance rates. See generally Jonathan Klick, John MacDonald & Thomas 
Stratmann, Mobile Phones and Crime Deterrence: An Underappreciated Link, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 243 (Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 
2012). However, we could find no developed body of literature on clearance rates and cell 
phones. Even if we could, cell phones appeared on the scene well after Miranda. Accordingly, 
we did not include a variable for cell phone usage.  
It has also been suggested that increases in abortion after Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
  
2017] STILL HANDCUFFING THE COPS? 721 
 
 
led to changes in crime rates by reducing the number of “unwanted” kids, thus later reducing 
the number of unsupervised and crime-prone juveniles. See John J. Donohue III & Steven D. 
Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116 Q.J. ECONOMICS 379, 380 (2001). See 
generally STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST 
EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 137-43 (2005). This theory, however, as 
originally propounded by Donohue and Levitt included a (later-acknowledged) mistake, John 
J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, Measurement Error, Legalized Abortion, and the Decline 
in Crime: A Response to Foote and Goetz, 123 Q.J. ECON. 425, 425 (2008), and has been 
heavily attacked for various reasons, see LATZER, supra note 159, at 254 (noting the abortion 
hypothesis “is unable to explain why, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, crime rose 
substantially among youth born during the legalization decade”); Philip J. Cook & John H. 
Laub, After the Epidemic: Recent Trends in Youth Violence in the United States, 29 CRIME & 
JUST. 1, 23 (2002) (noting that the timing of the theory is wrong because crime rates among 
juveniles did not decrease until about 1994); Christopher L. Foote & Christopher F. Goetz, 
The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 123 Q.J. ECON. 407, 409 (2008) (concluding that 
if the measurement mistake is corrected, the relationship between abortion and crime is much 
weaker); Ted Joyce, Did Legalized Abortion Lower Crime?, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1, 2 
(2004) (“Thus, even in models with state and year fixed effects, the relationship between 
abortion and crime may be biased by differences in within-state growth in cocaine markets 
over time, a classic problem of omitted variables.”); Joyce, supra note 142, at 112 (noting that 
because of the broad implications of the conclusion that legalized abortion lowered crime 
rates, more research must be done); John R. Lott Jr. & John Whitley, Abortion and Crime: 
Unwanted Children and Out-of-Wedlock Births, 45 ECON. INQUIRY 304, 305-06 (2007) 
(noting that although the abortion hypothesis is plausible, the fact that the legalization of 
abortion increased the number of out-of-wedlock births forecloses that hypothesis). Because 
the theory is so debated, and because we already control for changes in the crime rate that 
presumably capture any abortion effects, we did not try to separately model changes in 
abortion law here. But cf. Donohue, supra note 7, at 1161 (jettisoning noneconomic variables 
in clearance rate regressions to simplify equations).  
Likewise, it has been argued that reductions in lead absorption due to the introduction of 
unleaded gasoline reduced crime rates. See LATZER, supra note 159, at 255 (“[T]he 
government’s blood tests showed that between 1988 and 1991, lead levels fell dramatically 
for the age 6-19 cohort as well as for African Americans, two groups highly involved in the 
violent crime of those years. As crime was soaring, not declining, in 1988 through 1991, the 
effects were the very opposite of what [the theory suggested].”); Rick Nevin, How Lead 
Exposure Relates to Temporal Changes in IQ, Violent Crime, and Unwed Pregnancy, 83 
ENVTL. RES. 1, 2 (2000); Rick Nevin, Understanding International Crime Trends: The Legacy 
of Preschool Lead Exposure, 104 ENVTL. RES. 315, 315 (2007); Jessica Wolpaw Reyes, 
Environmental Policy as Social Policy? The Impact of Childhood Lead Exposure on Crime, 
7 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 1 (2007). This theory, too, is heavily debated. See, e.g., 
Scott Firestone, Does Lead Exposure Cause Violent Crime? The Science Is Still out, 
DISCOVER: THE CRUX (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2013/01/08/does-lead-exposure-cause-violent-
crime-the-science-is-still-out/#.WEwtgVwqx8 [https://perma.cc/Y76E-478W]. Here again, 
because of the ongoing debate and because we had already modeled crime rates in our 
equations, we did not attempt to model lead exposure effects. 
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a “dummy” variable in the equations (“MIRANDA”), which was assigned the 
value of 0 before Miranda and 1 after.180 Because we were working with yearly 
data and because Miranda was handed down on June 13, 1966 (roughly halfway 
through 1966), deciding what to do with the 1966 value of the MIRANDA 
variable was an issue. As a first approximation of Miranda’s effects, in our 
earlier paper, we first assigned MIRANDA the value of 0 for years before 1965, 
0.5 for 1966, and 1 for 1967 and the following years. Later analysis in that paper, 
as well as in a follow-on analysis from John Donohue, suggested that a three-
year “phase in” for MIRANDA might be appropriate—i.e., that it was appropriate 
to assign MIRANDA a value of 0 before 1966, 0.333 in 1966, 0.666 in 1967 (the 
first full year in which the Miranda decision was in effect), and 1 in 1967 and 
later years.181 The reason for the delayed phase in for MIRANDA was that 
Miranda’s effect did not take hold throughout the country instantaneously. 
Instead, it is commonly accepted that it took police a year or so to train officers 
in the new Miranda procedures.182 We discussed this issue at length in our earlier 
paper and simply follow the three-year phase in here.183 
We think these variables contain the most important influences on crime 
clearance rates over the last five decades. Although the equations could include 
other variables, a parsimonious construction has certain statistical advantages.184 




180 Of course, whether the MIRANDA variable captures changes in clearance rates due to 
the Miranda decision or some other factor at the time is open for discussion. We provide our 
reasons for attributing the changes to Miranda at infra Part VI. 
181 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1095.  
182 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 369 (5th ed. 2009) (“[I]n the months 
immediately following that decision it was determined that the police did not regularly or 
completely give the warnings before interrogation. This was largely attributable to delays in 
police training about the new requirements, and later studies found that police were regularly 
advising suspects of their rights before attempting to question them.”).  
183 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1092-95 (justifying the three-year phase in); 
Donohue, supra note 7, at 1166-67 (finding that the three-year phase in provided the best 
results). 
184 WILFREDO PALMA, TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 152-53 (2016) (discussing advantages of 
parsimony in model design); cf. JUDEA PEARL, CAUSALITY: MODELS, REASONING, AND 
INFERENCE 45-48 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing Occam’s razor in designing models).  
185 See infra Part VI. 
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Using standard ordinary least squares (“OLS”) regression techniques, it is 
possible to develop an equation to explain national crime clearance rates as 
follows: 
 
 CLEARANCE RATEI 
(for violent, property, 


















= β0i + β1(MIRANDA)i 
+ β2(VIOLENT CRIME RATE)i 
+ β3(POLICE PERSONNEL)i 
+ β4(POLICE DOLLARS (REAL))i 
+ β5(PERSONNEL CAPACITY)i 
+ β6(DOLLAR CAPACITY 
(REAL))i 
+ β7(JUVENILES)i 
+ β8(LABOR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION)i 
+ β9(UNEMPLOYMENT)i 
+ β10(PER CAPITA INCOME 
(REAL))i 
+ β11(BIRTHS TO UNMARRIED
WOMEN)i 
+ β12(URBANIZATION)i 
+ β13(CRIME IN SMALL CITIES)i 
+ β14(TREND OVER TIME)i 
+ εi
where i runs from 1950 to 2012 and the independent variables are as described 
above. This is a “reduced form” equation, which assumes that there are no 
“simultaneity” problems (that is, that the dependent clearance rate variables do 
not affect any of the independent variables), an assumption we discuss below.186 
4. Regression Equation Results 
In this Section, we report results stemming from this model. In Table 2, we 
report results for equations run on data from 1950 to 2012187 for the dependent 
variables for the FBI’s two composite clearance rate categories: violent crimes 
and property crimes. As can be seen, controlling for the potentially confounding 
influences, we find that our MIRANDA variable has statistically significant188 
negative effects on crime clearance rates for both categories. 
 
186 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1082; see infra notes 268-73 and accompanying text. 
187 Because our data stop at 2012, they do not include effects from possibly worsening 
police-citizen relations in the wake of the Ferguson shooting, such as the developing Black 
Lives Matter movement and related issues. See generally HEATHER MAC DONALD, THE WAR 
ON COPS: HOW THE NEW ATTACK ON LAW AND ORDER MAKES EVERYONE LESS SAFE (2016). 
188 All statistical significance tests reported in this Article are two-tailed, although an 
argument could be made for a one-tailed test. We are aware of the controversy surrounding 
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Table 2. Violent and Property Crime Clearance Rate Regressions 
(1950 to 2012) (three-year Miranda phase in) 
OLS Regressions on Clearance Rates for Cities (t statistics in parenthesis) 
 





















































ADJUSTED R2 0.9752 0.9511 
*** significant at .001 level ** significant at .01 level  * significant at .05 level 
† significant at .10 level 
 
reporting p-values and have tried to follow the recommendations of the American Statistical 
Association in our approach and report of findings. See generally Ronald L. Wasserstein & 
Nicole A. Lazar, Editorial, The ASA’s Statement on p-Values: Context, Process, and Purpose, 
70 AM. STATISTICIAN 129 (2016). All p-values reported in this Section should be considered 
in light of the Bayesian model averaging we report in the next Section.  
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In this table and others, we use gray shading to denote statistically significant 
effects of the MIRANDA variable, with darker gray indicating significance at the 
conventional 95% or higher confidence level and light gray indicating 
significance at the 90% confidence level. 
The magnitude of the MIRANDA effect is -9.446 for violent crimes (meaning 
MIRANDA depressed violent crime clearance rates by 9.446 percentage points) 
and -2.221 for property crimes (meaning MIRANDA depressed violent crime 
clearance rates by 9.446 percentage points). While our focus in this Article is on 
the MIRANDA variable, we found a few other interesting results. For example, 
as expected, an increase in the violent crime rate produced a statistically 
significant reduction in clearance rates (although the same thing did not occur 
for property crimes). Similarly, as expected, we found that an increase in police 
personnel led to an increase in violent crime clearance rates, although this result 
was statistically significant only at the 90% confidence level (and did not occur 
for property crimes). The proportion of the population consisting of juveniles in 
the crime-prone years (fifteen- to twenty-four-year-olds) also had a statistically 
significant negative effect for both crime categories. This finding can be viewed 
as consistent with suggestions in the clearance rate literature that gang-related 
crimes are more difficult to clear than other crimes189 because an increase in 
juveniles might produce (for example) an increase in gang membership. 
Table 2 reports statistics for aggregated categories composed of individual 
crimes. However, such aggregations may obscure trends among these individual 
crimes.190 Accordingly, we ran our regression equations for each of the seven 
individual component crimes for which data from 1950 to 2012 are available.191 
  
 
189 See, e.g., Litwin, supra note 148, at 339, 340 tbl.1 (showing a statistically significant 
decrease in homicide clearing rates when the homicide was gang-related). 
190 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1083.  
191 Clearance rate data for arson is currently reported in the UCR, but because that data 
does not extend back to 1966, we do not report any arson results here. 
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Figure 4 depicts clearance rates for all violent crimes except robbery—i.e., 
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As can be seen, all three crimes exhibit downward trends in their clearance 
rates during the 1960s, although they do not appear to exhibit the pronounced 
break at 1966 seen in the violent crime and property crime categories. Robbery 
is charted separately because its clearance rate is much lower than the others. As 
can be seen in Figure 5, robbery clearance rates exhibit a pronounced downward 
trend from 1966 to 1968, suggesting a harmful impact from Miranda. 
Regression results track what these visual observations suggest. As shown in 
Table 3, we find a statistically significant MIRANDA effect for robbery but not 
for other individual violent crimes. 
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Table 3. Total and Individual Violent Crimes Regressions 
(1950 to 2012) (three-year Miranda phase in) 

























































































































































ADJUSTED R2 0.9752 0.9856 0.9846 0.9648 0.9797 
*** significant at .001 level ** significant at .01 level  * significant at .05 level 
† significant at .10 level 
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The size of the statistically significant negative effect on robbery clearance 
rates from MIRANDA is (-5.683). For the other three crimes, the signs associated 
with MIRANDA were all negative, but none of the results were statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
We turn next to the three property crimes (burglary, larceny, and vehicle 
theft). In Figure 6, we graph clearance rates over time from 1950 to 2012 for 
burglary and larceny. 
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As can be seen, there are downward trend lines during the 1960s, which 
appear to be somewhat pronounced around the time of Miranda, particularly for 
larceny. Larceny also trends upward beginning around 2008, something we 
discuss below.192 Similar results are depicted in Figure 7, which shows clearance 
rates for vehicle thefts. 
 
Here again, we see a downward trend in the 1960s, with a particularly 




192 See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.  
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Table 4 reports our clearance rate findings for the three individual property 
crimes. 
 
Table 4. Total and Individual Property Crimes Regressions 
(1950 to 2012) (three-year Miranda phase in) 


























































































































ADJUSTED R2 0.9511 0.9892 
 
0.6763 0.9865 
*** significant at .001 level  ** significant at .01 level * significant at .05 level 
† significant at .10 level 
 
Tracking visual observation of the trend lines, we found statistically 
significant negative effects for MIRANDA for larceny and vehicle theft 
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clearances. For burglary clearances, the sign associated with MIRANDA was 
negative as expected but not quite statistically significant at conventional levels. 
In sum, our regression equations find that, even after controlling for important 
and potentially confounding variables, our MIRANDA variable was associated 
with statistically significant drops in crime clearance rates for both aggregate 
categories (violent and property crimes) and for the individual crimes of robbery, 
larceny, and vehicle theft. Interestingly, we have a consistent negative sign 
across all crime categories. These findings support the position that Miranda did 
indeed interfere with law enforcement’s ability to clear crimes. 
C. Quantification of Miranda’s Cost 
Our regression equations also allow us to quantify the number of lost 
clearances that appear to be attributable to MIRANDA. Table 5 shows these 
results. 













Violent 46.8 -9.446 20.1% 213,000 
Murder 62.5 0.000 N/A N/A 
Rape 40.1 0.000 N/A N/A 
Robbery 28.1 -5.683 20.2% 61,500 
Aggravated 
Assault 
55.8 0.000 N/A N/A 
Property 19.0 -2.221 11.6% 929,000 
Burglary 12.7 0.000 N/A N/A 
Larceny 22.0 -2.071 9.4% 513,000 
Vehicle Theft 11.9 -5.516 46.3% 304,000 
 
The numbers cited in Table 5 for additional cleared crimes were derived by 
multiplying the percentage increase in clearance rate that occurs without 
MIRANDA against total offenses known for all agencies.193 
D. Explaining the Pattern 
Our equations suggest a “MIRANDA effect” on clearance rates for violent and 
property crimes, as well as for robbery, larceny, and vehicle theft, but not for 
 
193 The clearance rate data we used is for cities only. We have made the assumption that 
the MIRANDA effect found in cities also applies to other agencies. The net effect of this 
assumption is to increase the “additional cleared crimes” category by about 25%. See UCR-
2012, supra note 79, at 394 tbl.25 (showing that all agencies cleared 1,060,028 violent crime 
offenses, while city agencies cleared 834,273 violent crime offenses).  
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homicide, rape, assault, or burglary.194 What could explain this pattern?195 We 
discuss some tentative possibilities in this Section. 
Turning first to the aggregate categories of violent and property crimes, one 
reason why we may have found our MIRANDA effect there is precisely because 
these are aggregate categories. Individual crime clearance categories may be 
subject to long-term changes for various reasons that are hard to investigate.196 
The larger aggregate categories might tend to eliminate some of the “noise”197 
in smaller categories, thereby proving more informative on broader trends.198 It 
is important to understand, however, that these aggregate categories will be 
largely driven by one or two component crimes. Violent crimes, for example, 
consist of about 60% aggravated assaults and 30% robberies.199 Property crimes 
are about two-thirds larcenies.200 Thus, the noise-reducing capacities of the 
aggregate categories are restricted. 
Turning to individual crimes, one thing of interest is that clearances for what 
might be loosely denominated as crimes of passion or aggression (i.e., murder, 
rape, and assault) were apparently unaffected by Miranda, while clearances for 
what are more often crimes of deliberation (i.e., robbery, larceny, and vehicle 
theft) were affected. These categories, of course, are gross oversimplifications, 
as there are obviously coolly calculated murders and impulsive car thefts. But if 
these generalizations are correct more often than not, they might correspond with 
the empirical evidence suggesting that Miranda more substantially interferes 
with police efforts to interrogate repeat offenders and professional criminals.201 
One potential problem with this theory is the crime of burglary. In our 1998 
article, we ventured essentially this same theory—which worked more cleanly 
then because burglary was one of the crimes for which we found a MIRANDA 
effect.202 Burglary does seem to be a crime often committed by professional 
 
194 We give our reasons for attributing these results to Miranda’s restrictions on police 
interrogation rather than some other cause. See infra Part VI. 
195 Because our focus is on Miranda’s effects, we will not discuss other effects we found 
(or failed to find) in specific equations—e.g., the effects of police and economic variables on 
clearance rates.  
196 See, e.g., infra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing changes in murder 
clearance rates due to changing patterns of murder).  
197 See infra notes 296-99, 328-63 and accompanying text (discussing noise in California 
data).  
198 Feeney has suggested that the aggregate categories are “not very informative” 
compared to the individual categories, but he does not address the “noise” issue we are 
concerned about. Feeney, supra note 8, at 108. 
199 See, e.g., UCR-2010, supra note 79, at 317 tbl.25.  
200 See, e.g., id.  
201 Cassell, supra note 16, at 464-66 (citing studies that show that repeat offenders may be 
less likely to confess than those without criminal records). 
202 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1089 (“Our equations suggest a ‘Miranda effect’ 
on clearance rates for . . . burglary . . . . But if the generalizations are more often than not 
correct, they might correspond with the empirical evidence suggesting that Miranda more 
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criminals,203 and the fact that burglary does not appear in our basic equation 
would be a strike against the theory. But we were able to produce a MIRANDA 
effect here in some of our other regression equations, as discussed below.204 And 
perhaps there are facts about burglaries that make them less likely to have been 
affected by Miranda.205 
Another possible partial explanation for our patterns is that police may be able 
to shift resources to maintain high clearance rates for the most serious and least 
common crimes (e.g., murder and rape) at the expense of lower clearance rates 
for some less serious and more common crimes (e.g., larceny and vehicle theft). 
Police agencies are frequently judged by their effectiveness in solving the most 
notorious crimes, especially murders.206 As a result, maximum “detective 
power” is allocated to solve homicides.207 If Miranda affected clearances 
generally, one would expect police to respond. To the extent resources affect 
clearance rates,208 police should be able to maintain high clearance rates for the 
most serious crimes by allocating more resources to solve them, but at the cost 
of lower clearance rates in crime categories less visible to the public.209 
Support for this theory comes from the only available before-and-after 
Miranda study analyzing individual crimes. Researchers in Pittsburgh found 
that, after Miranda, the confession rate in homicide cases fell 27.3 percentage 
points, robbery cases 25.7 points, auto larceny cases 21.2 points, burglary and 
receiving goods cases 13.7 points, and forcible sex offense cases 0.5 points.210 
But while this study found no post-Miranda change in homicide clearances rates, 
it found a significant robbery clearance rate drop.211 Interestingly, in the eighteen 
months before Miranda, Pittsburgh police cleared 94.3% (fifty of fifty-three) of 
 
substantially affects police success in dealing with repeat offenders and professional 
criminals.” (footnote omitted)). 
203 See LARRY J. SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY 343 (5th ed. 1995); Claire Nee, Understanding 
Expertise in Burglars: From Pre-Conscious Scanning to Action and Beyond, 20 AGGRESSION 
& VIOLENT BEHAV. 53, 53-55 (2015). 
204 See infra Tables 6 & 8 (noting a MIRANDA effect for burglary for Cassell/Fowles 
specification with 1950 to 2007 data, which BMA indicates is robust). But see supra Table 4 
(noting a MIRANDA effect for burglary for Donohue specification with 1950 to 2012 data); 
infra Table 7 (showing that BMA indicates such an effect is not robust).  
205 See infra notes 445-50 and accompanying text.  
206 See Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 179 
(2008) (noting that police officers are under “extraordinary pressure to secure convictions for 
heinous crimes”).  
207 See id. at 178. 
208 See supra note 158 (collecting conflicting evidence on this issue); cf. supra Table 2 
(finding sporadic effect of police resources on clearances). 
209 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1090. 
210 These figures are derived by subtracting the post-Miranda rates from the pre-Miranda 
rates listed in Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 87, at 11 tbl.1. 
211 Id. at 21 tbl.9 (finding overall clearance rates in Pittsburgh higher after Miranda than 
before). 
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all homicides; in the thirteen months after, they also cleared 94.4% (thirty-four 
of thirty-six) of all homicides—even though homicide confessions fell 
sharply.212 While it would have been feasible for the Pittsburgh police to devote 
the necessary resources to solve thirty-four homicides with fewer confessions, it 
would have been virtually impossible to deal with the large decline in the 
number of robbery confessions. Before Miranda, the Pittsburgh police cleared 
45.1% (970 of 2152) of all robberies; after Miranda, they cleared only 30.8% 
(556 of 1805).213 If similar trends occurred around the United States, police 
departments may have shifted resources to keep homicide clearance rates high 
at the expense of the clearance rates for some other less serious offenses, such 
as robbery. However, this reading of the Pittsburgh study does not explain why 
post-Miranda clearances rose slightly for burglary and vehicle thefts in that 
city214 (although the post-Miranda increase in burglary is consistent with our 
finding of no MIRANDA effect for burglary). 
Another reason why we found no MIRANDA effect for homicide may be that 
we did not account for changing homicide patterns. Homicide, more than any 
other violent crime, exhibits a long-term decline in clearance rates since 1950. 
It is quite likely that at least some part of this drop is attributable to the increase 
in the proportion of felony-type murders and the corresponding decline in 
murders within the family or as a result of “romantic triangles and lovers’ 
quarrels.”215 Presumably the family and romantic homicides are easier to solve, 
whereas the felony-type murders, often committed by strangers, are less so.216 
We have not accounted for these changes because of the difficulty in obtaining 
data for the relevant time period.217 It is possible that these changes have 
obscured any MIRANDA effect in the homicide regressions. 
If changes in the patterns of homicides could have obscured a Miranda-
induced drop in clearance rates, could changes in the patterns of other crimes 
have caused a drop in clearance rates for those crimes that coincided with 
Miranda? It seems improbable that crime patterns would have changed suddenly 
enough to explain the kind of sharp 1966-to-1968 drop that we observed in the 
robbery category, for example. In any event, there were two crimes for which 
patterns were relatively stable during the late 1960s: robbery and larceny.218 
 
212 Id. 
213 Id.  
214 See id. 
215 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1091 (quoting UCR-1993, supra note 79, at 285).  
216 See Litwin & Yu, supra note 152, at 96. 
217 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1091 n.163 (“FBI data before 1965 on offender-
victim relationships in homicide cases do not appear to be regularly published in a consistent 
format.”). 
218 Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus Felson, Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A 
Routine Activity Approach, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 588, 600 tbl.5 (1979). The authors report 
offense trends for only four crimes: robbery, burglary, larceny, and murder. Id. Although their 
analysis is based on data apparently collected as part of the UCR program, the data do not 
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Since we found a MIRANDA effect on both of these crimes, our MIRANDA 
effect does not appear to be an artifact of changing crime patterns. 
Still another explanation for our pattern of findings rests on the issue of so-
called “secondary clearances.” While we defer full discussion of such clearances 
until later,219 police may clear certain kinds of crimes through interrogations 
more frequently than other kinds of crimes. For example, police may press an 
arrested robber to confess to other similar robberies he has committed. Such 
repeated crimes (and the possibility of multiple clearances) may not exist as 
frequently for crimes like assault, which may typically consist of a single, 
unrepeated act. A study of the NYPD around the time of Miranda compiled 
ratios of clearances to arrests across crime categories.220 The ratio of clearances 
to arrests greatly exceeds 1.0 for some crimes—specifically burglary, grand 
larceny, grand larceny vehicle, and robbery.221 For grand larceny vehicle, for 
example, the ratio was 2.416, meaning that, for each vehicle larceny arrest, 
police cleared about two-and-a-half such crimes. No doubt a substantial number 
of these additional clearances came from confessions. On the other hand, for 
other crimes—specifically homicide, rape, and assault—the ratio was quite close 
to 1.0. Presumably murderers and rapists rarely confess to more than one crime. 
This suggests that confessions may play a more important role for crimes such 
as vehicle theft, larceny, and robbery, and that clearance for these crimes are, 
therefore, more susceptible to changes in confession procedures. Again, the one 
crime that does not fit the expected pattern is burglary. Burglary had the highest 
ratio (3.778), but we did not find a MIRANDA effect for burglary. Perhaps more 
research on these issues will shed further light on burglary clearances. 
III. MODEL SPECIFICATION ISSUES: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF JOHN DONOHUE’S 
SPECIFICATIONS 
We have just described the results produced with our “specification” of 
regression equations—that is, the results produced with our chosen variables. 
While we have explained why we chose these variables,222 this specification 
issue is an important one worth considering further. Improper specification of 
equations can lead to inaccurate results. Indeed, a concern is that, through 
improper specification, a researcher can produce a predesired or otherwise 
spurious result.223 
 
appear to be published in the annual crime reports and it is unclear whether the data are readily 
available. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1091 n.164. 
219 See infra notes 370-71, 452-99 and accompanying text.  
220 PETER W. GREENWOOD, N.Y.C. RAND INST., AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPREHENSION 
ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 24 tbl.3 (1970). 
221 See id. The following ratios of clearance rate to arrest rate can be derived from 
Greenwood’s data: 1.045 for homicide; 1.063 for rape; 1.660 for robbery; 1.073 for assault; 
3.778 for burglary; 2.564 for grand larceny; and 2.416 for grand larceny vehicle. See id.  
222 See supra notes 144-85 and accompanying text.  
223 A classic paper on this issue is Edward E. Leamer, Let’s Take the Con out of 
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This Section explores the specification issue. We are aided in this exploration 
by the fact that, after we circulated our 1998 paper for publication, John 
Donohue wrote a thoughtful response, carefully discussing (among other things) 
specification issues and reporting the results produced with his different 
specifications.224 At the time, we wrote a brief reply to Donohue, explaining how 
we believed that his specifications required some unusual assumptions, which 
explained why his equations produced somewhat fewer statistically significant 
MIRANDA effects than we reported.225 Now with the benefit of nearly two 
decades since that exchange, we revisit the specification issue. Time has given 
us two advantages: (1) an additional stream of FBI clearance rate data from the 
last two decades; and (2) advances in computing power and related econometric 
methods that allow specification issues to be more aggressively addressed. Both 
of these developments provide some additional support for our conclusion that 
Miranda has harmed law enforcement. 
A. The Donohue Model with Data Extended Through 2012 
Our clearance rate model here is essentially the same model that we used in 
our 1998 Stanford Law Review article.226 The model we use here produces 
results that parallel our 1998 results in many respects. Specifically, comparing 
our current equations (which use a three-year MIRANDA phase in) with our 1998 
results (which use a three-year phase in), we now find a MIRANDA effect for 
five of nine FBI categories compared to six of the same nine categories in 1998. 
The one difference between our current equations and the 1998 equations is the 
individual crime category of burglary, for which MIRANDA exhibited a 
statistically significant negative coefficient in 1998, but not in our current 
model.227 
In 1998, Donohue wrote a response that was generally supportive of some of 
our most significant conclusions. Donohue began by acknowledging that 
focusing on clearance rates (rather than confession rates) would probably 
significantly understate quantification of Miranda’s harmful effects.228 He also 
noted that we “beg[a]n at somewhat of a disadvantage since” we were forced to 
“base [our] study on an interrupted time series analysis stemming from a single 
federally imposed mandate, rather than on the more desirable type of panel data 
analysis, which examines the experience of different states over time.”229 
 
Econometrics, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 31, 36-39 (1983). 
224 See generally Donohue, supra note 7. 
225 See generally Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Falling Clearance Rates After 
Miranda: Coincidence or Consequence?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1998). 
226 The one difference is that we substituted violent crimes for index crimes as the measure 
of police workload, for reasons discussed in supra note 155. 
227 Compare Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1096 tbl.IV, with supra Table 4. 
228 See Donohue, supra note 7, at 1156. 
229 Id. at 1157. 
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We provided our data to Donohue so that he could run regression equations 
with his own, alternative specifications. As with our equations then (and now), 
Donohue’s equations produced negative MIRANDA effects230 across all 
aggregate and individual crime categories.231 Donohue’s equations, however, 
found fewer statistically significant effects than our equations. While our 
equations found statistically significant negative MIRANDA effects at the 
conventional 95% confidence level for six of the nine categories,232 Donohue 
found such negative effects for only two: violent crimes and larceny.233 Donohue 
also found such negative effects at the 90% confidence level for property crimes 
and vehicle thefts.234 
The difference between our equations and Donohue’s equations came down 
to specification. Donohue’s equations included, in addition to an identically 
constructed MIRANDA variable, variables for the violent crime rate, police 
officers (per capita), police officers/number of violent crimes, police 
expenditures (per capita), police expenditures/number of violent crimes, crime 
in small cities, time, and time squared.235 In addition to jettisoning noncriminal 
justice variables, Donohue made three assumptions different from ours: (1) that 
violent crimes, rather than index crimes, should be the independent variable 
measuring police workload; (2) that inclusion of a time-squared variable (in 
addition to a time variable) was appropriate; and (3) that the appropriate measure 
of police capacity was a measure of officers rather than total employees.236 
Eliminating any of these three assumptions produced much stronger MIRANDA 
effects.237 
Given that time has marched on for nearly two decades since our competing 
papers were published, we wondered whether, with the benefit of extra data, the 
Donohue specifications would reveal anything more about the Miranda effect. 
Sometimes with additional time—and additional data—patterns more clearly 
reveal themselves. Accordingly, we simply took Donohue’s original 
specifications and re-ran his equations using the additional data extending from 
1950 to 2012 that we assembled here—an additional seventeen years of data—
 
230 Donohue chose to relabel the dummy variable “Post-1966,” arguing that this was a 
more “neutral” term. Id. at 1163 n.74. We believe that labeling dummy variables by the effect 
they are designed to capture is a standard approach, although we acknowledge that further 
evidence is required beyond regression equations to explain why it is proper to attribute the 
effect indicated by the dummy variable to Miranda. We discuss this “causality” question at 
greater length later in this Article. See infra Part VI. 
231 Donohue, supra note 7, at 1176 tbl.IV, 1177 tbl.V. 
232 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1086 tbl.II, 1088 tbl.III. 
233 Donohue, supra note 7, at 1176 tbl.IV, 1177 tbl.V. 
234 Id. at 1177 tbl.V. Donohue’s coefficients for MIRANDA are also slightly different than 
ours, as he used the natural log of the clearance rates rather than the clearance rates 
themselves. See id. at 1160. 
235 Id. at 1173 tbl.I. 
236 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 225, at 1185-87. 
237 Id. at 1186-87, 1190 tbl.I. 
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instead of the 1950-to-1995 data that we had assembled for our first article. For 
reasons that we will explain shortly, we also ran Donohue’s equations (and our 
equations) starting in 1950 but stopping after 2007—the onset of the Great 
Recession. Table 6 reports the results of these various equations. 
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Table 6. Aggregate and Individual Crimes: 
Coefficients of the MIRANDA Variable—Alternative Specifications by 
Cassell/Fowles and Donohue 
(three-year Miranda phase in) 
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 As shown in Table 6, the Donohue specification now largely replicates our 
(current) findings, and completely replicates our findings if the data set is limited 
to 2007 (rather than 2012). Indeed, on this extended data set, Donohue’s 
specifications produce statistically significant results at the conventional 95% 
confidence level for even more categories (six of the nine) than do ours. 
This convergence of the results from our equations with those from 
Donohue’s equations is an important finding. Donohue set out to explore our 
regression equations and, independently of our efforts, specified his own 
alternative model. He then used this model to suggest that, while we had 
provided “some evidence” that Miranda harmed law enforcement, our evidence 
was not yet conclusive.238 The fact that even Donohue’s own equations now 
reproduce our findings is an important step in the direction of proof on which 
policy recommendations can be made.239 
A further step in that direction comes from considering the results of 
Donohue’s equations (and ours) if we run the equations on data stopping at 2007. 
Specifying the length of the data series on which to run a time series regression 
is an important issue, since results can sometimes be affected by length of the 
data set chosen.240 In our 1998 article, we showed that our MIRANDA effect was 
not sensitive to the time periods we selected for running the regressions. We got 
almost identical results in our equations not only with a full data set available to 
us (1950 to 1995), but also with a data set that excluded potentially problematic 
data from the 1950s (i.e., a data set from 1960 to 1995) and also a data set 
shortened by fifteen years (i.e., a data set from 1950 to 1980).241 The only 
difference we found was that, for the individual crime of burglary, the 1950 to 
1980 data set produced results significant only at the 90% confidence level.242 
Interestingly, burglary is also the only individual crime that drops out of 
statistical significance in our current equations. 
We are now in a position to extend that conclusion, by showing that our results 
hold, despite an additional seventeen years of data. But by extending the time 
period covered by the data comes the possibility that new and important events 
will creep into the equations. In extending the data from 1995 to 2012, we were 
concerned about a possibly impactful event: the Great Recession. According to 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Research (the arbiter of such things), the United 
States economy entered a recession in December 2007 that extended for eighteen 
 
238 Donohue, supra note 7, at 1171.  
239 See Aneja, Donohue & Zhang, supra note 134, at 614 (“Researchers and policy makers 
should keep an open mind about controversial policy topics in light of new and better 
empirical evidence or methodologies.”). 
240 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1098-99. For an illustration of this problem, see 
Aneja, Donohue & Zhang, supra note 134, at 601-06 (running “right-to-carry” law regressions 
over different time periods).  
241 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1100 tbl.VI.  
242 Id. 
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months, ending in June 2009.243 The Great Recession was, “by most measures[, 
the] worst economic recession since the Great Depression” of the early 1930s.244 
The widespread harms included unprecedented job losses and a significant rise 
in the unemployment rate.245 It also had worldwide effects, spreading to create 
“the worst recession the world has witnessed for over six decades.”246 
Because of its significant economic effects, we wondered whether the Great 
Recession would have had unpredictable (and uncontrolled) effects on our 
regression equations. While the available evidence suggests that the Great 
Recession did not significantly influence overall crime rates in the aggregate,247 
some crime patterns changed that could have influenced clearance rates, 
particularly with regard to property crimes.248 Additionally, the Great Recession 
could have affected other variables in our and Donohue’s equations. Both sets 
of equations include variables that could have been affected by economic 
changes, such as (for Donohue’s equations) dollars spent on law enforcement (a 
variable which is, in turn, inflation adjusted) and (for our equations) labor force 
participation, unemployment rate, and per capita income. Given the potentially 
significant effects, we decided to run our equations (and Donohue’s equations) 
stopping at 2007—the start of the Great Recession. 
As shown in Table 6 above, both sets of equations run on the data from 1950 
to 2007 produce more statistically significant MIRANDA effects. In our 
equations, we found statistically significant MIRANDA effects for violent and 
property crime clearances, as well as for robbery, assault (at the 90% confidence 
 
243 US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html [https://perma.cc/7J4X-7SK9] (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
244 Chart Book: The Legacy of the Great Recession, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
http://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/chart-book-the-legacy-of-the-great-
recession?fa=view&id=3252 [https://perma.cc/DY2Z-CECF] (last updated Feb. 10, 2017).  
245 Id.  
246 SHER VERICK & IYANATUL ISLAM, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF LABOR, THE GREAT 
RECESSION OF 2008-2009: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND POLICY RESPONSES 3 (2010), 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp4934.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7KC-4AMS].  
247 See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, STANFORD CTR. ON POVERTY & INEQUALITY, CRIME AND THE 
GREAT RECESSION 1, http://users.soc.umn.edu/~uggen/crime_recession.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TQQ9-JFBT] (last visited Jan. 29, 2017); James Q. Wilson, Crime and the 
Great Recession, CITY J., Summer 2011, at 90, 90.  
248 For example, from 2006 to 2010, there was a 21% increase in shoplifting crimes, UCR-
2010, supra note 79, at 90 tbl.7, which generally have extremely high clearance rates, see 
infra notes 440-41 and accompanying text. Also, motor vehicle thefts fell precipitously, by 
38% from 2006 to 2010. UCR-2010, supra note 79, at 90 tbl.7. Perhaps related to this decline, 
larceny of motor vehicle accessories (included in the larceny category) fell by 14% from 2006 
to 2010. See id. In contrast to other crimes’ clearance rates, larceny clearance rates show a 
sharp upward trend beginning around 2006. See supra Figure 6. We are not certain why this 
occurred, although the possibility of improved security technologies has been suggested as a 
general explanatory factor. See Michael Tonry, Why Crime Rates Are Falling Throughout the 
Western World, 43 CRIME & JUST. 1, 5 (2014). 
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level), burglary, larceny, and vehicle theft clearances. Using the Donohue 
specification, we found MIRANDA effects for violent and property crime 
clearances, as well as for rape, robbery, assault, larceny, and vehicle theft, all 
statistically significant at 95% confidence or (for violent, rape, robbery, 
property, larceny, and vehicle theft) at the 99% confidence level or greater. 
These results, too, give us greater confidence in the robustness of our conclusion 
that Miranda reduced clearance rates. 
B. Bayesian Model Averaging and the Cassell/Fowles and Donohue 
Specifications 
The specification issue that we are concerned with can also be addressed in a 
more rigorous fashion. Historically, uncertainty about which model 
specification was “correct” was a subject on which classical econometric 
methods offered little guidance. But recently, interest in Bayesian approaches 
has grown to address this problem.249 
A researcher attempting to quantitatively explore a phenomenon (such as, in 
this case, crime clearance rates) will likely encounter uncertainty about which 
variables to include in statistical models. Typically, a researcher must develop a 
theoretical model that contains some explanatory variables, but the precise set 
of explanatory variables to include is uncertain.250 More worrisome, a researcher 
could try a series of alternative specifications until discovering one that 
“works”—i.e., one that produces a statistically significant result251 (or, if trying 
to debunk a particular theory, one that does not produce a statistically significant 
result). 
Conventionally reported statistical significance measures (such as the t-
statistics we and Donohue have both reported) are of little use in assessing such 
concerns. These statistics show statistical significance within a particular model. 
But they do not help answer the question of whether the model itself is correct. 
Issues of model uncertainty related to the choice of which variables to include 
 
249 See generally ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2014); 
PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 213, 216-31 (6th ed. 2008); Fowles & Loeb, 
supra note 135, at 52. For an interesting historical account of early uses of Bayesian methods, 
see Duo Qin, Bayesian Econometrics: The First Twenty Years, 12 ECONOMETRIC THEORY 
500, 503-13 (1996). 
250 See Jacob M. Montgomery & Brendan Nyhan, Bayesian Model Averaging: Theoretical 
Developments and Practical Applications, 18 POL. ANALYSIS 245, 246-54 (2010). 
251 Alan Gerber & Neil Malhotra, Do Statistical Reporting Standards Affect What Is 
Published? Publication Bias in Two Leading Political Science Journals, 3 Q.J. POL. SCI. 313, 
314 (2008) (“[R]esearchers may engage in data mining to find model specifications and sub-
samples that achieve significance thresholds.”); see also Daniele Fanelli, Negative Results 
Are Disappearing from Most Disciplines and Countries, 90 SCIENTOMETRICS 891, 892-93 
(2012); cf. Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson & Uri Simonsohn, False-Positive Psychology: 
Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as 
Significant, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1359, 1359-62 (2011) (discussing problems when researchers 
report only equations that “worked”).  
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in a regression are paramount to problems of simultaneity and multicollinearity. 
In particular, problems emerge when the associated explanatory variables are 
correlated within a regression model. 
As a consequence of problems such as these, reported econometric results are 
sometimes fragile to even slight changes in model specification.252 Writing in 
this Symposium, Alschuler nicely flagged this concern when he wrote, with 
regard to law-related regression analyses, that most “seem to collapse as soon as 
one breathes on them. In particular, I have never seen any work by an 
econometrician that convinced me of anything.”253 
Bayesian model averaging (“BMA”) attempts to address concerns like 
Alschuler’s by trying to assess robustness of regression results with regard to 
alternative specifications.254 We refer our (largely legal) audience to other 
technical literature (including articles previously cowritten by Fowles255) for 
specific descriptions of how the procedure works.256 But, in brief, BMA looks 
at all conceivable model specifications and then weights them by their posterior 
probabilities.257 For example, if there are n number of variables that might be 
included in a regression equation, then BMA consider all 2n conceivable discrete 
models and determines whether the variable in question remains significant 
across those various specifications.258 It appears to be generally accepted that 
“BMA can help applied researchers to ensure that their estimates of the effects 
of key independent variables are robust to a wide range of possible model 
specifications.”259 It is also generally agreed that BMA can be a useful corrective 
for the (apparently widespread) problem of researchers selectively reporting 
only models that “work.”260 In the last few years, BMA has become commonly 
used in econometric literature.261 
 
252 Montgomery & Nyhan, supra note 250, at 246. For an illustration of this problem, see 
the spirited empirical debate over whether “right-to-carry” firearms laws reduce crime. Aneja, 
Donohue & Zhang, supra note 134, at 614-15. See generally LOTT, supra note 134. 
253 Alschuler, supra note 40, at 889 n.186.  
254 See David Weisbach, Introduction: Legal Decision Making Under Deep Uncertainty, 
44 J. LEGAL STUD. S319, S332 (2015). 
255 See Gail Blattenberger, Richard Fowles & Peter D. Loeb, Variable Selection in 
Bayesian Models: Using Parameter Estimation and Non Parameter Estimation Methods, in 
34 ADVANCES IN ECONOMETRICS: BAYESIAN MODEL COMPARISON 249, 261-65 (Ivan Jeliazkov 
& Dale J. Poirier eds., 2014); Blattenberger, Fowles & Loeb, supra note 136, at 119; 
Blattenberg, Fowles, Loeb & Clarke, supra note 136, at 1829.  
256 See, e.g., Montgomery & Nyhan, supra note 250, at 247-49. 
257 Blattenberger, Fowles & Loeb, supra note 255, at 261. 
258 Id. 
259 Montgomery & Nyhan, supra note 250, at 246.  
260 See Leslie K. John, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Measuring the Prevalence 
of Questionable Research Practices with Incentives for Truth Telling, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 524, 
525 (2012). 
261 Tiago M. Fragoso & Francisco Louzada Neto, Bayesian Model Averaging: A 
Systematic Review and Conceptual Classification, 16 tbl.2 (Sept. 29, 2015), 
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Recent advances in computing power have promoted adoption of BMA by 
making BMA calculations feasible.262 In the context of our clearance rate 
equations here, given that our model has thirteen independent (explanatory) 
variables, the total number of alternative model specifications is 8192 (2 to the 
13th power). Similarly, given that Donohue’s model has ten independent 
variables,263 the total number of alternative models is 1024 (2 to the 10th power). 
Without adequate computer processing speed, it would not previously have been 
possible to assess all these alternatives.264 But now, more powerful computers 
and readily available software packages allow researchers to use BMA to assess 
all these different possibilities.265 
We used the standard BMA package in R, which is readily available and well 
documented.266 We used the standard odds ratio of 1:20 for model inclusion. Our 
results for the Cassell/Fowles model, using our full data set (1950 to 2012), are 




262 KENNEDY, supra note 249, at 217 (“In recent years these practical difficulties have been 
greatly alleviated by the development of appropriate computer software . . . .”). Before BMA 
became practical, it was possible to conduct Extreme Bounds Analysis (“EBA”) to make 
similar fragility determinations. See Blattenberger, Fowles & Loeb, supra note 255, at 255-
56 (“[EBA] is a methodology of global sensitivity analysis that computes the maximum and 
minimum values for Bayesian posterior means in the context of linear regression models.”). 
EBA calculated the maximum and minimum coefficients that could be obtained using 
maximum likelihood estimation over all possible linear combinations of explanatory 
variables. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1104. In our 1998 paper, we reported EBA 
statistics showing that our results were not fragile. Id. at 1105. For further discussion of the 
differences between earlier EBA analysis and current BMA analysis, see Blattenberg, Fowles 
& Loeb, supra note 255, at 255-58, 261-65. 
263 Donohue, supra note 7, at 1173 tbl.1. 
264 See KENNEDY, supra note 249, at 213. 
265 Id. 
266 Blattenberger, Fowles & Loeb, supra note 255, at 262, 277 n.14, 278 (citing Adrian 
Raftery et al., BMA: Bayesian Model Averaging, CRAN.R-PROJECT (Nov. 6, 2015), 
https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/BMA/index.html [https://perma.cc/ECZ3-3T8W]); 
see also ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND 
MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 10-11 (2007) (advocating for the use of R software 
when conducting Bayesian analysis).  
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Table 7. Bayesian Model Average of MIRANDA Variable Inclusion in 
Cassell/Fowles Specifications—1950-2012 
(three-year Miranda phase in) 
Regressions on Clearance Rates for Cities 
Cassell/Fowles Specification (Odds Ratio of 1:20 for Models Inclusion) 
 












Violent Crimes 1950-2012 100.0% 100% -10.110 99 
Murder 1950-2012 10.2% 0% 0.093 14 
Rape 1950-2012 13.6% 20% -0.281 17 
Robbery 1950-2012 100.0% 100% -7.092 27 
Aggravated Assault 1950-
2012 
44.6% 40% -1.481 54 
Property Crimes 1950-
2012 
78.8% 100% -1.180 28 
Burglary 1950-2012 42.9% 60% -0.809 25 
Larceny 1950-2012 60.9% 80% -1.069 30 
Vehicle Theft 1950-2012 100.0% 100% -5.122 21 
Shaded areas denote crimes for which MIRANDA variable is found in at least 
four of the top five equations. 
 
Since some of our readers may not be familiar with the standard statistical 
reporting for BMA results, we will describe the first row of the table in some 
detail. This row reports BMA results for violent crime clearance rates using the 
data set 1950 to 2012. The BMA procedure considered all 8192 possible 
specifications of our equations—i.e., all different combinations of the thirteen 
explanatory variables we had identified. The procedure then selected equations 
that had odds of greater than 5% of being the correct model. BMA sorts through 
these 8192 models and retains those that are supported by the evidence and 
discards models whose support is low. From a Bayesian perspective, it is 
perfectly sensible to calculate a given model’s posterior probability, P(D|Mi), 
where Mi represents the ith model and D represents the observed data. When two 
models are compared, a selection decision comes down to either dropping one 
of the models from consideration or keeping both of them. The mechanism to 
assist in making this decision is the ratio of the posterior probabilities. If the 
odds ratio is relatively close to 1.0, the two candidate models are kept; otherwise, 
one model is retained and the other eliminated. With our choice of 1:20, the odds 
window retains a large number of plausible models, but significantly fewer than 
all possible 1.0s. As noted above, posterior model probabilities are also used as 
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the weights applied to the estimated coefficients for the retained models when 
computing Bayesian average. 
In this case, the BMA procedure identified ninety-nine out of 8192 models as 
being most likely correct. Of these 99 identified models, the MIRANDA variable 
was included in 99 of the 99 identified models (100%). Typically, posterior 
model probabilities drop quickly, so BMA also identified the top five models 
and, in these, MIRANDA was included in all five (100%). The average 
coefficient generated from these equations is -10.110, meaning that the BMA-
selected models had an average negative coefficient associated with MIRANDA 
of -10.111. The remaining rows in Table 7 report the same data for each of the 
other eight crime categories of clearance rates we are investigating. Strong 
results are shown for robbery, property crimes, larceny, and vehicle theft—
particularly for robbery and vehicle theft (100% inclusion). 
As discussed in the preceding Section, we were concerned about the Great 
Recession’s effect on our models. BMA can reveal which equations are selected 
if we confine our data to 1950 to 2007, as shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Aggregate and Individual Crimes: 
Bayesian Model Average of MIRANDA Variable Inclusion—1950-2007 
(three-year Miranda phase in) 
Regressions on Clearance Rates for Cities 
Cassell/Fowles Specification (Odds Ratio of 1:20 for Models Inclusion) 
(data for 1950-2007) 
 












Violent Crimes 1950-2007 100.0% 100% -8.482 44 
Murder 1950-2007 11.8% 20% 0.207 38 
Rape 1950-2007 13.0% 0% -0.303 44 
Robbery 1950-2007 100.0% 100% -5.773 19 
Aggravated Assault 1950-
2007 
76.5% 80% -2.631 44 
Property Crimes 1950-2007 100.0% 100% -2.778 22 
Burglary 1950-2007 73.2% 80% -1.727 19 
Larceny 1950-2007 99.1% 100% -2.504 37 
Vehicle Theft 1950-2007 100.0% 100% -5.621 25 
 
As this table shows, we have even stronger MIRANDA findings if we confine 
our data to data unaffected by the Great Recession. Not only do clearance rates 
for violent crimes, robbery, and vehicle theft show up in 100% of the equations, 
but property crimes (100%) and larceny (99.1%) show up almost invariably as 
well. Given the possibility that recessionary influences may have had some 
bearing on property crime clearance rates, this result is interesting. 
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Of course, BMA permits us to examine not just the robustness of our 
equations but also of Donohue’s equations. Table 9 reports the BMA results for 
the Donohue equations, using the full data set (1950-2012). 
 
Table 9. Bayesian Model Average of MIRANDA Variable Inclusion in 
Donohue Specifications—1950-2012 
(three-year Miranda phase in) 
Regressions on Clearance Rates for Cities 
Donohue Specification (Odds Ratio of 1:20 for Models Inclusion) 
(data for 1950-2012) 
 












Violent Crimes 1950-2012 100.0% 100% -9.090 46 
Murder 1950-2012 10.3% 0% -0.100 22 
Rape 1950-2012 75.9% 80% -4.485 19 
Robbery 1950-2012 95.8% 100% -4.476 50 
Aggravated Assault 1950-
2012 
37.7% 40% -1.049 40 
Property Crimes 1950-
2012 
41.0% 20% -0.691 21 
Burglary 1950-2012 20.6% 20% -0.210 9 
Larceny 1950-2012 9.0% 20% 0.022 9 
Vehicle Theft 1950-2012 100.0% 100% -6.161 15 
 
As can be seen, Donohue’s equations also produce robust MIRANDA findings, 
particularly for violent crimes (100% inclusion), vehicle theft (100% inclusion), 
and robbery (95.8% inclusion). BMA can also be used to assess the results of 
Donohue’s equations using the data set up to the Great Recession. Table 10 
reports these results. 
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Table 10. Bayesian Model Average of MIRANDA Variable Inclusion in 
Donohue Specifications—1950-2007 
(three-year Miranda phase in) 
Regressions on Clearance Rates for Cities 
Donohue Specification (Odds Ratio of 1:20 for Models Inclusion) 
(data for 1950-2007) 
 












Violent Crimes 1950-2007 100.0% 100% -9.603 11 
Murder 1950-2007 33.5% 40% -0.605 24 
Rape 1950-2007 100.0% 100% -9.625 8 
Robbery 1950-2007 100.0% 100% -6.267 38 
Aggravated Assault 1950-
2007 
42.7% 40% -1.464 23 
Property Crimes 1950-2007 100.0% 100% -2.366 18 
Burglary 1950-2007 18.8% 20% -0.180 10 
Larceny 1950-2007 85.8% 100% -1.555 29 
Vehicle Theft 1950-2007 100.0% 100% -6.509 39 
 
As can be seen, BMA shows that Donohue’s equations, when confined to 
prerecession data, produce robust MIRANDA effects for many different crimes, 
including violent crimes (100% inclusion), rape (100% inclusion), robbery 
(100% inclusion), property crimes (100% inclusion), vehicle theft (100% 
inclusion), and larceny (85.8% inclusion). 
In light of these findings, we think it is fair to say that our MIRANDA effects 
will not “seem to collapse as soon as one breathes on them,” in the colorful 
language of Alschuler.267 To the contrary, the great bulk of our findings (and 
even many similar findings by Donohue) are insensitive to model specification, 
as shown by the BMA procedure which assessed, quite literally, thousands of 
possible alternative specifications. 
C. Simultaneity Issues 
This may also be the appropriate point for a brief discussion of simultaneity 
issues. As we discussed with Donohue in our 1998 exchange, our equations are 
reduced-form models—that is, we have specified only a single causal 
equation.268 This requires the assumption that crime clearance rates were 
explained by various variables, but not vice versa. However, crime clearance 
rates could influence the explanatory variables. In particular, a drop in the 
clearance rate might cause crime rates to rise, because the lower the chance of 
 
267 Alschuler, supra note 40, at 889 n.186.  
268 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1101-03; Donohue, supra note 7, at 1168.  
  
750  BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:685 
 
apprehension, the greater the expected rewards to crime. Such a possibility is 
known as “simultaneity.”269 Our (and Donohue’s) crime clearance rates model, 
resting as it does on the reduced-form model, does not capture these possible 
interactions. There is considerable literature suggesting that failure to consider 
simultaneity can lead to problems in predicting crime rates and the deterrent 
effects of police.270 However, the issue posed here is a slightly different one: 
whether failure to control for possible simultaneity affects our conclusions about 
the MIRANDA variable. 
Particularly in light of the BMA results, we believe our conclusions are 
unlikely to have been substantially affected for several reasons. First, it is 
possible that there is no simultaneity—that is, clearance rates might not directly 
affect crime rates. While we do not necessarily subscribe to this counterintuitive 
theory, it is interesting that the literature on police effects on crime is 
conflicting.271 Second, even if simultaneity is an issue, results consistent with 
those reported here might still be found. Simultaneity can bias results not only 
upward, but also downward. It can also leave them unchanged. We do not think 
that simultaneity would explain away the kinds of dramatic shifts in crime 
clearance rates that we are studying here. 
Most importantly, our BMA analysis demonstrates that our results are 
insensitive to the variables that we include or exclude in the equations. This 
strongly suggests that simultaneity does not explain our findings, in that we do 
not detect MIRANDA fragility across a vast number of model specifications. 
Furthermore, the stability of MIRANDA is remarkable given the high degree of 
correlation within the data. In the presence of multicollinearity, it is not 
uncommon to observe sign switching for focus variables when other variables 
are added or dropped. Across the vast number of models that BMA estimates, 
MIRANDA remains robust. 
We readily acknowledge that, in theory, simultaneous equations for our crime 
clearance rate model would be the most desirable way to proceed. In practice, 
however, the specification of such models is often highly dependent on 
 
269 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1102. 
270 Id. at 1102 & n.209 (collecting illustrations of this problem). 
271 See Marian J. Borg & Karen F. Parker, Mobilizing Law in Urban Areas: The Social 
Structure of Homicide Clearance Rates, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 435, 436 (2001) (“[S]tudies 
have examined the link between clearance or arrest rates and crime rates. Results regarding 
this relationship are mixed. Although some studies demonstrate a crime-prevention effect of 
arrests on crime rates, others fail to find consistent evidence that higher clearance rates result 
in significantly lower crime rates.” (citations omitted)). Compare John E. Eck & Edwards R. 
Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An Assessment of the Evidence, 
in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207, 217 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000) 
(carefully reviewing nine studies, with twenty-seven dependent variables, of the size of police 
forces and violent crime and finding no “consistent evidence that increases in police strength 
produce decreases in violent crime”), with Levitt, supra note 163, at 176-79 (attributing the 
crime drop in the 1990s, in part, to increases in the number of police and a rising prison 
population). 
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underlying assumptions, particularly for individual crimes (e.g., robbery) in 
which we are particularly interested.272 Given the great debate over how to 
model relationships between law enforcement efforts and crime,273 however, we 
have decided to avoid this quagmire for present purposes. Instead, we simply 
leave things where they are: robust findings of many MIRANDA effects across 
both our and Donohue’s reduced form specifications of regression equations. 
IV. DATA COLLECTION ISSUES: A RESPONSE TO FLOYD FEENEY 
Following the publication of our initial Stanford Law Review article (and our 
follow-on exchange with Donohue), Feeney published a detailed response.274 
Feeney conceded that our approach of reviewing clearance rate data was likely 
to significantly understate any harmful effects due to Miranda.275 Feeney, 
however, also advanced three major challenges to the data underlying our 
premise—the data demonstrating that FBI clearance rates fell sharply after 
Miranda. First, Feeney argued that the clearance rate data we relied on, collected 
from cities, declined due to artificial (record-keeping) reasons and thus any 
decline should not be attributed to Miranda.276 Second, Feeney argued that the 
“premier” data on crime clearance rates in the 1960s come from California and 
that such data show no post-Miranda decline.277 Third, and somewhat in tension 
with his first two claims, Feeney argued that Miranda’s adverse effect on 
clearance rates was due to reductions in police ability to obtain secondary 
clearances.278 
We appreciate the time and attention Feeney devoted in crafting a 114-page 
response to our original article. We disagree, however, with many of his 
observations. In this Part and the following Part, we use new data we have 
collected to show that his three data-based critiques are unpersuasive.279 
 
272 See ZIMRING, supra note 163, at 55 (“Models to predict crime generally are not strong; 
models to predict specific types of crime are even more premature and fragile.”).  
Shortly after writing our 1998 paper, we attempted to develop simultaneous equations, and 
the models we tried showed the same strong MIRANDA effect as our reduced form equations. 
See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1103 n.215. But because we thought those models 
remained highly sensitive to underlying assumptions, we decided not to pursue the effort 
further.  
273 See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Robert M. Solow & Cynthia Lum, Deterrence, Criminal 
Opportunities, and Police, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 74, 74 (2015); Greg Pogarsky & Thomas A. 
Loughran, The Policy-to-Perceptions Link in Deterrence: Time to Retire the Clearance Rate, 
15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 777, 778 (2016); Steven Raphael, Optimal Policing, Crime, 
and Clearance Rates, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 791, 797-98 (2016).  
274 See generally Feeney, supra note 8.  
275 See id. at 5.  
276 Id. at 4. 
277 Id. at 4-5. 
278 Id. at 5-6. 
279 Feeney also criticized our conclusion that Miranda caused the drop in clearance rates. 
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A. Data Collection Problems in the Nation’s Cities 
1. Clearance Rate Declines in the Nation’s Fourteen Largest Cities 
Feeney’s lead argument is that changes in police record keeping in large cities 
caused clearance rates to fall after 1965 for reasons unrelated to Miranda.280 
Feeney points to, for example, the sharp fall in robbery clearance rates in New 
York City.281 Feeney attributes this decline to record-keeping changes, rather 
than any actual impairment of the NYPD’s ability to clear crimes.282 Feeney then 
goes on to argue that these record-keeping changes influenced our 
calculations.283 
Before diving into the details of this argument, we want to set a cautionary 
note. We are obviously aware that data from individual cities is subject to 
fluctuation and manipulation. We acknowledged this point in our first article.284 
But while such deviations might present a serious problem for analyses of police 
effectiveness in particular jurisdictions, our focus here is on a Supreme Court 
decision binding on police forces around the country. Accordingly, we use the 
aggregate national clearance rate, comprised of clearance reports from 
thousands of agencies.285 Even if a particular city reported rates in a questionable 
fashion, our results would be unaffected if any such manipulations did not 
change significantly in the several years surrounding Miranda or if any changes 
in the manipulations were relatively small in comparison to the total number of 
reports nationally— both reasonable assumptions.286 We also report results for 
the aggregated categories of clearance rates for “violent crimes” and “property 
crimes,” for which interjurisdictional variations in categorizing crimes should 
 
We review this criticism at infra notes 529-709 and accompanying text. Feeney also examined 
clearance rate data from foreign countries. A review of this claim is in progress. See generally 
Cassell, supra note 78. 
280 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 18-41. 
281 Id. at 31. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. at 32-33. 
284 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1075-76 (discussing how national aggregation 
of data mitigates problems with local data collection). 
285 Cf. Yehuda Grunfeld & Zvi Griliches, Is Aggregation Necessarily Bad?, 42 REV. ECON. 
& STAT. 1, 10 (1960) (“[A]ggregation is not necessarily bad if one is interested in the 
aggregates.”). 
286 See FOX, supra note 79, at 7 (concluding that the problem of data manipulation is “not 
overly troublesome” for time series analysis that “does not involve cross-sectional data, but 
rather a time series from the same population”); Charles R. Tittle & Alan R. Rowe, Certainty 
of Arrest and Crime Rates: A Further Test of the Deterrence Hypothesis, 52 SOC. FORCES 455, 
456 (1974) (stating that although manipulations are possible, “there are good reasons to doubt 
that they greatly contaminate the data” and that they “seem to be distributed throughout the 
various police departments so that the validity of a study which examines internal variations 
in the entire body of data . . . would be unaffected” (citations omitted)). 
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be minimized.287 Also, FBI data collection criteria for “cleared” crimes appear 
to have remained the same throughout the relevant period.288 So any record-
keeping changes would have to have occurred in individual cities for reasons 
unique to those cities, and with effects presumably confined to those particular 
cities, not influencing the much larger national aggregates we consider. 
Turning specifically to New York City, Feeney attributes the change in record 
keeping to the election of reform mayor John Lindsay.289 When Lindsay took 
office at the beginning of 1966, he apparently ordered “honest” reporting of all 
crimes committed.290 According to Feeney, these changes in reporting practices 
caused a substantial increase in the number of reported robberies in 1966, with 
the consequence that the clearance rate declined in New York City—from 42.9% 
to 17.7%.291 Feeney does not appear to have considered the possibility that just 
as New York City decided to report more crimes, it also reported more 
clearances for the same crimes. Nor does Feeney discuss the possibility that 
confession rate declines in New York City were in fact particularly steep, as 
suggested by the only post-Miranda confession rate study in New York City.292 
 
287 See Gene Swimmer, The Relationship of Police and Crime: Some Methodological and 
Empirical Results, 12 CRIMINOLOGY 293, 304 (1974) (claiming that the impact on the data by 
variability of reporting techniques is minimized by grouping the types of offenses into larger 
“property” and “violence” categories); see also FOX, supra note 79, at 127 n.8 (“Although the 
data on the individual Index offenses are available, such disaggregate analyses would be so 
specific that they would not lend themselves to making general statements about the 
interrelation of the variables of interest.”). 
288 The 1962 UCR Handbook defines a “cleared” crime and provides examples. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK: 
HOW TO PREPARE UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 48-49 (1962) (defining “offenses cleared by 
arrest” and “exceptional clearances”). The 1965 and 1966 handbooks contain virtually 
identical definitions. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING HANDBOOK 50 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 UCR HANDBOOK] (“An 
offense is ‘cleared by arrest’ or solved for crime reporting purposes, when at least one person 
is (1) arrested, (2) charged with the commission of the offense, and (3) turned over to the court 
for prosecution . . . .”). Later versions appear to be substantively indistinguishable. See, e.g., 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING 
HANDBOOK 41-42 (1984) (defining “cleared by an arrest” and “exceptional clearances”). It 
appears that the definition of a “cleared” crime was slightly broadened sometime before the 
1960s by allowing police to count as cleared crimes cases in which the offender was “turned 
over to the court for prosecution” rather than actually requiring the prosecution to take place. 
See Lawrence W. Sherman, Defining Arrest: Practical Consequences of Agency Differences 
(Part I), 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 376, 380 (1980).  
289 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 30. 
290 Id. 
291 Id. at 31, 32 tbl.5. 
292 See Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings on S. 300, 
S. 552, S. 580, S. 674, S. 675, S. 678, S. 798, S. 824, S. 916, S. 917, S. 992, S. 1007, S. 1094, 
S. 1194, S. 1333, and S. 2050 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law & Procedures of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 1120 (1967) [hereinafter Controlling Crime Hearings] 
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Instead of exploring these issues, Feeney builds on his theory about New York 
City to suggest that such record-keeping changes explain the drop in clearance 
rates that we are investigating. But Mayor Lindsay’s reforms produced changes 
in all crime categories (with the sole exception of murder—presumably a crime 
that is hard to fail to report).293 As discussed earlier, our equations find a 
MIRANDA effect for the categories of robbery, larceny, and vehicle theft, but 
not murder, rape, assault, and (in most models) burglary. This suggests that the 
record-keeping phenomenon is not the same phenomenon we are analyzing. 
To bolster his conclusions, immediately after reporting his table of New York 
City data, Feeney reported another table with robbery clearance rate data from 
the nation’s fourteen largest cities (including New York City), as of 1965.294 
Quickly eyeballing the numbers, Feeney seems to believe that the data from 
these fourteen cities raise a question about whether there was any decline in 
clearance rates after Miranda at all. Looking at the data from these fourteen 
cities, Feeney suggests that they show, in his opinion, “an almost random 
shifting” or a “mixed trend.”295 
While Feeney commendably provides a table listing the published and 
unpublished data for the fourteen cities he relies upon, he does not explain 
precisely how he determines whether or not this data exhibits any pattern. 
Moreover, focusing on any individual city presents its own problems. Focusing 
on smaller individual data sets tends to obscure larger trends—the proverbial 
missing-the-forest-for-the-trees problem. The smaller the unit from which data 
is collected, the more likely it is that some random event may influence that data, 
introducing randomness or “noise” into the data set.296 To provide an obvious 
 
(noting the reduction in confession rates from approximately 49% of nonhomicide felony 
defendants to 15% following Miranda); Weinraub, supra note 107, at A1 (reporting that a 
police spokesperson attributed the decline in clearance rates from 1965 to 1966 in New York 
City in part to Supreme Court decisions restricting the ability to get multiple confessions). 
But cf. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, TAPING POLICE INTERROGATIONS IN THE 20TH PRECINCT, 
N.Y.P.D. 79-80 (1967) (questioning whether Miranda could have caused the reported changes 
in New York City’s clearance rate); Nagin, supra note 151, at 114-15 (suggesting that more 
accurate record-keeping policies might explain the decline in the New York City clearance 
rate). 
293 Compare UCR-1965, supra note 79, at 65 tbl.3 (reporting New York City index 
crimes), with UCR-1966, supra note 79, at 170-85 tbl.55 (same).  
294 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 35-36, 37 tbl.6. Feeney claims that these fourteen cities 
“account for over 50% of the robberies in the nation in 1966, 1967, and 1968.” Id. at 36. But 
the citation he cites to does not support his point. See id. at 36 n.92 (citing PHILIP J. COOK, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ROBBERY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT TRENDS 
AND PATTERNS 11-12 (1983) (noting that in 1981, the nation’s fifty-seven cities reported 61% 
of all robberies)). The UCR for 1966 does not either because summing the total robberies for 
the nation’s twenty-four largest cities in that year does not provide a number of robberies 
equaling 50% of the nation’s total. See UCR-1966, supra note 79, at 92 tbl.6.  
295 Feeney, supra note 8, at 35-36.  
296 See GEORGE E. P. BOX, J. STUART HUNTER & WILLIAM G. HUNTER, STATISTICS FOR 
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example, to discover the effects of Miranda on police, we would not want to 
exclusively look at crime clearance rates from one individual police precinct. 
Police officers might come and go from the precinct, a new gang might move 
into the precinct, and so forth, making it hard to generalize from what happened 
in that small area to the entire country. Of course, similar problems can exist 
with respect to data from particular cities, as Feeney’s own arguments explain. 
A new mayor or police chief might introduce a different record-keeping system 
for the police force.297 Or in a particular year, a city might face a budget crunch 
or the spread of a particularly dangerous addictive drug. Each of these factors in 
any particular city could have changed clearance rates during the 1966-to-1968 
period—thereby introducing noise into the data and obscuring any larger trends 
that may or may not have existed across the country. 
With regard to noise in data, a standard statistical response is averaging. So 
long as the noise is random with respect to the phenomenon of interest, 
averaging should help remove the effects of noise on the data being studied.298 
Applied to the issues discussed in this Article, while data from any one city 
might gyrate for unpredictable reasons, the collective data from fourteen cities 
are less likely to do so. And data from, 140 or 1400 cities, for example, are even 
less likely to do so. If we are interested in a big picture assessment of a national 
phenomenon like Miranda, that picture will come into sharper focus as we step 
back and aggregate larger data sets, as Feeney himself appears to agree.299 
 
EXPERIMENTERS: DESIGN, INNOVATION, AND DISCOVERY 558-59, 568-76 (2d ed. 2005). See 
generally HOLGER KANTZ & THOMAS SCHREIBER, NONLINEAR TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 174-96 
(2003). The issue of the appropriate level of aggregation is obviously not confined to the 
Miranda context, but is a broader issue in criminal justice research. See, e.g., Aneja, Donohue 
& Zhang, supra note 134, at 596-97 (analyzing both county-level and state-level data because 
of problems with individual counties); John R. Hipp, Block, Tract, and Levels of Aggregation: 
Neighborhood Structure and Crime and Disorder as a Case in Point, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 659, 
660 (2007). Related to these problems is what has been called “The Law of Small Numbers,” 
the belief that small samples mirror the population from which they are drawn. See David A. 
Hyman, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits Against PPACA?, 2014 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 805, 830.  
297 See, e.g., David Seidman & Michael Couzens, Getting the Crime Rate Down: Political 
Pressure and Crime Reporting, 8 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 480 (1974) (discussing 
“[m]anipulation of crime statistics” in Baltimore, Maryland). 
298 See, e.g., Hilary Sigman, Environmental Liability and Redevelopment of Old Industrial 
Land, 53 J.L. & ECON. 289, 303 (2010). We are aware of more complex and thorough 
approaches for addressing issues of noise in time series data. See, e.g., Grega Repovš, Dealing 
with Noise in EEG Recording and Data Analysis, 15 INFORMATICA MEDICA SLOVENICA 18, 
19 (2010) (discussing methods for dealing with noise in medical research); Michail Vlachos, 
Dimitrios Gunopulos & Gautam Das, Indexing Time-Series Under Conditions of Noise, in 57 
DATA MINING IN TIME SERIES DATABASES 67, 68 (Mark Last, Abraham Kandel & Horst Bunke 
eds., 2004). However, the limited number of data points in the series we are working with 
precludes using such methods.  
299 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 33-34 (discussing ways to create a data set larger than 
individual cities and moving in the direction of “national” data).  
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We took this aggregating approach with Feeney’s own fourteen-city data set, 
averaging the reported clearance rates for the fourteen cities.300 The results are 
depicted in Figure 8 below, which shows the robbery clearance rates for each of 
the fourteen cities, as well as the average of the fourteen cities and the FBI’s 
national average. As anticipated, data from the fourteen individual cities involve 
a lot of “noise,” reflected by the fluctuating trend lines plotting year-to-year data 
from the various cities. But when averaged together, the data from the fourteen 
cities show a clear downward trend over 1966 to 1968. 
 
But rather than just give our own subjective opinion as to whether the average 
looks like a sharp downward trend (as we believe) or “random shifting”301 
showing only a “mixed trend” (as Feeney believes), we decided to take a more 
rigorous approach to the question. A standard statistical technique for reviewing 
a data set for possible changes over time is to ask whether the data contains a 
structural break.302 Reviewing data for a structural break is a pure time series 
 
300 We used an unweighted average—i.e., simply the numerical average of each of the 
fourteen cities. This approach is appropriate because our concern was to determine not the 
magnitude of any drop in clearance rates in these cities, but rather whether a drop occurred in 
these cities. We also generated four missing observations for Chicago (1960 to 1963), by 
assuming that clearance rates in those years were the same as those in 1964, and one missing 
observation for Dallas (1969), by averaging the clearance rates for the preceding and 
following year. 
301 Feeney, supra note 8, at 35. 
302 See, e.g., Patricia H. Born & J. Bradley Karl, The Effect of Tort Reform on Medical 
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question about a single data series. No choices need to be made about model 
specification or the inclusion/exclusion of additional variables. Moreover, 
standard statistical software is available to perform such examinations. Using 
the standard structural change function (strucchange303) in R, we reviewed the 
fourteen-city average from 1960 to 1970.304 Remarkably, where Feeney saw 
only “random shifting,” we found a statistically significant structural break 
following 1965 (with a confidence interval of one year on either side)—
consistent with our hypothesis that Miranda caused a break in clearance rates 
over the 1966-to-1968 timeframe. 
Feeney might respond, however, by arguing that the big drop in clearances in 
New York City from 1965 to 1966 lies behind our finding of a structural break 
in the data. Feeney suggests as much when he notes that New York City’s 
numbers influence our other clearance rate discussions.305 But, here again, it is 
possible to test this hypothesis by simply excluding New York City from the 
fourteen-city average. Simple visual observation suggests that dropping New 
York City from the data set does not make much of a difference, as shown in 
Figure 9. 
 
Malpractice Insurance Market Trends, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 718, 747 (2016) 
(performing structural break analysis on an insurance market). 
303 See Achim Zeileis et al., Strucchange: An R Package for Testing for Structural Change 
in Linear Regression Models, 7 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1, 15 (2002). 
304 One of the choices we had to make was what minimum number of observations was 
required for a structural break. We assumed three observations.  
305 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 32-33.  
  
758  BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:685 
 
 
But we can do more than simple visual observation by again using the 
strucchange function. Reviewing the thirteen-city average (the large cities 
without New York City), we once again detect a structural break in the data, this 
time at 1966 (with confidence intervals of one year on either side)—a timeframe 
that fits our 1966-to-1968 hypothesis.306 
Feeney might respond, however, that even among just the thirteen cities, more 
record-keeping problems still existed. In particular, Feeney identified three cities 
(in addition to New York City) where he believes record-keeping changes 
coincidentally occurred, potentially affecting clearance rates at the same time as 
Miranda: Detroit, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C.307 So, once again, we can 
test this possibility by dropping all of the cities with identified record-keeping 
changes from the original fourteen-city data set, leaving behind ten cities. When 
examined visually, this data set also shows a downward trend at the time of 
Miranda, as shown in Figure 10. 
 
306 We also detected a second break in the data at 1963. 
307 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 35 (“The four cities with record keeping shifts (New York, 
Detroit, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C.) show sharp downward figures . . . . [H]owever, 
this is due to the record keeping shifts rather than to any real sharp decline in clearance 
rates.”). 
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Using the strucchange algorithm, we are again able to identify a downward 
structural break in the data in 1967, a time consistent with our theory,308 although 
this break does not show a confidence band associated with it. We hypothesize 
that if we had more observations, to the left and right (that is, earlier and later), 
we would be able to shrink the confidence band. But significant pieces of the 
fourteen-city data are unpublished or not otherwise generally available. Thus, it 
would require an extraordinary amount of time to collect data for this extended 
data set. 
In sum, relying only on Feeney’s hand-plucked robbery clearance rate data 
from the nation’s fourteen largest cities, we are able to disprove his claim that it 
shows no evidence of declining clearance rates at the time of Miranda. Instead, 
when the data are averaged together to eliminate noise—with or without 
individual cities with record-keeping changes—they reveal a structural decline 
in crime clearance rates in the immediate post-Miranda period (i.e., 1966 to 
1968). 
 
308 One of the ten cities that Feeney believes does not have record-keeping problems is Los 
Angeles Accordingly, Los Angeles is included in the ten cities depicted in Figure 10. See id. 
at 38. As we show shortly, however, the Los Angeles clearance rate data are subject to wild 
fluctuations at the time of Miranda—fluctuations that tend to obscure the post-Miranda 
decline in the remaining nine cities. See infra notes 343-65 and accompanying text. Because 
dropping Los Angeles from the average would only further steepen the immediate post-
Miranda clearance rate decline in the average depicted in Figure 10, we did not undertake a 
separate analysis of the data without Los Angeles.  
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2. Clearance Rate Declines in the Nation’s Cities Organized by Population 
Feeney’s claim that record-keeping changes in New York City and a few other 
large cities explain the crime clearance rate declines can be explored in another 
way. After pointing to problems with the New York City data, Feeney notes that 
“in theory” it would be possible to remove New York City (and other 
problematic large cities) from the calculation, producing a “cleaner data set.”309 
Feeney believes that the logistics of such data collections make the project quite 
difficult.310 But actually, collecting cleaner data sets is relatively 
straightforward. Indeed, the FBI has already constructed data sets where record-
keeping issues are unlikely to be a serious problem. 
The FBI annually reports not only data for all cities (the data set we generally 
rely upon311) but also numerous other subgroupings (e.g., Group I—cities with 
populations of more than 250,000; Group II—cities with populations between 
100,000 and 250,000; Group III—cities with populations between 50,000 and 
100,000).312 Of course, looking to the grouping of smaller cities would eliminate 
the effect of record-keeping changes in large cities like New York City. Some 
of these groupings aggregate as many as several hundred cities whose reporting 
practices would not have all changed simultaneously in 1966 when the Miranda 
decision was handed down. 
Moreover, while the exact number of cities reporting data within each group 
may fluctuate slightly each year, the fluctuations are insignificant in aggregated 
data. We plot the number of cities reporting crime data to the FBI in Figure 11.313 
As can be seen, there are no sudden spikes or changes in the data. 
 
309 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 33.  
310 See id. at 33-34. 
311 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.  
312 See, e.g., UCR-1968, supra note 79, at 110-11 tbl.22. 
313 In Figure 11, a missing 1957 data point was obtained by averaging the data from 1956 
and 1958. 
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We agree with James Alan Fox (one of the country’s leading crime observers) 
that, “[a]lthough the group of cities included in the FBI tabulations does change 
annually, the extent of error resulting from these fluctuations is minimal relative 
to the aggregate data.”314 Also, analysis of the national data does not show any 
major fluctuations, specifically in the 1965-to-1969 timeframe of particular 
interest here.315 In short, so long as there are a large number of cities in the 
national group reporting data,316 we would not expect record-keeping problems 
to dictate results (conversely, if there were a very small number of cities in any 
particular grouping, we would worry about “noise” in the data which might 
create anomalous results). 
Focusing on clearance rates for robbery (the same category that Feeney 
focuses on), we collected the FBI robbery crime clearance rate data from the 
eleven different population groupings for which the FBI reported data from 1950 
to 2012.317 We then ran our standard multiple regression equations on each of 
the eleven groupings, with the same explanatory variables used earlier.318 
 
314 FOX, supra note 79, at 127 n.11. 
315 See MICHAEL D. MALTZ, ANALYSIS OF MISSINGNESS IN UCR CRIME DATA 13-14 (2006).  
316 The situation might be different if one were researching state-level data or, particularly, 
county-level data. See id. at 14-15; Michael D. Maltz & Joseph Targonski, A Note on the Use 
of County-Level UCR Data, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 297, 316-17 (2002). 
317 For some groupings, the FBI did not begin reporting data until several years after 1950. 
We note those more limited data sets in our chart below.  
318 In doing so, we were running regression equations that contained a dependent variable 
(clearance rates) for cities grouped by particular size and that contained independent variables 
resting on national data. Of course, we would have preferred to use independent variables 
reporting data for precisely the same city grouping. But it did not appear possible to assemble 
such data for all our variables, at least without extraordinary effort, so we simply used our 
  
762  BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:685 
 
Because of the possibility that particularly groupings of cities might have been 
able to implement Miranda more quickly (or been forced to implement it more 
slowly), we ran equations for both an immediate MIRANDA effect and the three-
year phase in of the MIRANDA effect we generally use throughout this Article. 
Table 11 reports our results: 
 
Table 11. City Subgroups by Population: 
Coefficients of the MIRANDA Variable for Robbery Clearances 
(both immediate and three-year Miranda phase in) 
OLS Regressions on Clearance Rates for Specified City/Agency Groupings 
(t statistics in parenthesis) 
 
















Group IA - All cities more than 1 







Group IB - All cities between 
500,000 and 1 million population 






Group IC - All cities between 
250,000 and 500,000 population 






Group II - All cities between 100,000 
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Group V - All cities between 10,000 

























*** significant at. 001 level ** significant at .01 level  * significant at .05 level 
† significant at .10 level 
 
 
existing data. We do not believe this influenced our general results, as it seems very likely 
that trends in the national data on such things as police officers and unemployment rates 
generally corresponded to trends in the particular city groups. So long as the trends 
corresponded, we would be able to reach general conclusions of the type we discuss here.  
319 For some initial data sets in the 500,000 to 1 million range, we took an average 
(weighted by population) of two subcategories reported by the FBI. 
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As can be seen in Table 11, for the immediate MIRANDA effect, we found 
statistically significant MIRANDA effects across all population groupings320—
with the exception of Group IA, the nation’s largest cities (i.e., New York City, 
Los Angeles, and a few others). For the three-year phase in, we found 
statistically significant MIRANDA effects (at the 90% confidence level or 
higher) for all population groupings with the exception of Group IA and III 
(although Group III is close to statistical significance). 
On closer inspection of the groups, it turns out that Group IA contains just a 
tiny number of cities. For instance, in the year of Miranda (1966), Group IA 
comprised just five cities. And, as Feeney himself points out, around the time of 
Miranda, there was some fluctuation in data reporting in the nation’s largest 
cities. For example, Group IA apparently excludes Los Angeles in 1965 but 
includes Los Angeles in 1966, while excluding New York City from 1966 to 
1972.321 
With this point in mind, the finding that robbery clearance rates from Group 
IA do not show a MIRANDA effect is easily explainable by changes in the 
composition of the reporting cities. For example, the inclusion or exclusion of 
just one extra city in the population group would mean a 20% increase (6 ÷ 5) 
in the number of cities reporting.322 Additionally, the inclusion or exclusion of a 
single city could dramatically change the population of the reporting cities in a 
single year.323 
On the other hand, the other broad groupings are not so susceptible to random 
fluctuations attributable to a single jurisdiction or a small group of jurisdictions. 
For example, Group VI (cities with populations of less than 10,000) comprises 
more than a thousand cities.324 The average clearance rates of those cities are 
unlikely to be subject to short-term changes in the data. We find MIRANDA 
effects in every single FBI population grouping where there are enough cities to 
avoid such random fluctuations—i.e., every FBI grouping for cities and agencies 
below the one million population level, extending through suburban and rural 
agencies—with the only exception being the “near miss” of Group III in the 
three-year Miranda phase in (an anomalous result that we believe does not 
undercut the general picture). 
To be sure, in theory, it would be desirable to assemble a consistent set of a 
large number of cities to examine their clearance rates and see whether any of 
 
320 To be clear, Group II was statistically significant only at the .10 level. 
321 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 30-33.  
322 From 1968 to 1969, the number of cities in Group IA changed by 20%, from five cities 
to six cities. Compare UCR-1968, supra note 79, at 100 tbl.12, with UCR-1969, supra note 
79, at 94 tbl.9. 
323 From 1965 to 1966, the population of the cities in Group IA changed substantially, 
from 16,149,000 to 11,230,000, a more than 30% change in a single year. Compare UCR-
1965, supra note 79, at 97 tbl.8, with UCR-1966, supra note 79, at 100 tbl.12. 
324 See, e.g., UCR-1966, supra note 79, at 101 tbl.12 (reporting 1233 cities in the Group 
VI category). 
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our conclusions change. But given the almost uniformly consistent findings from 
the ten population groupings the FBI currently reports, we think that further 
effort in this area would not change our conclusions. It is important to remember 
a point (not discussed by Feeney) that the FBI itself emphasized in its crime 
reports in the two years immediately following Miranda. In summing up the 
1966 data, the FBI noted that the drop in clearances was “universally reported 
by all population groups.”325 And in the following year, 1967, the FBI continued 
to report widespread bad news.326 Again a clearance rate drop was “universally 
reported by all population groups.”327 Record-keeping changes in a few isolated 
cities, such as those Feeney identified, cannot explain this pattern. 
B. California Clearance Rate Data 
Feeney also points to data from California to claim that Miranda had no 
harmful effect on the clearance rates. Feeney repeatedly asserts that in the 1960s 
“California was . . . widely regarded as having the nation’s best crime 
statistics,”328 although he provides no source for this assertion. He then reports 
that California clearance rate data show a steady decline in the 1960s, but 
“nothing very dramatic.”329 
Because Feeney provides no source for the claim that California had the 
“premier” state crime data,330 it is difficult to assess his position. Perhaps his 
views are colored by the fact (not disclosed in his article) that he served on the 
Research Advisory Council for California’s crime statistics and thus helped 
oversee the collection of the data whose quality he finds high.331 But, in any 
event, the pertinent issue here is not the overall quality of California’s crime 
data, but rather the quality of one particular series: the clearance rate series. 
One thing that caught our eye in reviewing Feeney’s presentation of the 
California clearance rate data is that he used data running only from 1954 to 
1969.332 Since the period we are interested in is 1966 to 1968, that gives only 
one year of post-Miranda data (1969). It would obviously be better to run the 
data out to 1970, 1975, or beyond, to look at long-term trends. Indeed, 
confirmation of that fact comes from Feeney’s immediately previous table of 
individual city clearance data (discussed in the preceding Section), which 
appears just two pages earlier in his article, reporting city clearance rate data 
 
325 UCR-1968, supra note 79, at 27. 
326 See UCR-1967, supra note 79, at 30 (“Whereas police nationally cleared 24.3 percent 
of these offenses in 1966, this dropped to 22.4 percent in 1967. The decrease was noted in 
every Crime Index offense with auto theft solutions having the sharpest decline . . . .”). 
327 Id. at 30. 
328 Feeney, supra note 8, at 38.  
329 Id.  
330 Id.  
331 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS & SPECIAL SERVS., CRIME AND 
DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA, 1980-1989, at ii (listing advisory board members). 
332 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 39 tbl.7.  
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from 1960 to 1970.333 Why did Feeney fail to run the California data similarly 
out to (at least) 1970? 
On close inspection of the annual publications from the California Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (Crime and Delinquency in California),334 an answer to that 
question appears: California stopped reporting clearance rate data entirely in 
1970. Crime and Delinquency in California—1969 contains clearance rate data 
for the seven index crimes (just as every previous publication back to 1954 
had).335 Crime and Delinquency in California—1970 does not contain any 
clearance rate data.336 Indeed, California did not report any clearance rate data 
until 1985, at which point they made available data collected back to 1980.337 
For someone claiming that this California clearance rate data are the best data 
on clearance rate changes in the 1960s,338 it is odd that Feeney does not disclose 
the fact (which must have been apparent to him339) that the California Bureau of 
Criminal Statistics determined, in 1970, that the data set should not be reported 
at all. Of course, the natural inference is that in 1970, the Bureau of Criminal 
Statistics decided that there was some problem with the data series 
(unreliability?), which meant that it was not worthy of reporting. And, of course, 
if the 1970-to-1979 data was unreliable or otherwise unworthy of reporting, that 
raises the inference that the same problems would likely have existed just a few 
years earlier, including the critical 1966-to-1968 period. 
But even assuming that the California clearance rate data are reliable, what 
are we to make of Feeney’s assertion that it shows only a steady decline in the 
1960s, but “nothing very dramatic” and certainly no “sharp fall.”340 The wiggle 
words “nothing very dramatic” begin to arouse some suspicion, particularly 
when it becomes clear that there were, in fact, significant crime clearance rate 
changes in California when 1965 is compared to 1968, as shown in Table 12. 
  
 
333 Id. at 37 tbl.6. 
334 From 1952 to 1964, the annual publication of California crime statistics was entitled 
Crime in California.  
335 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN 
CALIFORNIA 1969, at 55 tbl.II-3 (reporting statewide clearance rates for 1969).  
336 See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN 
CALIFORNIA 1970 (lacking clearance rates throughout entire report, including in the table of 
contents). 
337 See CAL. BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 
1985, at 24 (1985).  
338 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 38 (“Without question, it was the premier state criminal 
justice statistical agency in the nation.”).  
339 Presumably Feeney attempted to collect California clearance rate data for 1970 to make 
his California series consistent with the fourteen-city series he discusses just a few pages 
earlier. Also, Feeney was on the Research Advisory Council when the decision was made to 
resume releasing clearance rate data. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.  
340 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 36-38.  
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Table 12. California Clearance Rate Changes—1965-1968 
Seven Index Crimes 
 












-8.3% -11.2% -16.0% -6.4% -13.4% -11.5% -23.9% 
Sources: CRIME IN CALIFORNIA—1965; CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA—1968 
 
The consistent downward movement of California’s clearance rates 
immediately after Miranda would appear to be consistent with our hypothesis of 
Miranda’s harms. But Feeney seems to argue that even if California’s clearance 
rates moved downward during that time, there was no “sharp fall” in the 
clearance rates. Of course, what may seem to a particular observer to be—or not 
to be—a “sharp fall” is a matter of judgment. As discussed in the previous 
Section,341 however, statistical techniques exist for examining data to determine 
whether there has been a structural break in the series. Applying that same 
technique—the strucchange algorithm from R—we decided to look at the 
California robbery clearance rate data from 1960 to 1969.342 We detected a 
structural change, occurring in 1963 with a 95% confidence interval extending 
from 1962 to 1965. The 1963 date does not by itself fit our Miranda theory, 
although the confidence band (1962 to 1965) is broad enough to accept our 
theory. 
However, we wanted to look more carefully at the California clearance rate 
data to determine whether it was reliable. Our initial assumption was that, 
because California was a large state with many different police agencies, the 
data would be generally internally consistent through the 1960s. But as we 
investigated California crime statistics during that time period more carefully, 
we learned that a single county—Los Angeles County—was responsible for a 
huge percentage of the reported felonies in the state.343 Looking at the 1965 
 
341 See supra notes 302-04 and accompanying text. 
342 California did not report crime clearance rate data from 1970 to 1984. See supra notes 
334-37. We selected 1960 as the beginning for our series because we wanted to compare the 
Los Angeles data discussed by Feeney, and the data he reported for that Los Angeles data set 
began in 1960.  
343 See, e.g., State Crime: More than Half of It in L.A. County, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1965, 
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statistics for robbery, the crime of most interest to Feeney and to us, well over 
half—63.7% (6496)— of the California robbery arrests (10,200) came from Los 
Angeles County.344 That suggests that if there were changes in reporting criteria 
for clearance rates in that one county, it would have had a very significant effect 
on California’s statewide data. It also raises some concern about the 
comparability of California data to the rest of the country because Los Angeles 
County in 1966 had the highest crime rate in the nation, according to the FBI.345 
The argument could be made, however, that Los Angeles County is not, in 
fact, a single jurisdiction for crime reporting purposes, but rather comprised of 
multiple agencies (the police departments in Los Angeles, Long Beach, 
Pasadena, Alhambra, etc.). This is true. However, among the various agencies 
in Los Angeles County, a single city—Los Angeles—is far and away the largest. 
In 1965, of the robbery arrests made in Los Angeles County, more than half 
(4115) were made in Los Angeles.346 This means that in 1965, 40.3% of all 
California robbery arrests were made in just this single city. 
The fact that so much of the data in California came from one jurisdiction 
would be of even greater concern if there were any reason for thinking the Los 
Angeles data are problematic. Unfortunately, reasons for concern exist. 
Continuing our focus on robbery clearance rates, it is first concerning that, 
according to Feeney, Los Angeles data are not included in the FBI’s 1965 UCR, 
but are included in the 1966 UCR.347 This suggests perhaps that Los Angeles 
had difficulty gathering its data for 1965.348 Moving to the next few years, and 
looking at the annual reports from Los Angeles (the Statistical Digests), one 
finds reason for concern about the accuracy of the robbery clearance rate data 
precisely in the 1965-to-1968 period in which we are most interested. 
Specifically, the total number of cleared robberies in Los Angeles fluctuated 
wildly during that period: 
  
 
at A1 (“Los Angeles County contributed more than half of 346,255 felonies reported in 
California during 1964 . . . . ). 
344 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME & DELINQUENCY IN 
CALIFORNIA 1965, at 221 app. 3 [hereinafter CRIME & DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1965].  
345 See Eric Malnic, County Had Highest Crime Rate in U.S. in 1966, FBI Says, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1967, at 3.  
346 CRIME & DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1965, supra note 344, at 221 app. 3.  
347 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 30-31.  
348 This hypothesis is supported by the fact that in the Claremont McKenna library, a 
depository for the LAPD’s Statistical Digest, the 1965 volume was not received until March 
13, 1967—far later than the typical appearance of middle of the following year. For example, 
the 1965 volume was received on May 23, 1965.  
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These data show a dramatic one-year increase from 1966 to 1967 of 47%—a 
total of 1152 additional clearances.350 To be sure, crime was increasing during 
this period of time. But the one-year increase in crime during that year (8%351) 
is not anywhere close to a 47% increase. Robbery is not the only crime category 
for which the 1967 data appears anomalous. For example, the number of 
burglary clearances in Los Angeles jumped from 8327 in 1966 to 13,726 in 
1967—a 64% increase in a single year.352 These startling increases suggest that 
something changed in Los Angeles in 1967, either in its approach to policing or 
in its collection of data. 
One possibility is that a change in leadership in the Los Angeles Police 
Department (“LAPD”) during the critical time period produced a change in 
clearance rates. As shown in the chart below, William Parker’s sixteen-year run 
as LAPD Chief of Police ended with his death just a few weeks after Miranda. 
The LAPD then had three new chiefs of police over the next three years. 
  
 
349 County of Los Angeles, DEP’T OF SHERIFF, STATISTICAL DIGEST 1965, at 11 [hereinafter 
L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1965] (providing data from robbery clearance reports); County of 
Los Angeles, DEP’T OF SHERIFF, STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, at 8 [hereinafter L.A. STATISTICAL 
DIGEST 1966] (same); County of Los Angeles, DEP’T OF SHERIFF, STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967, 
at 8 [hereinafter L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967] (same); County of Los Angeles, DEP’T OF 
SHERIFF, STATISTICAL DIGEST 1968, at 8 [hereinafter L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1968] (same).  
350 The numbers in the text are absolute numbers. The same dramatic fluctuations are 
shown in clearance rate changes, from 32.8% in 1965, to 30.4% in 1966, to 35.8% in 1967, 
and then 27.1% in 1968. See L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1965, supra note 349, at 11; L.A. 
STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, supra note 349, at 8; L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967, supra note 
349, at 8; L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1968, supra note 349, at 8. 
351 Compare L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, supra note 349, at 6 (reporting total index 
crimes for 1966 of 174,583), with L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967, supra note 349, at 6 
(reporting total index crimes for 1967 of 188,717). 
352 L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, supra note 349, at 9; L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967, 
supra note 349, at 9. The burglary clearance rate for Los Angeles jumped from 14.9% to 
22.9%, a 53% increase in a single year.  
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Table 13. Los Angeles Chiefs of Police—1950-1978 
 
Name of Chief 
Initial Date of Service as 
Chief 
Last Date of Service as Chief 
William A. Warton June 30, 1949 August 9, 1950 
William H. Parker August 9, 1950 July 16, 1966 
Thad F. Brown July 18, 1966 February 17, 1967 
Thomas Reddin February 18, 1967 May 5, 1969 
Roger E. Murdock May 6, 1969 August 28, 1969 
Edward M. Davis August 29, 1969 January 16, 1978 
Robert F. Rock January 16, 1978 March 28, 1978 
Daryl F. Gates March 28, 1978 June 27, 1992 
Source: Chiefs of the Los Angeles Police Department, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/chiefs_of_the_los_angeles_police_department 
[https://perma.cc/BE77-SQH9] (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
 
This instability in LAPD leadership might have produced changes in 
approaches either to policing or record keeping during the critical time for our 
study. For example, from February 1967 to May 1969, Chief Thomas Reddin 
was trying to put a more “human face” on the LAPD.353 Interestingly, 1967 was 
also the year that the LAPD returned to the nation’s airwaves courtesy of the 
program Dragnet, which showed Los Angeles police officers as “mild-
mannered, by-the-book cops.”354 The year 1967 was also a year in which 
relations between the LAPD and the media took a downward turn, and when 
LAPD instituted “sweeping changes” in recruiting and training.355 
It is hard to tell how these background changes affected on-the-ground 
policing in Los Angeles in 1967. We have located an L.A. Times article from 
1967, which suggests that police methods changed in that year. The article 
reports that, “Los Angeles police will soon adopt tactical operations in which 
forces can be instantly poured into areas where crime problems are greatest.”356 
 
353 David Shaw, Chief Parker Molded LAPD Image—Then Came the ’60s, L.A. TIMES, 
May 25, 1992, at A1 (“Chief Reddin, in particular, tried to put a more human face on the 
department, with billboards of smiling police officers and LAPD sponsorship of Little League 
baseball teams, youth camping trips and neighborhood kaffeeklatsches.”); see also Paul 
Houston, Reddin Stresses Firm, Fast Control of Riots, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1967, at EB 
(noting buildup of community-relations programs and Chief Reddin’s efforts in this area). See 
generally JOE DOMANICK, TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: THE LAPD’S CENTURY OF WAR IN THE 
CITY OF DREAMS 203-08 (1994).  
354 See Shaw, supra note 353, at A1.  
355 See Paul Houston, Police Dept. Overhauls Recruiting and Training, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
18, 1967, at A1; Shaw, supra note 353, at A1 (describing a critical 1967 article about LAPD 
as being viewed by police as “a blatant declaration of war”).  
356 Gene Blake & Bob Jackson, Crime War Need: New Concepts, Technology, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 5, 1967, at E12A. This may have been a precursor to the “hot spot” theory of policing 
that is currently in vogue. See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga, Andrew V. Papachristos & David M. 
Hureau, The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and 
Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 634 (2014); Jerry H. Ratcliffe et al., Citizens’ Reactions to 
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The Chief of the LAPD, Darryl Gates, notes in his autobiography that in 1967 
he was in charge of a newly created unit that focused on robberies.357 
Interestingly and perhaps related to these points, we noticed that in the LAPD’s 
Statistical Abstract, about half of the 1100 additional clearances in Los Angeles 
came from the 77th Street Division of the LAPD—an apparent high-crime area. 
We also noticed that the number of detectives assigned to the 77th Street 
Division increased significantly that year as well,358 along with a substantial 
increase in arrests for FBI index crimes.359 This would seem to suggest that the 
LAPD changed its approach to policing in 1967,360 which could have produced 
a significant improvement in its robbery clearance rates. 
  
 
Hot Spots Policing: Impacts on Perceptions of Crime, Disorder, Safety and Police, 11 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 393, 394 (2015); cf. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT 
BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL 142 (2012) 
(discussing New York City crime decline and “hot spot” policing).  
357 DARYL F. GATES WITH DIANE K. SHAH, CHIEF: MY LIFE IN THE LAPD 110-13 (1992) 
(discussing how Chief Reddin established the new unit). 
358 Compare L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, supra note 349, at 82 (noting that there were 
eighty-one detectives in the 77th Street Division), with L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967, supra 
note 349, at 82 (noting that there were eighty-seven detectives in the 77th Street Division). 
359 L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1967, supra note 349, at 3. 
360 See JAMES A. BULTEMA, GUARDIANS OF ANGELS: A HISTORY OF THE LOS ANGELES 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 229 (2013) (recounting changes made by Chief Reddin). 
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The 1967 anomaly in the Los Angeles data is sufficiently large to noticeably 
affect the California clearance rate trend line data for this time, as shown in 
Figure 12. 
Plotting the Los Angeles robbery clearance rate data on a graph over time, 
there is a small drop in 1966, a sharp spike upward in 1967, and then a drop in 
1968. Because Los Angeles data forms such a significant part of the California 
data, that single spike tends to obscure (i.e., tends to level or smooth out) a 
downward drop in California crime clearance rates from all other 
jurisdictions.361 While California’s robbery clearance rate declines throughout 
the 1966-to-1968 period, the drop is not a sharp fall (as also shown in Figure 
12)—the point on which Feeney seizes. 
The complication for our purposes is that LAPD’s apparent change in police 
approaches in 1967—and the anomalous one-year upward spike in clearance 
rates—renders Los Angeles an unsuitable jurisdiction for a simple before-and-
after comparison of clearance rates. The change in policing is a confounding 
variable that makes it impossible to determine what effect Miranda alone had 
on policing. It is, however, possible to eliminate the effect of anomalous Los 
Angeles data on the California clearance rate data by removing Los Angeles 
 
361 Because Los Angeles is one of the nation’s ten largest cities, L.A. data form part of the 
ten-city average we discussed in the previous Section. And because of Los Angeles’s 
anomalous 1967 upward spike in clearance rate, its data tend to obscure the post-Miranda 
clearance rate drop in Figure 10.  
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from the trend line.362 Figure 13 plots robbery crime clearance rates during the 
1960s not only for Los Angeles, but also for all California police agencies apart 
from Los Angeles, all California agencies (as just discussed), the “Pacific” 
region of the United States as reported in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports,363 
and the national city data that we have relied on throughout this Article. As can 
be seen—and as would be expected to be the case with progressively larger data 
sets plotted on a single graph—the one data set that is most subject to 
fluctuations is, unsurprisingly, the smallest of these groupings: the city of Los 
Angeles. As the groupings become progressively larger, the trend lines become 
generally smoother. This suggests that the fluctuating “tree” of Los Angeles is 
tending to obscure the “forest” of many other jurisdictions. 
 
362 To back out the Los Angeles data from the California data, one only needs to know 
what percentage of the data come from Los Angeles and what the Los Angeles clearance rate 
was compared to the California clearance rate. To simplify calculations, we assumed that Los 
Angeles’s percentage of (adult) arrests from 1965 (the midpoint of the series) fairly reflects 
its percentage throughout the decade. We were forced to use this estimate because we were 
unable to easily locate a series that would allow us to calculate Los Angeles’s percentage of 
the overall California data throughout the decade, as California Crime and Delinquency 
stopped reporting individual city data around 1966. In 1960, Los Angeles City (adult) robbery 
arrests constituted 42.7% of all (adult) arrests in California for robbery, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 1960, at 49 tbl.III-5, which is not too 
different from the 40.3% reported in 1965, CRIME & DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1965, supra 
note 344, at 221 app. 3, the figure we used for the entire decade. We do not believe that a 
more precise calculation of the percentage throughout the decade would alter the findings we 
report.  
363 This includes not just California, but also Oregon, Washington, Alaska, and Hawaii. 
  
2017] STILL HANDCUFFING THE COPS? 773 
 
So far we have been discussing what is apparent simply from visual 
observation of the trend lines. But a more rigorous analysis of the trends is 
possible. In particular, because of the seemingly anomalous fluctuations in the 
1967 Los Angeles data, we thought it would be instructive to run the structural 
break algorithm discussed earlier on California’s robbery clearance rate data, but 
now removing the Los Angeles data. Over the 1960-to-1969 period, the 
strucchange algorithm found two structural breaks in that series: (1) 1963 (with 
95% confidence interval break dates between 1962 and 1964); and (2) 1966 
(with 95% confidence interval break dates between 1965 and 1967). This second 
break fits our Miranda theory precisely. Put another way, removing from the 
California data series the fluctuating data from one possibly anomalous 
jurisdiction (which had multiple police chief changes between 1966 and 1969), 
the data from all other jurisdictions in California reveal a sharp—i.e., structurally 
significant—downward drop in robbery crime clearance rates starting 
somewhere between 1965 and 1967. This is exactly when the drop should have 
occurred to be consistent with our theory. Thus, far from contradicting our 
conclusions, if anything, the California robbery clearance rate data support it. 
V. WHY CLEARANCE RATES WILL INHERENTLY UNDERESTIMATE 
MIRANDA’S COSTS 
The crime clearances rate data we have discussed thus far suggest that 
Miranda did harm law enforcement. It is possible to argue, however, that crime 
clearance rates are a “poor” way to measure Miranda’s effect on law 
enforcement, as Feeney has also contended in his article—after arguing (as just 
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discussed) that the clearance rates did not really decline after Miranda.364 We 
agree with Feeney’s general point about limits on Miranda’s ability to harm 
police clearance rates. But that does not make clearance rates a “poor” way of 
measuring Miranda’s impact on police, but rather an understated way of 
measuring that impact.365 Put another way, if Miranda’s harmful effects can be 
detected even in nationally aggregated crime clearance rates which would miss 
many of the harmful effects, then Miranda’s actual impact on law enforcement 
would likely be substantially greater. 
In this Part, we develop the reasons for concluding that clearance rate data 
will understate any harmful effects from Miranda. In Section V.A, we develop 
the ways in which Miranda could affect clearance rates. In Section V.B, we 
review Feeney’s studies on police conduct investigations to see what they tell us 
about Miranda’s capacity to affect clearance rates. And in Section V.C, we 
consider whether Miranda’s effects would be detectable only in “secondary” 
clearance rates, or in primary and other clearance rates as well. In Section V.D, 
we present reasons for believing that declining clearance rates are a product of 
declining confession rates. We conclude, in Section V.E, with an explanation of 
why confessions remain extremely important even in an era of advancing 
forensic science. 
A. How Miranda Is Relevant to Clearance Rates 
As Feeney points out, Miranda’s impact on clearance rates might be 
somewhat limited. Many crimes will be “cleared” before police interrogate any 
suspect. Feeney offers as straightforward examples several different bank robber 
scenarios, such as when a guard walks into a bank during a robbery and makes 
an arrest; when the police identify a robber with a photo from a camera inside 
the bank; or when a bank teller sees a picture of the robber in the suspect mug 
book.366 Those cases will be cleared by the arrest of the suspect before Miranda 
comes into play. In cases such as these, Miranda has, in Feeney’s words, “very 
little capacity to impact the ability of the police to identify and apprehend 
offenders.”367 
Feeney does not appear to contest that Miranda could have an effect on 
clearance rates, but instead argues that any effect would be quite modest.368 
Accordingly, it may be useful to set out initially the three different ways in which 
 
364 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 113.  
365 On this point, Donohue agrees with us. See Donohue, supra note 7, at 1156 (“If 
Miranda significantly stops the flow of damaging statements by criminals to the police, it 
could well reduce the rate of successful prosecutions of crime even if it has no impact on 
measured clearance rates.”). 
366 Feeney, supra note 8, at 42. 
367 Id. 
368 Id. (“It is certainly possible that giving the Miranda warnings has some impact upon 
the willingness of a suspect to talk with the police and that the decision hampers the police in 
conducting post-arrest interrogations.”). 
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Miranda could have theoretically harmed law enforcement clearance rates, two 
of which Feeney discusses and one of which he does not. 
The most obvious way in which Miranda could harm the police would be by 
affecting “primary clearances”—that is, by interfering with the ability of police 
to interrogate suspects for crimes that the police suspect they have committed. 
As we noted briefly earlier, police might wish to question a suspect about a crime 
and Miranda might interfere with their ability to do so, either by blocking 
interrogation entirely (because a suspect “lawyers up”) or by making 
interrogation less effective.369 To be sure, many cases will be cleared by arrest 
before Miranda comes into play. But for cases in which a suspect is questioned 
in custody but never ultimately formally arrested, Miranda could have a harmful 
effect on the primary clearance rate—that is, a reduction in the ability of police 
to get information that they need to clear a crime in the first instance. 
Miranda might also interfere with so-called “secondary clearances”—that is, 
situations where police arrest a suspect for one crime and he secondarily 
confesses to other similar crimes. For example, a robbery suspect caught by 
police might confess not only to the robbery for which he was caught but also to 
several others.370 But because secondary clearances occur after an initial arrest, 
there seems to be little doubt that Miranda could harm law enforcement 
secondary clearance rates, as even Feeney himself concedes.371 
There remains a third type of clearance not specifically discussed by Feeney, 
a form that we will label “more-serious-crime” clearances. Consider, for 
example, a drug dealer arrested for a traffic offense or a small drug deal. Before 
Miranda, the drug dealer might have been interrogated and confessed to a more 
serious crime—a robbery or homicide perhaps. But after Miranda, this drug 
dealer “lawyers up” and thus avoids police questioning.372 As a result, the police 
never clear that more serious crime. 
This kind of clearance has been discussed in the literature in connection with 
so-called “broken windows” policing. The theory behind broken windows 
policing is that disorder (i.e., things like broken windows in a neighborhood) 
 
369 See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.  
370 JOHN E. CONKLIN, ROBBERY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 147 (1972); see also 
infra Section V.C.2. 
371 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 65 (noting eighteen percent of robbery clearances in 
Boston studied by Conklin were secondary clearances, “clearly sufficient to cover a drop of 
the magnitude claimed by Professors Cassell and Fowles”). 
372 Once a suspect invokes his Miranda right to an attorney, Miranda blocks not only 
questioning about the offense for which he was initially being questioned, but any other 
offense as well. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 150 (1990) (holding that the “Fifth 
Amendment protection of Edwards is not terminated or suspended by consultation with 
counsel”); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 678-79 (1988) (holding that, once a suspect 
invokes right to counsel, a suspect cannot be interrogated for any offense); Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981) (finding that after request for counsel police questioning 
had to cease).  
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and crime are inextricably linked.373 If police focus on order maintenance 
policing, then crime levels will ultimately drop.374 Studies dispute whether such 
order maintenance policing actually reduces crime rates and, if so, how it 
reduces crime rates.375 But for present purposes, it is informative to focus on one 
way in which order maintenance policing might operate to shed light on how 
Miranda could harm clearance rates. 
One mechanism by which order maintenance policing is said to work is that 
increased arrests of petty offenders give police more opportunities to interrogate 
offenders.376 This kind of clearance has been discussed in the clearance rate 
literature.377 For example, in one case, the NYPD solved numerous interwoven 
homicides based on one misdemeanor arrest, when a vehicle stop led to a 
misdemeanor arrest and subsequent interviews of the passengers.378 Of course, 
if Miranda makes such post-arrest interviews more difficult to conduct, then it 
will have a depressing effect on clearance rates. 
This more-serious-crime clearance possibility was recently raised by Graham 
Ousey and Matthew Lee in their multivariate regression analysis of declining 
homicide clearance rates from 1980 to 2000 across several hundred cities.379 
They found a link between increased drug dealing arrests and improved 
homicide clearance rates.380 As an explanation, they offered the possibility of 
the more-serious-crime clearance, specifically: 
[The] war on drugs policies of the 1980s and 1990s may have resulted in 
“sweeps” that cast wide nets that snagged many offenders. Even if the vast 
majority of those arrested in drug sweeps were nonviolent drug offenders, 
 
373 See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 30-31. 
374 GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING 
ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 14 (1996). 
375 Compare GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, JR., MANHATTAN INST. CTR. FOR 
CIVIC INNOVATION, CIVIC REP. NO. 22, DO POLICE MATTER?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF 
NEW YORK CITY’S POLICE REFORMS 18 (2001), with BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF 
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 4-6 (2001). 
376 See Jang, Hoover & Lawton, supra note 153, at 531 (describing a study by Jack Maple 
and Chris Mitchell in 1999 that found that “increased arrests of petty offenders provide police 
more opportunity to interview offenders”); see also JACK MAPLE WITH CHRIS MITCHELL, THE 
CRIME FIGHTER: HOW YOU CAN MAKE YOUR COMMUNITY CRIME-FREE 156-57 (1999) (listing 
objectives for interrogations of minor offenders, including “statements about any other crimes 
the suspect might admit” and concluding that broken windows policing was a significant 
contributor to crime reduction in New York City).  
377 See Lockwood, supra note 160, at 750.  
378 Jang, Hoover & Lawton, supra note 153, at 531-32.  
379 See Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 141 (“Against the backdrop of the precipitous 
decline in urban homicide clearance over the past several decades, this study examines factors 
that may be linked to within-city, over-time variation in homicide clearance rates from 1980 
to 2000.”). 
380 Id. (“[D]rug market arrests are associated with higher clearance rates.”). 
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a small segment may have been “persons of interest” in open homicide 
cases who previously had managed to avoid detection by the police. Thus, 
a by-product of aggressive drug law enforcement may have been that police 
were able to detain and ultimately arrest (i.e., clear) wanted perpetrators of 
murder. Related to the above possibility, aggressive drug enforcement may 
have increased avenues of acquiring information on existing unsolved 
homicide cases. In essence, perpetrators of drug offenses who were caught 
in drug sweeps may have been questioned regarding open murder cases, 
with reduced charges offered as an incentive for “rolling over” on known 
homicide perpetrators.381 
Ousey and Lee’s suggestion of a linkage between drug arrests and homicide 
clearances, detectable even in the aggregate data they were reviewing, suggest 
the real possibility of important more-serious-crime clearances. But the evidence 
on this point is conflicting. For example, a study by Hyunseok Jang and his 
colleagues investigated what effect broken windows law enforcement had on 
clearance rates. They found inconsistent results across different crime 
categories, with broken windows enforcement having a positive impact on 
clearance rates for burglaries, a marginal impact on auto theft clearances, and a 
negative relationship with larceny clearances.382 On the other hand, Brian 
Lockwood’s more recent article on burglary clearances in Philadelphia found 
empirical support for the theory.383 
A similar argument can be made with regard to Miranda’s indirect effects on 
stop-question-and-frisk (“SQF”) tactics that police employ. An expansion of 
broken windows policing,384 SQF involves police aggressively stopping and 
questioning suspected criminals, and in some cases frisking them in an effort to 
fight crime.385 Developing empirical research appears to support the proposition 
that concentrated police tactics in concentrated areas can be effective in fighting 
 
381 Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 153.  
382 Jang, Hoover & Lawton, supra note 153, at 534-35. 
383 Lockwood, supra note 160, at 757. Some further indirect support for the theory is found 
in the “field interrogation” studies and related literature. Infra note 415. 
384 See Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 335, 337 (2014) (describing SQF as a deepening and expansion of order 
maintenance policing).  
385 James Q. Wilson & Barbara Boland, The Effect of the Police on Crime, 12 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 367, 370 (1978). 
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crime,386 although the research on SQF tactics in particular is mixed.387 We have 
not focused on such tactics extensively here, because Miranda does not directly 
harm police SQF efforts, since a suspect who is merely “stopped” is not entitled 
to the Miranda warnings-and-waiver procedures.388 But Miranda may indirectly 
harm such crime fighting efforts to the extent that suspects arrested through stop-
and-frisk operations may invoke their rights and prevent subsequent questioning 
about other offenses. 
We need not definitively determine here who has the better of the argument 
on the underlying debate over the effectiveness of broken window policing or 
stop and frisk tactics. Our limited purpose in describing how Miranda might 
have influenced more-serious-crime clearances, along with primary clearances 
and secondary clearances, is only to suggest that such a linkage is possible—a 
possibility we then explore through our regression equations. Given these three 
ways in which Miranda might affect clearance rates, our project of looking for 
possible effects from Miranda is a reasonable one. 
One additional point is worth making. Some scholars have speculated that 
Miranda might actually increase the number of confessions that suspects give 
by providing false assurances to suspects.389 Our methodology allows for this 
possibility, since it is not uniquely tied to a reduction in clearance rates; 
clearance rates could have increased after Miranda. However, we saw no 
evidence that Miranda was useful in obtaining additional clearances. 
B. Empirical Studies on Miranda’s Capacity to Change Clearance Rates 
Given the three possible ways in which Miranda could have depressed crime 
clearance rates, we were surprised at the extent to which Feeney attempted to 
 
386 CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER & EVAN MAYO-WILSON, POLICE STRATEGIES TO REDUCE 
ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND CARRYING OF FIREARMS: EFFECTS ON GUN CRIME 8, 14-28 (2012) 
(reviewing literature on proactive investigation and enforcement, described as “intensified 
traffic enforcement and field interrogations of suspicious persons,” and finding that they 
reduced gun crimes); Lawrence W. Sherman, James W. Shaw & Dennis P. Rogan, The Kansas 
City Gun Experiment, in NAT’L INST. OF JUST., RESEARCH IN BRIEF 1 (1995), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/kang.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7LP-SMPA] (discussing results 
from an experiment in Kansas City involving an increased number of traffic citations, car 
checks, pedestrian checks, and arrests, which produced a drop in gun crimes); Robert J. 
Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A Replication and 
Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 163 (1988) (finding strong effects of 
proactive policing, particularly on robbery crime rates).  
387 Compare Dennis C. Smith & Robert Purtell, Does Stop and Frisk Stop Crime? (Nov. 
6, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (finding statistically significant 
negative effects of stops on robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and homicide, but not on 
other crimes), with Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on 
Precinct Robbery and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003-2010, 31 JUST. Q. 96, 98, 103-
04 (2014) (finding, “contrary to prior research,” few effects of SQF on robbery and burglary).  
388 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984).  
389 See Duke, supra note 14, at 558-60.  
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make the case that Miranda could have had “very little capacity” to depress 
clearance rates390 and that “[o]nly if police interrogation plays an important role 
in identifying and arresting suspects . . . is it possible that the Miranda decision 
has the effects” we find in our regression equations.391 In support of his 
argument, Feeney marshals a series of studies of police investigatory techniques. 
But while these studies support the conclusion that Miranda could have had only 
a limited—i.e., understated—effect on police clearance rates, they hardly 
support Feeney’s claim that Miranda effects would have been undetectable in 
clearance rates. 
Feeney presents two types of studies in support of his argument: a pre-
Miranda study and several post-Miranda studies. We analyze these two groups 
differently because they have different imports. 
1. A Pre-Miranda Study on Police Investigations 
Perhaps the most important study cited by Feeney is a detailed analysis of 
cases investigated by the LAPD in January 1966 (just a few months before 
Miranda) conducted by the Science and Technology Task Force of the 
President’s Crime Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of 
Justice.392 This study is important because it is the only pre-Miranda study cited 
by Feeney, and thus it provides a unique glimpse into what the police world 
looked like before the Miranda rules came into play. 
This President’s Crime Commission study analyzed 1905 reported crimes in 
two field divisions of the LAPD.393 Feeney believes that this study provides a 
“good general picture of how the police apprehended offenders in the period 
immediately prior to Miranda,”394 citing it to support his argument that 
interrogation did not play an important role in identifying and arresting 
suspects.395 But Feeney never explains how his position can square with the 
study’s own explicit finding: that the “interrogation of arrestees” was among the 
principle methods used by detectives to identify suspects.396 Indeed, the study 
presents a table on police methods used to link unnamed suspects to crimes in 
which interrogation is the single most successful method.397 
Rather than discuss this overall conclusion from the study’s own authors, 
Feeney constructs his own subset of data from the study. Lumping his analysis 
 
390 Feeney, supra note 8, at 42.  
391 Id. at 43. 
392 See id. (citing Herbert H. Isaacs, A Study of Communications, Crimes, and Arrests in a 
Metropolitan Police Department, in INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY—A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 88 (1967)). 
393 Id. 
394 Id.  
395 Id. at 48.  
396 Isaacs, supra note 392, at 8. 
397 Id. at 98 tbl.B-18.  
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of the study into a section devoted to “how the police catch burglars,”398 Feeney 
extracts from the study’s 1905 total crimes a subset of 626 burglary cases.399 
Feeney then derives his own clearance rate for burglaries (based on another 
table) and concludes that “interrogation is credited with a burglary clearance all 
by itself in only 4% of the burglary clearances.”400 
But in the process of jerry-rigging his own statistics, Feeney has made basic 
arithmetic errors. Properly calculated, the study actually shows (using Feeney’s 
method of calculation) that interrogation was credited with producing a 
clearance all by itself for 11.1% of the burglary clearances.401 And when we 
include additional clearances where interrogation was involved “in 
combination” with other police investigative methods, the percentage of the 
burglary clearances in which interrogations was a factor rises to 26.4%.402 
In addition, Feeney chose to focus solely on the study’s data on burglary. But 
burglary was not one of the individual crime categories where we have a 
consistent MIRANDA effect.403 Instead, robbery is the individual crime where 
we find the most consistent MIRANDA effects. And the study suggests that 
interrogation was involved in 25.4% of all robbery clearances (and 7.8% of all 
robbery cases).404 
Still further, the study appears to have entirely excluded secondary 
clearances; the study followed cases to an arrest, not to a clearance.405 
Accordingly, if a robbery suspect was arrested and later confessed to several 
other robberies, the study would not have necessarily captured those clearances. 
As a consequence, the study’s clearance rate numbers are artificially depressed, 
particularly given the fact that the study looked at cases cleared over one month 
 
398 Feeney, supra note 8, at 48.  
399 Id.  
400 Id.  
401 See Isaacs, supra note 392, at 98 tbl.B-19 (finding that interrogation was the “unique 
method” of clearance in eight cases which, divided by the seventy-two burglary clearances 
(626 burglary cases x 11.5% clearance rate) equals 11.1%). 
402 See id. (finding that interrogation was the “unique method” or “in combination” method 
of clearance in nineteen cases, which divided by the seventy-two burglary clearances (626 
burglary cases x 11.5% clearance rate) equals 26.4%).  
403 See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.  
404 Unlike for burglary, the study does not report a specific clearance rate for robbery. 
Because the study was done in Los Angeles in 1966, however, we can estimate the clearance 
rate for the robbery in the study by using the LAPD’s robbery clearance rate for 1966 which 
is 30.4%. See L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, supra note 349, at 8. The study reports 102 
robbery cases, which multiplied by the 30.4% clearance rate implies approximately thirty-one 
cleared robberies. The study reports that two robbery cases were uniquely solved by 
interrogation and six cases by interrogation in combination with other methods. 
405 See Isaacs, supra note 392, at 90 (“Where no arrest was made, no case was actually 
counted as cleared . . . even though there may have been some other method of clearance.”); 
see also id. at 95 tbl.B-11 (defining “other clearances” so that they appear to primarily involve 
prosecutor decisions not to charge).  
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in two particular field divisions,406 and thus would automatically exclude 
clearances in other time periods or originating from other areas. 
Good reasons exist for believing that even these figures significantly 
understate interrogation’s role in clearing crimes. The study could easily collect 
standard information about robberies that was normally reported to the FBI—
e.g., the study’s apparatus was triggered when a robbery was reported to the 
police and then the clearance status (cleared or not cleared) would have been 
collected in the ordinary course of business. But collecting information about 
whether interrogation occurred in a particular case was trickier business. To 
gather that statistic, the study examined the “followup” reports filed by 
detectives.407 Of course, if a detective for any reason failed to file follow-up 
paperwork—or to memorialize questioning in that paperwork—then the study 
would not have detected any role of interrogation. 
In addition, the study reported information on interrogation only where it was 
involved in linking to a crime a suspect who had not been named in the initial 
police report.408 If for any reason a suspect’s name appeared in the initial report, 
then the study did not collect information about the methods police used to solve 
that crime—including interrogation.409 And because the focus was on police 
successes (i.e., cleared crimes) and not on police failures, the study collected no 
data on police interrogations in cases involving uncleared crimes, which were 
about three quarters of the total crimes in the study.410 
In assessing all these numbers, it is important to remember that we do not 
purport to offer an explanation for the trajectory of, for example, all robbery 
cases, but only a fraction of them. Our best estimate of the harmful effect of the 
Miranda variable on robbery clearances is 7.1%,411 a number that can coexist 
quite comfortably with the numbers recounted above about the role of 
interrogations in clearances. 
2. Post-Miranda Studies on Police Investigations 
We have spent considerable time analyzing the President’s Crime 
Commission study because it appears to be the only pre-Miranda study that 
Feeney discusses. With regard to several post-Miranda studies that, in Feeney’s 
view, show a limited role for interrogation, one simple point to be made is that 
the data from these studies likely supports our argument, rather than detracts 
from it. We believe that in the post-Miranda world, clearance rates are depressed 
precisely because of Miranda. A finding that interrogation does not solve many 
crimes after Miranda is consistent with that argument. Put another way, as a 
theoretical matter, even if the post-Miranda clearances attributable to 
 
406 Id. at 88. 
407 Id. at 89. 
408 Id. at 98 tbl.B-18. 
409 See id. at 98 (discussing methods used in “unnamed suspect cases”).  
410 See id. at 97 tbl.B-15 (comparing 1423 uncleared cases with 482 cleared cases). 
411 See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
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interrogation are 0, that hardly disproves our position that, in the absence of 
Miranda, they would be, for example, 7.1 percentage points higher in the case 
of robbery or 1.0 percentage point higher in the case of larceny.412 
Feeney nonetheless seems to believe that these post-Miranda police studies 
demonstrate empirically that Miranda could not have had the kinds of effects on 
clearance rates that we ascribe to the decision.413 But Feeney relies on a certain 
kind of study, specifically studies on how to manage police investigations. These 
studies do not focus mainly on police interrogations and, accordingly, rarely 
discuss police interrogations—much less Miranda’s possible depressing effect 
on clearance rates. A much more direct effort to assess Miranda’s effects is 
found in the studies that asked police officers for their assessment of Miranda’s 
impact. We canvass the relevant studies below, reporting the findings that police 
officers who had experience operating both with and without Miranda 
consistently believed that Miranda was harming their investigative efforts, 
including, in particular, clearance rates.414 Feeney does not explain why he 
ignores this research.415 
But even if we confine ourselves to Feeney’s selected post-Miranda 
investigative management studies, these studies fail to prove Feeney’s claim that 
Miranda has little capacity to effect police clearance rates. Feeney discusses 
studies involving three kinds of crimes: robbery, burglary, and larceny.416 We 
will look at these three areas separately to show the problems with his approach. 
a. Robbery Studies 
Turning to robbery, Feeney relies on studies that are designed to answer not 
the question of how significant is police interrogation in solving crimes, but 
 
412 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.  
413 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 36 (arguing that post-Miranda clearance rate trends could 
be described as a “mixed trend with a downward slide,” but not a “sharp fall”).  
414 See infra notes 531-44 and accompanying text.  
415 Feeney spends only one sentence in his article on this point, obliquely noting, without 
clarification, that “surveys of detective opinion sometimes place greater value on police 
interrogations as a method of solving crimes.” Feeney, supra note 8, at 47 n.121. 
Feeney also does not review studies on “field interrogation” and related police tactics, 
which tend to provide support for the importance of interrogations to effective law 
enforcement. See, e.g., JOHN E. BOYDSTUN, SAN DIEGO FIELD INTERROGATION: FINAL REPORT 
27 (1975) (presenting a controlled experiment finding that suspensions of field interrogations 
was associated with a significant increase in the frequency of crimes); Sampson & Cohen, 
supra note 386, at 185 (favoring “the interpretation that proactive policing directly reduces 
crime rates”); Gordon P. Whitaker et al., Aggressive Policing and the Deterrence of Crime, 7 
LAW & POL’Y 395, 407 (1985) (finding support for field interrogations deterring crime). See 
generally Wilson & Boland, supra note 385, at 367 (discussing ways in which aggressive 
policing might reduce crime rates); Rushin & Edwards, supra note 127 (manuscript at 40) 
(finding that externally imposed regulation of police, through consent decrees, “may, at least 
initially, make officers less aggressive or less effective in combatting crime”). 
416 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 48, 52, 57.  
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rather the question of how to manage police investigations. Thus, the studies 
often look at issues regarding how to assign police manpower in optimal ways, 
such as among patrol and detective units.417 As Feeney is forced to concede, 
these studies do not typically directly analyze the question of how cases are 
solved.418 
Because these studies were not designed to focus on questions relating to 
police interrogation, Feeney has to jerry-rig his own statistics by selectively 
extracting numbers from the reported data addressing other subjects. Feeney’s 
most extended discussion of robbery clearance is his presentation of data from a 
1969 Oakland, California study, which (according to Feeney) shows that only 
2% of robbery clearances (2 cases out of 83) came from interrogating 
suspects.419 Feeney presents this figure in a table in his article, but describes the 
numbers as being “[a]dopted from” a study done by William Smith.420 But 
Smith’s study did not purport to even address the number of cases in which 
interrogation of a suspect was involved in a clearance. To derive his 2% figure, 
Feeney appears to have scanned through the write-ups of some examples given 
by Smith in various categories. And, finding only two examples that directly 
mention interrogation, Feeney then infers that only 2% of the entire body of 
cases involved interrogations. 
As a method for calculating how often interrogation clears crime, this 
approach is badly flawed. Obviously, looking at only a limited number of 
written-up examples does not provide a comprehensive assessment of the total 
universe of the cases. Given that only approximately one-third of the cases had 
detailed write-ups,421 we might reasonably assume that the two examples Feeney 
found might more realistically be just one-third of the total interrogation cases, 
 
417 See, e.g., GREENWOOD, supra note 220. While we discuss the quantitative aspects of 
these studies below, it is interesting to find qualitative suggestions in the studies that police 
interrogation is a significant factor in clearance rates. See, e.g., id. at 17 (discussing burglary 
cases and noting that “[t]he large majority of cases cleared that meet the FBI definition [of a 
clearance through an arrest for stolen property] rely on the suspect’s admission of guilt”).  
418 See, e.g., Feeney, supra note 8, at 49 n.130 (discussing the Greenwood study in the 
preceding footnote and concluding “[t]he study did not analyze how cases were solved”); see 
also id. at 50 (discussing Bernard Greenberg and his colleagues’ model for predicting which 
cases police could most easily clear); id. at 55-56 (discussing Greenberg and his colleagues’ 
“predictive model” for robbery clearances). Greenberg and his colleagues developed this 
model in two studies published in the 1970s. See BERNARD GREENBERG ET AL., FELONY 
INVESTIGATION DECISION MODEL: AN ANALYSIS OF INVESTIGATIVE ELEMENTS OF 
INFORMATION (1977) [hereinafter GREENBERG ET AL., FELONY INVESTIGATION]; BERNARD 
GREENBERG ET AL., ENHANCEMENT OF THE INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTION: ANALYSIS AND 
CONCLUSIONS (1972) [hereinafter GREENBERG ET AL., ENHANCEMENT]. 
419 Feeney, supra note 8, at 53 (discussing William Smith, How Cops Catch Robbers, in 4 
THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF ROBBERY 39 (Floyd Feeney & Adrianne Weir eds., 1973)).  
420 Id. at 54 tbl.11.  
421 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 50-74 (writing up approximately twenty-six examples).  
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suggesting that rather than a 2% clearance rate due to interrogation reported by 
Feeney, the actual rate would have been about 6%. 
But an even more serious problem develops on close scrutiny of Feeney’s 
method for “adopting” the figures from Smith’s study. Feeney notes that the 
study initially involved 106 robbery clearances, but his 2% figure involves only 
83 cases.422 What happened to the missing 23 cases? 
It is not easy to determine how Feeney boiled down Smith’s 106 clearances 
to just 83 cases,423 but one thing that is clear is that Feeney artificially excluded 
a significant number of Smith’s cases that involved interrogations and 
confessions. Smith notes that one of the ways in which robbery cases are cleared 
is that a robber is apprehended at the scene and then “is questioned about [other 
similar robberies].”424 Smith calls these clearances “secondary clearances” and 
identified thirteen such secondary clearances in the sample (along with an 
additional seven cases charged to the arrested suspects, but not cleared within 
the period).425 Smith’s later discussion of these secondary clearances makes 
clear that at least some of these involved confessions. Indeed, a later table in the 
study explains that, of the thirteen secondary clearances, four cases involved a 
cab robbery for which the basis for the clearance was “the suspect confessed,” 
and, in another case involving a laundromat robbery, the suspect “confessed to 
[a] street holdup two weeks earlier.”426 This means that Feeney excluded at least 
five clear cases of interrogations clearing crimes by crafting his smaller sample. 
Smith also notes that there were two cases in which “the robber did identify 
himself as responsible for a number of robberies,” including one case in which 
the arrestee “identified himself as responsible for 40 pursesnatches, but the 
detective was able to identify . . . six of the instances.”427 Here again, given that 
Feeney had only two clearances in his entire sample, he didn’t count (for 
example) these extra robbery clearances. 
If we start to add in all of these cases that Feeney dropped for unexplained 
reasons, it becomes clear that interrogation is a significant feature of the way in 
which some robbery cases are cleared. And it is important to remember that all 
of these data are post-Miranda, where it might be expected that police would 
encounter obstacles to clearing crimes—precisely the obstacles that we are 
 
422 Compare id. at 53 n.148 (describing the study as involving 106 clearances), with id. at 
54 tbl.11 (reporting statistics involving a total of 83 clearances). 
423 We have reviewed the Smith chapter several times and cannot find any obvious way to 
narrow down the 106 total clearances Feeney references to 83 clearances. One nonobvious 
way is to look only at cases where victims and witnesses played the decisive role identifying 
a suspect. See Smith, supra note 419, at 50 (referring the victim and witness playing the 
decisive role in 36 of the 48 unshared roles and 47 of the shared roles; 36 + 47 = 83). But if 
this is how Feeney constructed his subset, then he specifically excluded all cases in which 
police investigation played a decisive role in the clearance. 
424 Smith, supra note 419, at 43. 
425 Id. at 46 tbl.4. 
426 Id. at 80 tbl.11.  
427 Id. at 79. 
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trying to assess in this Article. Indeed, the Smith study reported that robbery 
suspects were often unwilling to talk to investigators,428 presumably after receipt 
of Miranda warnings. 
Among the remaining studies Feeney cites on robbery, only one of them 
follows police actions through the investigative process and collects data on how 
police collect crime-related information.429 That study—a four-city study 
conducted by John Eck—actually suggests that questioning of suspects is 
important to the investigative process. Eck noted that “[s]uccessfully 
investigating crimes is, in large part, reliant on the collection and interpretation 
of information that may identify a suspect.”430 Accordingly, Eck collected 
information about how police agencies gathered information. Eck provided a 
table showing the probability of obtaining related crime information through 
various actions of robbery investigators, which identified “suspect interview” as 
a highly productive approach for obtaining information by robbery 
investigators.431 Indeed, “suspect interview” was the most productive approach 
in DeKalb County, one of the four areas studied.432 This seems to directly 
support our conclusion that interrogation of suspects could be an important tool 
in robbery investigations. 
b. Larceny Studies 
With regard to larceny investigations, Feeney argues that most larceny crimes 
are solved not by interrogations, but by “apprehension in the act of theft, 
apprehension in the possession of stolen property, or identification of a suspect 
by the victim.”433 We can stipulate that these are the main ways in which 
larcenies are solved, as we do not purport to offer a theory addressing most 
larceny clearances. Rather, our theory is that Miranda has caused larceny 
clearance rates to drop about 2 percentage points—for example, that in 2012, 
larceny clearance rates would have been about 24% without Miranda rather than 
 
428 Id. at 78-79. 
429 See JOHN E. ECK, SOLVING CRIMES: THE INVESTIGATION OF BURGLARY AND ROBBERY 
244-45 (1983) (distinguishing his study from earlier studies because those studies “did not 
collect data on what detectives did after the preliminary investigation had been conducted”). 
The Eck study was also published in the same year by the Police Executive Research Forum. 
Following Feeney, we cite here the National Institute of Justice version. 
430 Id. at 165. 
431 Id. at 196 tbl.6-14 (listing “Probability of Obtaining Related Crime Information Given 
That Activities are Conducted by Investigators of Robberies (% of Case-Days)” and listing 
for “Suspect Interview” percentages for both patrol officer conduct and detective conduct). 
432 In DeKalb County, “suspect interview” produced related crime information 51.5% of 
the time, compared to “discussion with detective” (32.7%), and “informant interview” 
(26.7%), among other approaches. Id.  
433 Feeney, supra note 8, at 58.  
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22% with it.434 Thus, the question is whether Miranda’s rules hamper clearances 
for about 2% of total larcenies.435 
Feeney writes that “[i]f Professors Cassell and Fowles are serious about their 
claim that Miranda resulted in a sizable loss of larceny clearances, they might 
begin by showing that the police actually interrogated a significant proportion 
of the 1966-68 larceny arrestees.”436 As Feeney presumably knows, no empirical 
studies exist on the precise number of larceny suspects questioned during those 
three years. Indeed, there is very little data from the fifty years since Miranda 
on the frequency of police questioning. But what little data do exist suggest that 
a significant percentage of larceny arrestees are in fact questioned. As discussed 
earlier,437 Cassell, joined by Hayman, studied cases presented by law 
enforcement to the Salt Lake County Attorney’s Office for prosecution in 1994. 
For the property crimes in the study,438 79.7% of suspects were in fact 
questioned,439 giving significant room for Miranda to operate in the percentage 
of cases we are trying to explain. 
To try and prove that police do not often question larceny suspects, Feeney 
discusses the crime of shoplifting. He notes that shoplifting is generally reported 
to the police only when store detectives have apprehended a shoplifter—thus, 
police do very little, yet the clearance rate for shop lifting is extraordinarily high 
(80% to 90% or higher).440 But shoplifting (with its high clearance rate) is clearly 
a small part of the FBI’s larceny crime category. According to the FBI, in 2010, 
shopliftings were only 17.2% of larceny theft offenses, with the other important 
categories being theft from motor vehicles (26.4%), theft from buildings 
(11.3%), theft of motor vehicle accessories (8.9%), and a catchall of “others” 
(31.8%).441 Shoplifting and its high clearance rates is an anomaly among all 
larceny offenses. 
Finally, Feeney appears to betray his ignorance about how regression 
equations operate when he writes that if we “are serious” about our claim that 
Miranda resulted in a sizeable loss of larceny clearances, we “need also to deal 
 
434 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.  
435 As noted earlier, even a two-percentage-point delta in larceny clearance rate means that, 
without Miranda, larceny clearances would have been 9.4% higher and about 500,000 
additional larcenies would have been cleared in recent years. See supra Table 5. 
436 Feeney, supra note 8, at 58-59 (footnote omitted).  
437 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing Cassell and Hayman’s 
study).  
438 Most of the cases reviewed (58.4%) involved property crimes (i.e., theft, burglary, 
larceny/forgery, and auto theft). Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 853 tbl.1.  
439 Id. at 870 tbl.5, 853 tbl.1 (deriving the percentage figure by taking the number of 
property cases in which suspects were questioned and dividing by the number of property 
cases). About two-thirds of the questioning in the study was custodial questioning. Id. at 883 
tbl.6. 
440 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 57-58.  
441 UCR-2010, supra note 79, at 26 (displaying a chart of “Larceny-Theft Distribution, 
2010”). 
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with the problem of statistical error. [The] ‘sharp fall’ for larceny is barely 
perceptible even in the FBI figures. Although [Cassell and Fowles] find 
statistical significance in the drop, the statistical effect that they find is not 
particularly strong.”442 Feeney seems to be confused here, because the “barely 
perceptible” drop in larceny clearance rates to which he refers is a drop that 
ultimately is explained with high confidence by our Miranda equations—both 
in their current iteration and in our earlier article’s version.443 Our finding is, 
indeed, “particularly strong”—statistically significant at conventional levels, 
and not fragile as confirmed by Bayesian model averaging. 
c. Burglary Studies 
A final type of crime that Feeney believes could not have been affected by 
Miranda is burglary.444 Burglary was a crime for which we found statistically 
significant MIRANDA effects in some of our regression equations but not 
others.445 Perhaps burglary is simply a crime for which interrogation plays a less 
important role in solving cases than for other crimes, which is why our 
MIRANDA effect is not as robust. 
But even for the crime of burglary, Feeney’s data fail to demonstrate that 
Miranda lacks any capacity to affect clearances—at least to the degree required 
to be consistent with our findings. Our models suggest that Miranda might have 
an effect on burglary clearances of about two percent.446 We can thus readily 
accede to Feeney’s point that the most important way in which burglary suspects 
are identified and apprehended is through on-the-scene information, such as 
initial identifications by burglary victims or witnesses.447 We are trying to 
explain change not in these quickly solved “slam dunk” burglary cases, but the 
more difficult-to-solve cases where follow-up investigation is required. 
As with the robbery studies discussed earlier, most of Feeney’s cited burglary 
studies focus on the initial identification of suspects rather than on follow-up 
 
442 Feeney, supra note 8, at 59. 
443 See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text; supra Table 4 (showing that Miranda’s 
effect on larceny clearance rates is statistically significant at conventional 95% confidence 
level); supra Table 7 (showing that 60.9% of all equations have a larceny effect, including 
80% of the top five equations, for data 1950-2012; supra Table 8 (showing that 99.1% of all 
equations have a larceny effect, including 100% of the top five equations, for data 1950-2007, 
before the recession occurred). 
444 Feeney, supra note 8, at 48. 
445 See supra note 204 and accompanying text; supra Table 6 (MIRANDA effect found for 
1950-2007 data but not 1950-2012 data in Cassell/Fowles model); supra Table 6 (MIRANDA 
effect found (at ninety percent confidence) in 1950-2012 data in Donohue model, but not 
1950-2012 data); supra Table 7 (Bayesian model average shows MIRANDA effect only in 
42.9% of equations); see also Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1088 tbl.3 (statistically 
significant effect found for burglary). 
446 See supra Table 6. 
447 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 48-52.  
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investigation.448 The one study that tries to follow burglary cases throughout the 
investigative process is the Eck study, which (as with robbery) found the suspect 
interviews were important (although slightly less important than in the robbery 
cases).449 A table showed that “suspect interview” was important in obtaining 
related crime information for burglary.450 Eck’s data supports our thesis that 
police interrogation can be an important method of obtaining information used 
to clear burglaries—and that Miranda, by restricting that method, could have 
caused a noticeable reduction in burglary clearances. 
C. Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Primary and Secondary Clearances 
For all the reasons just explained, we believe Feeney is incorrect in his 
assertion that Miranda did not have the “capacity” to cause clearance rate 
changes of the type and magnitude we found in our regression equations. And it 
appears that Feeney is, perhaps, not entirely convinced by his argument either. 
Immediately after arguing at length against Miranda’s capacity to reduce crime 
clearance rates, Feeney next advances the argument that any reduction in 
clearance rates would have been confined to “secondary” rather than “primary” 
clearances.451 Feeney appears to concede that Miranda could depress secondary 
clearance rates.452 Indeed, Feeney specifically suggests that changes in 
secondary clearances could have explained the drops in the clearance rates that 
we observed.453 Other scholars have advanced similar theories in the past, 
including Kamisar.454 
Feeney first argues that the lost clearances that our regression equations 
identify are probably all secondary clearances.455 He then further argues that lost 
secondary clearances “would have had little real effect on law enforcement—
because solving older crimes typically contributes little to the fight against 
crime.”456 Serious problems exist with both prongs of his argument. 
 
448 See supra notes 417-21.  
449 See ECK, supra note 429, at 192 (discussing results of study as to importance of suspect 
interviews for burglary suspect information).  
450 Id. at 191 tbl.6-11.  
451 Feeney, supra note 8, at 42-43 (“[Miranda] may have affected what the British call 
‘secondary clearances’ . . . [b]ut it has had little to do with ‘primary clearances’ . . . .”). 
452 Cf. id. at 42 (conceding that Miranda may have affected secondary clearances).  
453 See id. at 65 (“Professors Cassell and Fowles point to no empirical studies indicating 
that the number of secondary clearances was too small to account for the ‘sharp fall’ in 
clearance rates that they claim.”).  
454 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1122 & nn.325-26 (discussing Kamisar’s study 
and citing to additional supporting sources). 
455 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 60 (“One response to the Cassell-Fowles claims of a 
‘sharp’ post-Miranda fall in clearance rates has been to attribute the decline to a drop in the 
number of [secondary clearances].”). 
456 Id.  
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1. Lost Clearances as Lost Primary Clearances 
Turning first to the question of whether the lost clearances were primary or 
secondary, it is useful to begin by getting some sense of the proportion of these 
two kinds of clearances in the FBI data. The FBI does not regularly distinguish 
primary clearances from secondary clearances,457 so we must look to other 
sources to make a determination. Unfortunately, as with many other aspects of 
crime clearance rates, there is limited data on the extent to which clearances are 
primary versus secondary clearances. 
In our earlier article, we acknowledged that there was limited empirical 
evidence on this point, but cited two specific studies with data on secondary 
clearances suggesting that only a small percentage of crimes were clearances of 
this type. Our first study was a 1967 Vera Institute study of arrested suspects in 
one precinct in New York.458 The study found that, after Miranda, only a small 
fraction of additional crimes were solved through interrogation.459 We also cited 
the Yale Law Journal study from New Haven the summer after Miranda, which 
suggested that about ten to fifteen percent of clearances might be attributable to 
secondary clearances.460 Curiously, while Feeney discusses other aspects of our 
argument, he does not discuss these two studies.461 
 
457 The FBI does collect data on two different kinds of clearances: (1) crimes cleared by 
arrest; and (2) crimes cleared by “exceptional means” (such cases where police have identified 
the perpetrator but are unable to arrest him because he is located in another jurisdiction). See, 
e.g., UCR-2010, supra note 79, at 313 (discussing exceptional clearances). Our sense is that 
such “exceptional” clearances are, indeed, exceptional and are not worth discussing separately 
here. See Marc Riedel & John G. Boulahanis, Homicides Exceptionally Cleared and Cleared 
by Arrest: An Exploratory Study of Police/Prosecutor Outcomes, 11 HOMICIDE STUD. 151, 
151-63 (2007) (finding that 10.7% of homicide cases reported to the Chicago Police 
Department were cleared by exceptional means); see also John P. Jarvis & Wendy C. 
Regoeczi, Homicide Clearances: An Analysis of Arrest Versus Exceptional Outcomes, 13 
HOMICIDE STUD. 174, 178-79 (2009) (discussing the Riedel & Boulahanis study). But cf. 
Cassia Spohn & Katharine Tellis, Justice Denied?: The Exceptional Clearance of Rape Cases 
in Los Angeles, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1379, 1380-99 (2011) (finding large numbers of sexual 
assault cases cleared by exceptional means in Los Angeles). Not only are exceptional 
clearances a relatively small fraction of clearances, but we have also seen no developed 
argument that the proportion of exceptional clearances would have been significantly altered 
by Miranda. 
458 See VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 292. 
459 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1123 n.329 (citing VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 292, at 68 & n.27).  
460 See id. (citing Wald et al., supra note 51, at 1595 n.203).  
461 Since publication of our earlier article, we have located one additional study with data 
showing only a small percentage of clearances to be secondary clearances, at least in the crime 
categories for which we consistently find a general MIRANDA effect. A study in Rochester, 
New York, found that 8.8% of robbery clearances, 4.4% of larceny clearances, and 50.8% of 
burglary clearances by regular police units were secondary arrest clearances. PETER B. BLOCH 
& JAMES BELL, MANAGING INVESTIGATIONS: THE ROCHESTER SYSTEM 27 tbl.5 (1976) 
(reporting data for “nonteam” clearances). While the burglary secondary clearance percent is 
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Instead of discussing our data, Feeney turns to the individual police agency 
studies just discussed. We find it interesting that Feeney fails to consider some 
of the same studies that he had reviewed when he was arguing that police 
interrogation is a relatively insignificant way in which police officers solve 
crimes. Perhaps the reason Feeney fails to discuss these studies is that they 
would show a very low percentage of cases (sometimes bordering on 0%) in 
which secondary clearances were obtained, which is perhaps why they tended to 
show a small role for interrogations in the first place.462 Because these studies 
were designed to follow cases that led to an arrest, they tended not to capture 
cases in which a crime was cleared without an arrest—the very kinds of cases 
where secondary clearances ordinarily occur. 
Illustrative of this problem of undercounting secondary clearances is the study 
by Bernard Greenberg and his colleagues in 1974 of the Oakland Police 
Department. He found that 42 of 330 robberies during the study period in 
Oakland were cleared, all of them by arrest and prosecution463—suggesting that 
the primary clearance rate was 100%, mathematically leaving a secondary 
clearance rate of only 0%.464 Similarly, in an earlier study by Greenberg and his 
colleagues, the means of identification for various crimes was only rarely (3 of 
58, or 5.2%) due to “unrelated interrogation.”465 
Similar low percentages of secondary clearances come from the one pre-
Miranda study cited by Feeney, the President’s Crime Commission study in Los 
Angeles in early 1966. This study showed very high percentages of cases cleared 
by arrest and only a small percentage that could have been cleared through a 
secondary clearance. For example, the study found that 24 of 26 (92.3%) robbery 
cases were cleared by arrest, leaving only 2 cases that could have been solved in 
“other” ways.466 Similarly, most burglaries (55 of 68, or 80.8%) were cleared by 
arrest.467 With regard to the “other” category (apart from arrest) for clearing, 
 
very high, the more salient number for present purposes are the robbery and larceny 
percentages—as they come from categories in which we found a MIRANDA effect. The study 
reported higher secondary clearance numbers for specialized experimental “teams” that were 
created to investigate crimes, but cautioned that these numbers “cannot be accepted too 
readily” because the teams may have worked especially hard to show that the experiment was 
working. See id. at 29.  
462 See, e.g., supra notes 405-06 and accompanying text (noting reasons for thinking that 
the cited studies exclude secondary clearances). 
463 GREENBERG ET AL., FELONY INVESTIGATION, supra note 418, at 8 tbl.I-2 (displaying 
results of study). 
464 Feeney argues that the way in which police usually obtain secondary clearances is by 
promising suspects that they will not be prosecuted for the additional offenses. Feeney, supra 
note 8, at 64-65. On this theory, if all cleared crimes are prosecuted, the secondary clearance 
rate is 0%.  
465 GREENBERG ET AL., ENHANCEMENT, supra note 418, at 70 tbl.6-4. 
466 Isaacs, supra note 392, at 95 tbl.B-12.  
467 Id. 
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secondary clearances were not specifically mentioned at all, suggesting that they 
must have been a tiny percentage (if any) of the cases involved.468 
Rather than discuss these studies, Feeney reviews two individual studies that 
collected data on the proportion of primary clearances to secondary clearances. 
Both studies show the great majority of clearances are primary clearances. One 
of these studies is Smith’s study in Oakland in 1969.469 Within a study period of 
several weeks, Smith collected data on 106 robbery clearances.470 He identified 
only thirteen of those 106 (12.3%) as secondary clearances.471 Smith also noted 
that he found “no evidence of the robbery detectives attempting to aid their 
clearance records by clearing a number of reports on spurious . . . 
confessions.”472 He explained that part of the reason for this was that in 1969 
(three years after Miranda) “robbers for the most part did not confess . . . [and 
if] they did confess, it was mainly for the robbery for which they were 
caught.”473 Smith concluded that “[i]n general it was not rewarding for the 
detective to try to link a suspect with a large number of cases as it was time 
consuming,” particularly in light of the fact that detectives were “[f]requently 
stymied by the suspect’s unwillingness to talk.”474 
John Conklin studied the clearance of robberies in Boston in 1968. He found 
a slightly larger percentage of secondary clearances, with the vast majority of 
clearances being primary clearances. Specifically, Conklin found that 17.9% of 
the robbery clearances in that year came from “clearance[s] by multiple 
confession[s].”475 Conklin noted that “[m]ost robberies solved in this manner 
were cleared some time after the offense occurred, suggesting that the victim 
might have been unavailable to make an identification or might have been unable 
 
468 The table explaining “other clearance methods” apart from arrests lists juvenile 
prosecution, declination by prosecutor, victim refusal to procedure, and no-crime 
determinations as the other specifically identified reasons for a clearance. Id. at 95 tbl.B-11.  
469 See supra notes 422-30 and accompanying text (discussing Smith’s study and Feeney’s 
analysis of the data). The qualitative data on secondary clearance rates is largely limited to 
the anecdotal observation that some police officers will try to increase their clearance rates by 
having an arrested suspect “confess” to a large number of similar crimes. See, e.g., JEROME 
H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 169-73 
(3d ed. 1994). For our purposes, such qualitative assessments are unhelpful. While we agree 
that such inflated secondary clearances exist, our focus is on the extent of such clearances.  
470 Smith, supra note 372, at 46 tbl.4. 
471 Id. 
472 Id. at 78. 
473 Id. at 79. 
474 Id. 
475 CONKLIN, supra note 370, at 147. Interestingly, Conklin also noted (consistent with the 
findings in this Article) that in the nation’s largest cities, there was little change in robbery 
clearance rates from 1960 to 1965, but then clearance rates fell significantly over the next 
several years. Id. at 133. Conklin also found a drop in clearance rates in Boston from 1964 to 
1968, although the extent of the drop (from 37.4% to 35.8%) was not as large as in other 
cities. Id. at 133-34.  
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to identify the offender after a lapse of so much time.”476 Conklin also added 
that a suspect who confessed to multiple crimes was rarely punished for his 
admissions.477 
As between the Smith study reporting a 12.3% secondary clearance rate and 
the Conklin study reporting a 17.9% rate, Feeney seizes on the larger of the two 
numbers to argue that it is “clearly sufficient to cover a drop of the magnitude 
claimed by Professors Cassell and Fowles.”478 It is not clear why Feeney 
believes it is appropriate to use the single largest figure of secondary clearances 
that is reported in any of the studies discussed, particularly when Conklin 
himself thought that his 17.9% figure might have been higher than in other 
cities.479 But, in any event, Feeney has done his math incorrectly in asserting 
that the 17.9% figure is sufficient to account for our findings. 
Feeney appears to misunderstand how coefficients associated with regression 
equations operate. Feeney is discussing percentages of clearances, while our 
regressions show a percentage point change or “delta” (a difference between two 
values, i.e., delta = x – y). When this fact is correctly appreciated, secondary 
clearances are not sufficient to explain the Miranda coefficients on our 
equations. 
For example, taking the robbery category that Feeney discusses, our standard 
1998 regression equation480 showed a Miranda coefficient (i.e., delta) of -6.4% 
for robbery at a time when robbery clearance rates were 24.2%.481 Our equation 
thus predicts that robbery clearance rates for 1995 without Miranda would have 
been 30.6% (24.2% + 6.4%)—i.e., that clearance rates would have been about 
26% higher (30.6%/24.2%) without Miranda. The net result is that the delta, or 
change due to Miranda, exceeds the 17.9% of clearances that Feeney estimates 
could be due to secondary clearance.482 Thus, contrary to Feeney’s claim, even 
using Feeney’s handpicked high number of secondary clearances does not 
produce a “clearly sufficient” number to cover the magnitude of our drop.483 
 
476 Id. at 147. 
477 Id. 
478 Feeney, supra note 8, at 65. 
479 CONKLIN, supra note 370, at 148 (suggesting that this technique of clearing cases may 
have been more common in Boston). 
480 The “standard” equation is the three-year Miranda phase in that both we and Donohue 
believe best fits the data.  
481 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1086 tbl.II, 1106 tbl.VIII. 
482 Assuming that 17.9% of the 30.6% predicted clearance rate without Miranda was due 
to secondary clearances, that would mean a 5.4% delta in clearance rates (30.6% x 17.9%)—
which is smaller than the 6.4% delta that our equations found.  
483 Because Feeney was criticizing our earlier article, the numbers quoted above come 
from our earlier article on data through 1995. The problems with Feeney’s argument also 
apply given our current robbery clearance rate coefficients. Our latest equations estimate a 
delta for robbery of about -7.1%. See supra note 411 and accompanying text (reporting a 
Bayesian average coefficient for Miranda of -7.092). Given a 2012 robbery clearance rate of 
28.1%, see supra note 193 and accompanying text, our current predicted clearance rate in the 
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Even more clear-cut is the case of vehicle theft. Assuming the percentage of 
secondary clearances for vehicle theft is the same that Feeney selects for robbery 
(17.9%), that percentage of secondary clearances is far lower than the number 
needed to explain our delta for vehicle theft. Given that so few vehicle thefts are 
cleared, our delta for the vehicle theft is a substantial part of the total. Our 
regression equations suggest that, without Miranda, clearance rates for vehicle 
theft would have been 31% higher (using our 1995 article and data) or 42% 
higher (using our current article and data).484 For Feeney’s secondary clearance 
theory to account for our findings, it has to explain all of the crime categories 
where we found a MIRANDA effect. Because it clearly fails to explain the 
vehicle theft category, his theory should be rejected. 
For all these reasons, we do not believe that individual studies demonstrate 
that the declining clearance rates we have found are all attributable to lost 
secondary clearances. But lost secondary clearances surely may have played a 
role, and it would be nice to have a better quantitative method for determining 
what fraction of our drop might be attributable to lost secondary clearances. An 
approach for calculating such a fraction comes from recognizing that 
analytically the clearance rate consists of two components: (1) the number of 
arrests per crime, and (2) the number of clearances per arrest.485 Feeney’s 
ultimate claim is that a change in the second component—clearances per 
arrest—is responsible for the observed clearance rate drop. But the available FBI 
data suggest that clearance rates fell immediately after Miranda not only because 
police were obtaining fewer statements (and thus confessions) from suspects, 
but also because they were making fewer arrests per crime. In other words, both 
clearances per arrest and arrests per crime fell after Miranda. FBI data for violent 
crimes from 1965 to 1991486 on this issue are plotted in Figure 14. 
 
 
absence of Miranda is 35.2%. Assuming that 17.9% of the 35.2% predicted clearance rate 
without Miranda was due to secondary clearances, that would mean that a -6.3% delta in 
clearance rates (35.2% x 17.9%)—which is smaller than the -7.1% delta that our equations 
found.  
484 In our earlier article, our regression for vehicle theft produced a Miranda coefficient 
of -4.148. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1096 tbl.4. Given a 1995 clearance rate for 
vehicle theft of 13.2%, that means we were predicting that the clearance rate without Miranda 
would have been about 31% higher (17.2%/13.1%)—far more than Feeney’s 17.9% 
secondary clearance number could explain. Our current equations lead to similar results, given 
that we find a -5.1% delta in vehicle clearance rates, see supra note 193 and accompanying 
text (Table 7), which, given a 2012 clearance rate for vehicle theft of 11.9%, means we are 
predicting that the clearance rate without Miranda would have been about 42% higher 
(17.0%/11.9%)—again, far more than Feeney’s 17.9% secondary clearance number could 
explain. 
485 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1123.  
486 The FBI has published a consistent revision of its arrest data that extends back only to 
1965. For further details about this chart, see Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1123-24. 
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Figure 14 - Arrests/Crime and Clearances/Arrest 
On close examination of the chart, the years 1966 to 1968 show a substantial 
decline in the number of arrests per violent crime. In fact, so far as we can tell 
from simple visual observation of the available data, more than half of the 1966-
to-1968 drop in violent crime clearance rates stemmed from reductions in arrests 
per crime. 
Feeney’s response to this chart is primarily to fall back on his other main 
arguments—i.e., that (despite FBI data to the contrary) clearance rates did not 
sharply fall from 1966 to 1968, and that there is no reason to think that Miranda 
would have an effect on clearance rates.487 These primary arguments have been 
rebutted elsewhere in our current Article.488 Feeney also nitpicks several other 
points, which hardly suffice for him to carry his point.489 
 
487 Feeney, supra note 8, at 61. 
488 See supra notes 280-327 and accompanying text (arguing that clearance rates did, in 
fact, fall sharply after Miranda as the FBI and many other observers reported) and notes 280-
308 and accompanying text (explaining why Miranda could harm clearance rates).  
489 Having established through our regression equations (and related Bayesian model 
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2. The Harm of Lost Secondary Clearances 
For these reasons just given, we think it is likely that most of the clearance 
rate drop is due to reductions in primary clearances rather than secondary 
clearances. But even if Feeney is correct in isolating the cause of the clearance 
rate drop to be only secondary clearances, the other part of his argument—that 
society is unharmed when police officers solve fewer crimes from each arrest—
is incorrect. Perhaps the most important reason to be concerned about lost 
secondary clearances is their effect on crime victims. Uncleared crimes harm 
crime victims, who never receive the reassurance that their attackers have been 
apprehended.490 As Jeff Fagan and Daniel Richmond recently put it, “[c]learance 
rates matter in reassuring people that police are dedicated to their safety, and 
that they can deliver on promises of security.”491 Evidence suggests that the 
principle harms suffered by crime victims includes psychological trauma.492 
Without a clearance, they will likely continue to fear that they will be victimized 
 
averaging) significant negative MIRANDA effects on clearance rates, as well as the fact that 
the great majority of crime clearances are primary clearances, we think the burden of proof 
can properly be assigned to Feeney to prove that our negative effects are mostly attributable 
to secondary clearances. Along these lines, we find it interesting that Feeney criticizes our 
graph of the FBI data by arguing that, instead of plotting clearances/arrests and arrests/crimes, 
we should have plotted arrests/crimes. Feeney, supra note 8, at 62-63. But Feeney provides 
no clear reason why this is the proper approach. Nor does he choose to present such a 
calculation himself. We see no reason to chase down such a calculation, particularly because 
our chart plots clearances/arrests. Clearance rates are, of course, composed entirely of crimes 
(i.e., crimes solved divided by crimes committed).  
Feeney also says (correctly) that our chart includes data from major cities like New York 
City, which should (in his view) be eliminated from the data to reach accurate conclusions. 
See id. at 63-64. We have shown earlier that eliminating flawed large city data from 
consideration does not alter our conclusions. See supra notes 280-308 and accompanying text. 
Feeney also complains that our graph starts in 1965 and that a longer pre-Miranda period 
would be preferable. See Feeney, supra note 8, at 64. We naturally would like more pre-
Miranda data, but the FBI has not made any such data available. Finally, Feeney notes that 
attitudes about the importance of secondary clearances may have changed at some point, with 
the effect of minimizing officers’ interests in obtaining such clearances. See id. at 66-71. But 
Feeney does not press this argument very hard, and he even ends up conceding that such 
changing attitudes would not have occurred during the 1966-to-1968 period of interest to us. 
See id. at 70 (“It is highly doubtful that much of the criticism of secondary clearances . . . had 
filtered its way down to working level police officers by 1966-68.”). 
490 See Spohn & Tellis, supra note 457, at 1399-415 (discussing the experiences of sexual 
assault victims in the crime clearance process). 
491 Jeffrey Fagan & Daniel Richman, Understanding Recent Spikes and Longer Trends in 
American Murders, 117 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 41) (on file with 
authors). 
492 See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
611, 619-21 (2009); see also LESLIE SEBBA, THIRD PARTIES: VICTIMS AND THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 80-81 (1996). 
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again.493 Elizabeth Mustaine explained: “For victims, witnesses, and others 
connected to criminal events, whether or not a criminal offense is cleared by the 
police is an important personal and emotional issue. For victims, knowing that 
perpetrators who offended against them are identified and arrested may be 
important for mental health and daily functioning.”494 Uncleared crimes leave 
their “victims without answers.”495 Victims understandably want to see justice 
done, and that is often not possible until the crime is cleared. Victims of property 
crimes also benefit from each clearance, because even if the suspect is never 
charged or convicted for the secondary crime, the confession creates the 
possibility of the return of stolen property496 or restitution.497 
Fewer secondary clearances also harm law enforcement. Fewer cleared 
crimes leave police investigators less able to focus effectively on crimes that 
require their attention. They are forced to spend time attempting to solve crimes 
that would have been solved by talking with a suspect briefly.498 The paucity of 
police resources makes this unnecessary diversion a possible concern. Multiple 
confessions are also useful to help police officers discern the modus operandi 
(or “MO”) of professional criminals.499 
D. Falling Clearance Rates as an Understated Telltale for Lost Convictions 
For the reasons just given, lost secondary clearances are a matter of concern 
in and of themselves. However, a much broader response is also available to the 
argument that lost secondary clearances are of little consequences. The broader 
point is that we are interested in declining clearance rates not only because of 
the intrinsic value of clearances, but also because they signal a presumably much 
 
493 See Riedel, supra note 110, at 1148; Roberts, supra note 153, at 61; see also 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 28 (1982), 
https://www.ovc.gov/publications/presdntstskforcrprt/87299.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVR6-
T2LQ]. 
494 Mustaine et al., supra note 148, at 256.  
495 Fagan & Richman, supra note 491 (manuscript at 34). 
496 See GREENBERG ET AL., ENHANCEMENT, supra note 418, at 45 (reporting detectives’ 
views that the possibility of returning property to burglary victims justified attempts to obtain 
multiple clearances). 
497 See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (2012) (providing for restitution to victims). See 
generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 607-18 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the importance of restitution).  
498 See Leo, Police Interrogation in America, supra note 57, at 99 (reporting police views 
that “getting a confession makes the investigator’s job a lot easier . . . . If he gets a 
confession . . . he doesn’t have to spend hours tracking down witnesses, running fingerprints, 
putting together line-ups, etc.”). But cf. Smith, supra note 419, at 79 (noting that police 
officers in Oakland were not rewarded for trying to link a suspect to “a large number of 
cases”).  
499 See GREENBERG ET AL., ENHANCEMENT, supra note 418, at 45-46 (reporting detectives’ 
views to this effect). 
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larger decline in the confession rate. And declining confession rates are clearly 
a matter of significant public concern. 
If police clear fewer crimes because they obtain fewer statements from 
suspects, subsequent prosecutions will be impaired. It could conceivably be true 
that it makes little difference whether an arrested robber confesses to four crimes 
or to one. But it makes a considerable difference whether he confesses to one 
crime or none, as a confession is quite important to prosecutors.500 Miranda does 
not generally reduce the number of confessions from four to one; it reduces them 
to zero by occasionally blocking police interrogation entirely.501 It seems hard 
to view such declining clearances as anything other than a serious social cost. 
Moreover, there is every reason to think that the clearance rate changes that 
we have been investigating significantly understate Miranda’s harmful effects. 
As Feeney (and others) has accurately explained, good reasons exist for thinking 
that in many cases Miranda will not prevent police from clearing a crime, but 
could prevent police from obtaining a conviction.502 If police have enough 
evidence for probable cause to arrest, but not enough evidence to obtain a 
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, interrogation may be critical to securing 
a confession needed for conviction.503 
Confessions can be extremely important in securing a conviction.504 Feeney 
himself has collected data on precisely this point. In his 1983 study Arrests 
Without Conviction: How Often They Occur and Why, Feeney emphasizes the 
importance of confessions, writing that “[a] confession by the defendant stating 
that he committed the crime is powerful evidence . . . . The conviction rate in 
robbery and burglary cases involving confessions is 40 to 180 percent greater 
than in the cases not involving confessions.”505 In his article responding to us, 
 
500 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 909-16 (finding that whether police obtain an 
incriminating statement makes a significant difference in case outcome); Leo, Police 
Interrogation in America, supra note 57, at 295 (suspects who incriminated themselves were 
twenty-six percent more likely to be convicted).  
501 See Cassell, supra note 16, at 494-96 (presenting data on what percentage of suspects 
do not waive rights and thus cannot be interrogated). 
502 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 42 (“It is certainly possible that giving the Miranda 
warnings has some impact upon the willingness of a suspect to talk with the police and that 
the decision hampers the police in conducting post-arrest interrogations.”); see also Donohue, 
supra note 7, at 1156 (“If Miranda significantly stops the flow of damaging statements by 
criminals to the police, it could well reduce the rate of successful prosecutions of crime even 
if it has no impact on measured clearance rates.”).  
503 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 912 tbl.16 (reporting data showing that 
suspects who confessed are more likely to be convicted and less likely to receive favorable 
plea bargains).  
504 See Cassell, supra note 16, at 422-37 (collecting multiple studies regarding the 
importance of obtaining a confession to securing a conviction). 
505 FEENEY, DILL & WEIR, supra note 56, at 141. 
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however, Feeney repackages his earlier findings, explaining (in a footnote) that 
confessions show only a “marginal contribution” to convictions.506 
Conviction rates 40% to 180% higher are not “marginally” better—they are 
substantially better. And it is for this reason alone that society should be 
extremely concerned about declining clearance rates. They stand as a surrogate 
for declining confession rates—and thus ultimately as an understated measure 
of the number of criminals who are escaping prosecution due to the decline in 
confession rates after Miranda.507 
In this connection, it is interesting to observe that the title of Feeney’s article 
is Police Clearances: A Poor Way to Measure the Impact of Miranda on the 
Police. His title brings to mind Winston Churchill’s quip that “democracy is the 
worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from 
time to time.”508 Clearance rates may, indeed, be a poor way—or more precisely, 
an understated way—of measuring Miranda’s impact. But they appear to be the 
only quantitative way to measure Miranda’s effects across the country over its 
fifty years of existence. 
Feeney’s argument against clearance rates as a way of measuring Miranda’s 
effect also might have more bite if he proposed an alternative. But remarkably 
for someone who has written an article spanning some 114 pages, Feeney does 
not offer any alternative approach to determining Miranda’s effects. We are thus 
left to draw the best inferences we can from the only long-term measure we have. 
Clearance rates for several important crime categories had statistically 
significant reductions following Miranda—reductions that have persisted over 
time and cannot be explained through other factors. These clearance rate 
declines strongly suggest that Miranda’s dissenters were correct in predicting 
significant reductions in confession rates due to the Miranda regime. 
E. How Police Interrogation Remains Important in an Era of Advancing 
Forensic Science 
So far in this Part, we have discussed the studies cited by Feeney, most of 
which were conducted in the 1970s and 1980s. Have things changed since then? 
In particular, have advances in forensic science rendered police interrogation 
irrelevant? 
The idea that crimes are now typically solved through advanced forensic 
science techniques—rather than through old-fashioned methods such as police 
interrogations—has been overstated to such an extent that it has its own 
Wikipedia entry: the “CSI effect.”509 The basic idea is that exaggerated portrayal 
 
506 Feeney, supra note 8, at 42 n.107.  
507 Cf. Cassell, supra note 16, at 437-40 (calculating based on confession measure that 
Miranda produces a loss of about 3.8% of all convictions).  
508 Winston Churchill, Speech, House of Commons, November 11, 1947, in 7 WINSTON S. 
CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 7563, 7566 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 
1974). 
509 See CSI Effect, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 2, 2017, 11:09 AM), 
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of forensic science on crime television shows, such as CSI: Crime Scene 
Investigation, creates the inaccurate belief (in the general public and jurors in 
criminal cases) that forensic evidence is often available to the police.510 In fact, 
despite important advances in forensic science, traditional law enforcement 
techniques, including interrogation, remain vital for solving cases.511 
Forensic science relies on the examination of physical trace data collected 
from crime scenes to identify criminals.512 Despite the continued advancement 
of forensic science’s ability to assist law enforcement in crime investigation,513 
national crime clearance rates generally show no improvement in recent years.514 
Part of the reason forensic science has been unable to reverse clearance rate 
trends is the frequent unavailability of physical trace data at crime scenes.515 For 
example, a recent report has found that forensic evidence was submitted to crime 
labs in less than 15% of burglaries and robberies, and less than 10% of assault 
cases had physical evidence examined in crime labs.516 Even where physical 
evidence has been collected and submitted to forensic scientists, “a very low 
percentage of arrests actually [have] physical evidence examined before the 




511 See INBAU ET AL., supra note 82, at xii (“Many criminal cases, even when investigated 
by the best qualified police departments, are capable of solution only by means of an 
admission or confession from the guilty individual or upon the basis of information obtained 
from the questioning of other criminal suspects.”).  
512 See Forensic Sciences: Types of Evidence, NAT’L INST. JUST. (May 29, 2015), 
https://nij.gov/topics/forensics/evidence/Pages/welcome.aspx [https://perma.cc/4SUH-
PKRX]. 
513 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE IMPACT OF FORENSIC SCIENCE RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT 6 (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248572.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J2CF-D598] (analyzing how advancements in forensic science improve 
scientists’ ability to effectively assist law enforcement in solving crimes).  
514 See supra Figures 2-7; see also Nagin, supra note 151, at 77 (“Modern forensic 
methods could improve the effectiveness of postcrime investigations, but . . . clearance rates 
for seveal crime types have remained stable over the period 1970 to 2007.”). Interestingly, the 
only exception to this fact is the clearance rate for larceny, a crime for which forensic science 
does not seem to be generally important. See supra Figure 6 (depicting the increase in larceny 
clearance rates in recent years). 
515 See, e.g., JOSEPH PETERSON ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF 
FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 3-7 (2010), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf [https://perma.cc/VDJ6-GY9A] 
(providing summaries of the low forensic evidence in various property crimes).  
516 Id. at 122; see also BRENT E. TURVEY, CRIMINAL PROFILING: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE ANALYSIS 148-49 (4th ed. 2012) (examining additional reports of low 
availability of forensic evidence and the “diminished role for forensic evidence and a lack of 
emphasis on it in criminal investigations and subsequent prosecutions”).  
517 PETERSON ET AL., supra note 515, at 123. 
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arrests.”518 Even for crimes like homicide where forensic evidence is often 
submitted to crime laboratories,519 clearance rates continue to be low.520 
The fact that forensic evidence is not generally available in criminal cases 
provides a response to Dripps’s argument, advanced in this Symposium, that the 
chain of events needed for Miranda to produce a loss of evidence is “long and 
improbable.”521 Without going through each step in his logic, several points are 
worth highlighting. Dripps mentions the possibility of noncustodial questioning 
of a suspect outside the Miranda regime; but the available data shows that about 
seventy percent of all police questioning of defendants is custodial and that 
noncustodial questioning is less effective.522 Dripps mentions informants as a 
possible alternative source of information. But, as the police studies just 
reviewed show, informants are involved in a tiny sliver of cases.523 Dripps also 
alludes to the possibility that a “digital portrait” might exist of the suspect, 
without providing any suggestion that this happens with enough regularity to be 
a significant factor in discussions about Miranda.524 So too with an electronic 
surveillance order, which is so time consuming and expensive as to be all-but-
impossible to use in anything other than the most extraordinary cases. 
In any event, it is possible to determine how often lost confessions are 
necessary to obtain a conviction. Cassell collected all of the available data on 
this subject in 1996, finding that confessions were needed in about 23.8% of all 
cases.525 Dripps offers no good reason to think that this figure has changed 
significantly in recent years. 
 
518 TOM MCEWEN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT: THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF 
FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 118 (2010), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/236474.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA8P-ZA4R]. 
519 See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 515, at 122 (finding that forensic evidence is submitted 
to the crime lab eighty-nine percent of the time for homicides). 
520 See supra Figure 4; see also Getting Away with Murder, ECONOMIST (July 4, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21656725-police-fail-make-arrest-more-
third-nations-killings-getting-away [https://perma.cc/J57M-M58N] (commenting on 
continually declining homicide clearance rates).  
521 Donald A. Dripps, Miranda for the Next Fifty Years: Why the Fifth Amendment Should 
Go Fourth, 97 B.U. L. REV. 893, 927-28 (2017). 
522 See infra notes 726-28 and accompanying text (noting that the Cassell and Hayman 
study found a 56.9% success rate for custodial questioning versus a 30.0% success rate for 
noncustodial questioning). 
523 See, e.g., ECK, supra note 429, at 177 tbl.6-4 (showing that informants provide a suspect 
description to patrol officers in between 0.0% and 0.9% of patrol officer cases and 0.0% to 
7.3% of detective cases).  
524 Dripps, supra note 521, at 928 (claiming that police could use a digital portrait of the 
suspect “to convict or to support additional warrant searches”). 
525 Cassell, supra note 16, at 434 tbl.2. 
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VI. THE CAUSALITY QUESTION: ATTRIBUTING DECLINING CLEARANCE 
RATES TO MIRANDA 
So far we have presented our updated evidence that, controlling for major 
criminal justice and socioeconomic variables, in our regression equations the 
crime clearance rates for robbery, larceny, vehicle theft, and possibly burglary 
fell significantly after Miranda.526 The question remains whether Miranda 
caused those drops. Regression analysis can never establish causality. Instead, 
the causal conclusion can only come from combining the information provided 
by the regression equations with theory and other information to determine 
whether a causal interpretation is a reasonable one. The potential obstacle to 
concluding that Miranda was the cause of the 1966-to-1968 drop in clearance 
rates is the problem of the “omitted variable” or “alternate causality”—that is, 
some other change in society, unaccounted for in our regression equations, was 
responsible for the reduction in clearance rates. 
In interrupted time series analysis, especially without control groups, it is 
important to consider such potentially omitted variables. In working on both our 
1998 article and this Article, we have made aggressive efforts to identify 
possible “omitted” variables that might influence our conclusions527 and discuss 
the various possibilities of such an omission in this Part. Before turning to these 
other, thus-far-unconsidered candidates for the omitted variable, we should first 
discuss briefly what we are looking for. To be a strong candidate for the omitted 
variable, the variable must change sharply in the critical 1966-to-1968 period—
but not elsewhere. For example, Figure 5 above showed that robbery clearances 
plunged from 37.6% in 1965 to 26.9% in 1968 and have remained relatively 
stable since.528 Our regression equations suggest that about half of this drop is 
explained by a structural shift at the time of Miranda, controlling for such 
criminal justice variables as crime rates and police personnel and such 
socioeconomic and demographic variables as unemployment and juveniles in 
the population. BMA analysis confirms that these findings are not caused by 
specification of our equations. Now that we have used such analysis to rule out 
the influences of those factors, we next look to the relevant theoretical, 
anecdotal, and logical explanations that could reveal what was the cause of the 
shift in the clearance rate: Miranda or something else? 
A. Contemporaneous Explanations of the Clearance Rate Decline 
In assessing plausible causal factors for the decline in clearance rates, it is 
useful to first examine the contemporaneous assessments that were made. Crime 
 
526 In some other specifications, clearance rates for other crimes fell as well. We focus on 
our main equations in this Part.  
527 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1081, 1107. 
528 See Daniel S. Nagin, Robert M. Solow & Cynthia Lum, Deterrence, Criminal 
Opportunities, and Police, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 74, 77 (2015) (noting largely stable clearance 
rates for robbery and other crimes for last several decades).  
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clearance rate declines in 1966 through 1968 were discussed at the time they 
happened. What was the contemporaneous understanding? 
The national clearance rate declines were reported by the FBI in its annual 
Uniform Crime Reports. The FBI had strong incentive to provide explanations 
for apparently declining police performance. During the critical 1966-to-1968 
period, the authors of the FBI’s UCR listed the following causes of falling 
clearance rates: “court decisions which have resulted in restrictions on police 
investigative and enforcement practices, sharply increasing police workloads 
not limited to crime increases, an almost static ratio of police to population not 
commensurate with the sharp rise in crime, and constant increasing criminal 
mobility.”529 Setting aside the first italicized factor (“court decisions”), the 
regression equations control for two of the remaining three factors the FBI cited: 
the increase in police workloads and the static ratio of police strength. The last 
factor cited—increased mobility of those committing crimes—may have some 
long-term explanatory power, but seems an unlikely explanation for relatively 
sudden shifts in crime clearance rates. Increasing mobility could only affect 
clearances over the long haul. That leaves the first factor—“court decisions 
which have resulted in restrictions on police investigative and enforcement 
practices”—as the logical remaining explanation. Of course, that is the 
explanation we have focused on in this Article through our MIRANDA 
variable—a factor identified by the FBI at the time. 
Confirming the FBI’s contemporaneous explanation were the assessments 
from those who knew firsthand the effects of those court decisions: law 
enforcement officers who questioned suspects both before and after the Supreme 
Court imposed Miranda’s constraints. Otis Stephens and his colleagues 
interviewed officers on the streets in Knoxville, Tennessee, and Macon, Georgia 
in 1969 and 1970.530 Virtually all of the officers surveyed believed that Supreme 
Court decisions had harmed their work, and most attributed this negative 
influence first and foremost to Miranda.531 Similarly, in New Haven, 
Connecticut, Yale students interviewed most of the detectives involved in the 
 
529 UCR-1967, supra note 79, at 30 (emphasis added); see also Malnic, supra note 345, at 
27 (“FBI director J. Edgar Hoover said increased . . . restrictions on police investigative and 
enforcement practices are contributing to the reduced rates of solving serious crimes.”).  
530 See Otis H. Stephens, Robert L. Flanders & J. Lewis Cannon, Law Enforcement and 
the Supreme Court: Police Perceptions of the Miranda Requirements, 39 TENN. L. REV. 407, 
411 (1972). 
531 See id. at 420 tbl.IV (finding “over 90%” believed the Court decisions created negative 
effects, with “58% attribut[ing] this negative influence primarily to Miranda”). The 
percentage identifying Miranda as responsible might have been higher but for a memorandum 
on legal restrictions governing search and seizure that circulated shortly before some of the 
interviews. See id. at 421. Seventy-four percent said that advice of defendants’ rights had an 
adverse effect on investigations. See id. at 424 tbl.VIII. In individual interviews, the officers 
surveyed generally gave negative assessments of Miranda. See id. at 426-29. In light of these 
findings, Stephens’s conclusion that his survey showed little impact from Miranda, see id. at 
430-31, is hard to understand. 
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interrogations they observed during the summer of 1966 as well as an additional 
twenty-five detectives.532 They reported that “the detectives unanimously 
believe [Miranda] will unjustifiably [help the suspect].”533 They also reported 
that “[t]he detectives continually told us that the decision would hurt their 
clearance rate and they would therefore look inefficient.”534 Also, law student 
Gary Wolfstone sent letters in 1970 to police chiefs and prosecutors in each state 
and the District of Columbia. Most agreed that Miranda at least raised obstacles 
to law enforcement.535 And, in Seaside City, James Witt interviewed forty-three 
police detectives before 1973.536 Witt reported that the detectives “were in 
almost complete agreement over the effect that the Miranda warnings were 
having on the outputs of formal interrogation. Most believed that they were 
getting many fewer confessions, admissions and statements.”537 Witt also found 
the detectives to be “quick to refer to a decline in their clearance rate when 
discussing problems emanating from the Miranda decision.”538 
Concerns about Miranda continue to be expressed by law enforcement.539 For 
example, when the Supreme Court heard arguments in Dickerson v. United 
States540 (involving the congressional statute designed to supersede Miranda541) 
a number of law enforcement organizations filed briefs in support of the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision restricting circumstances in which confessions would be 
suppressed for Miranda violations.542 But the more telling evidence is what the 
 
532 See Wald et al., supra note 51, at 1528. 
533 Id. at 1611. 
534 Id. at 1612 n.265. 
535 See Gary L. Wolfstone, Miranda—A Survey of Its Impact, 7 PROSECUTOR 26, 27 (1971). 
536 Witt’s article was published in 1973. See Witt, supra note 87, at 320. He appears to 
have begun collecting his data sometime after 1968. 
537 Id. at 325. 
538 Id. at 330. 
539 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1108-10. But cf. Victoria M. Time & Brian K. 
Payne, Police Chiefs’ Perceptions About Miranda: An Analysis of Survey Data, 30 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 77, 84 (2002) (reporting that 52.6% of chiefs surveyed believed that Miranda warnings 
hindered voluntary confessions, but 64.2% did not believe that Miranda made it more difficult 
for police to do their jobs); Marvin Zalman & Brad W. Smith, Attitudes of Police Executives 
Toward Miranda and Interrogation Policies, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 873, 893 (2007) 
(finding police administrators did not generally believe Miranda made it more difficult for 
police to do their jobs). 
540 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
541 Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling 
of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 177 (1999) (discussing § 3501’s replacement of Miranda); 
see also Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in Dickerson, 
99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 898 (2001) (criticizing Dickerson’s failure to uphold § 3501). 
542 See, e.g., Brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Affirmance, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 95-5525); Brief for 
Fraternal Order of Police as Amicus Curiae Urging Affirmance, Dickerson v. United States, 
530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525); Brief for National Association of Police Organizations 
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police thought at the time Miranda was handed down, when they had experience 
both with and without the new rules. Those firsthand, contemporaneous 
reports—including the FBI statements of concern about recent “court 
decisions”—are strong evidence that Miranda was the cause of the clearance 
rate drop. 
B. Alternate Explanations Proposed by Feeney 
In continuing our search for possible alternative causalities besides Miranda, 
we now have the benefit of Feeney’s labors. Having argued at length (for reasons 
discussed in previous Sections) that clearance rates did not fall sharply after 
Miranda, Feeney then somewhat paradoxically engaged in an aggressive search 
to find explanations for why clearance rates would have fallen sharply. Having 
canvassed the relevant literature, he offered two alternative explanations—race 
riots, and a heroin “epidemic” breaking out at exactly the same time as 
Miranda.543 We consider both of these possibilities at some length here because, 
given the time and effort Feeney has invested in searching for alternate 
causalities, if his identified alternatives fail then we have increased confidence 
that Miranda is to blame. 
1. Race Riots and Related Disturbances 
Feeney’s top choice for an alternative cause for the post-Miranda clearance 
rate decline is “race riots and disturbances.”544 Feeney begins his argument by 
prominently quoting a 1975 book by Jerry Wilson, Chief of the D.C. Police 
Department, who said that urban riots (and shortly thereafter, the antiwar and 
campus disorders) were the principal issue in police “administration” in the 
middle and later 1960s.545 But Feeney neglects to mention that Wilson 
specifically discusses not only issues of “administration,” but also—more 
directly relevant to our discussion—rising crime rates due to restrictive court 
rules. Wilson identifies riots as fourth on a list of five specific factors that 
explained crime rate increases in the 1960s, just ahead of increased use of 
 
et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirming the Decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525); Brief for National District 
Attorneys Association, Various State Prosecuting Associations & the Police Executive 
Research Forum in Support of the Judgment Below, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 
(2000) (No. 99-5525). Thomas and Leo argue that these briefs from major national 
organizations appear “to be the result of Paul Cassell’s impressive lobbying and advocacy 
efforts, not the natural inclination of law enforcement, on its own, to abandon Miranda.” 
Thomas & Leo, supra note 23, at 253. But collecting these briefs required little more than a 
single short phone call advising the organizations of the amicus briefing schedule, not a major 
professorial effort to indoctrinate them on a particular theory about Miranda’s effects.  
543 Feeney, supra note 8, at 76-83.  
544 Id. at 77.  
545 Id. (quoting JERRY WILSON, POLICE REPORT: A VIEW OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, at viii 
(1975)). 
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heroin.546 Wilson’s top three explanatory factors are all included in our 
regression equations. Wilson wrote that rising crime in the 1960s is attributable 
to: urbanization, the maturation of baby boomers into their crime prone years, 
and, of importance here, “increasingly restrictive court rules which impinged on 
both the police and the courts”—including specifically “Miranda.”547 Wilson 
also discussed at length the harmful impact on the District of Columbia of 
Mallory v. United States,548 a decision regarding the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure that restricted the ability of police officers to question suspects in D.C. 
ten years before Miranda.549 If anything, Wilson’s views regarding the 
harmfulness of court restrictions on police interrogation support our view that 
Miranda is a potential candidate for the post-1965 clearance rate declines. 
With regard to riots, Feeney acknowledges that in our earlier article we briefly 
considered this possibility.550 In our view, however, events like the race riots 
Feeney refers to—and more broadly, declining police-citizen relations—are 
poor candidates for explaining the 1966-to-1968 decline in clearance rates that 
we are interested in. To be sure, citizen cooperation is essential for clearing 
many crimes, as witnesses (and victims) must both report crimes to police and 
give information about those crimes for police to clear them.551 But although 
worsening relations could conceivably have played a role in declining clearance 
rates during the 1960s, we think it an unlikely candidate for an alternative 
causality for the nationwide clearance rate declines in 1966 to 1968. It is 
improbable that police-citizen relations would have deteriorated substantially 
across the country over such a short period of time. Indeed, the Gallup Poll 
suggests increased respect for the police around the time of Miranda. In April 
1965, 70% of respondents across the country had a great deal of respect for the 
 
546 WILSON, supra note 545, at 31, 33 (mentioning riots and heroin, respectively, as a 
contributing factors). Wilson also discusses, as a background factor for rising crime, the fact 
that government officials, at least in the early 1960s, were willing to “live with” rising crime 
rates. Id. at 35-36. 
547 Id. at 29. The Court decisions that Wilson cited in addition to Miranda were Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and the line-
up/identification cases (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), Gilbert v. California, 
388 U.S. 263 (1967), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)). WILSON, supra note 545, 
at 29. We discuss Escobedo at infra notes 756-65 and discuss the line-up cases at infra notes 
643-53 and accompanying text.  
548 354 U.S. 449 (1957). 
549 WILSON, supra note 545, at 47-50 (calling Mallory an “ill-advised” decision that should 
have been overturned, but also noting that D.C. police might have been better to use the 
decision as a basis for trying to obtain more manpower to help function under the decision). 
550 Feeney, supra note 8, at 77 (citing Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1114-15).  
551 See Desmond, Papachristos & Kirk, supra note 138, at 858; W. S. Wilson Huang & 
Michael S. Vaughn, Support and Confidence: Public Attitudes Toward the Police, in 
AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 31, 31 (Timothy 
J. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996). 
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police, a percentage that rose to 77% two years later in August 1967.552 Although 
we have been unable to locate consistent polling data on public confidence in 
the police throughout the decade, the polls we have found reported generally 
high public confidence in the police, although then (as now) minority 
communities were more skeptical than were their white counterparts.553 
In our earlier article, we also explained that any decline in trust for the police 
would have been a more long-run phenomenon, extending from the late 1950s 
through (at least) the mid-1970s, from the earliest days of the civil rights protests 
to the waning days of Vietnam War protests and Watergate disillusionment. 
Such an extended decline would therefore not explain the sharp decline in 
clearance rates of the late 1960s. Also, the late 1960s, like the years before and 
after, were a time of rising public concern about crime,554 which might have 
produced more, rather than less, willingness to help the police.555 We also noted 
in our earlier article that it is quite possible that declining confidence in the 
police was more concentrated in some parts of the country than others, and in 
some kinds of geographical areas than in others (e.g., large cities). Yet the 
sudden drops in clearance rates in 1966 and 1967 were reported by all population 
groups and all geographic divisions.556 
In response to these points, Feeney argues that we needed to pay more 
attention to “the turbulent race riots and disturbances that shook the nation in 
1965-68”557—and then he goes on to quantify (in the next sentence of his article) 
that the riots “affected 570 different cities during 1967-69.”558 The fact that 
Feeney himself gives—in consecutive sentences in his article—two different 
time frames for the riots (1965-68 vs. 1967-69)—illustrates a problem for his 
 
552 See 3 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at 1935, 
2077 (1972). 
553 See NAT’L CTR. ON POLICE & CMTY. RELATIONS, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE AND 
COMMUNITY RELATIONS, preface, 10 (1967) (reprinting a national Harris Poll finding a “good-
excellent” rating of 76% for federal law enforcement, 70% for state law enforcement, and 
65% for local law enforcement around 1966). The same polls also suggest lower confidence 
in the police in minority communities. See id. at 11-13. However, this low confidence existed 
well before 1966. See id. at 16 (citing CALIFORNIA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON CALIFORNIA: POLICE-MINORITY GROUP RELATIONS 8 (1963)). 
554 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS—1994, at 166 tbl.2.31 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994) 
(reporting that 49% of Harris Poll respondents felt more uneasy on the streets in 1966 than in 
the previous year; this number increased to 53% in 1968 and to 55% in 1969). 
555 Public attitudes towards the police “have changed little since the 1970s.” See Emily 
Ekins, Policing in America: Understanding Public Attitudes Toward the Police. Results from 
a National Survey., 1 (CATO Inst., Working Paper, Dec. 7, 2016), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/working-paper/policing-america-understanding-public-
attitudes-toward-police-results [https://perma.cc/YN7V-34WR]. 
556 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. 
557 Feeney, supra note 8, at 77 (emphasis added). 
558 Id. (emphasis added). 
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argument. The timing of the riots is quite important, because we are seeking to 
explain nationwide declines in clearance rates during 1966 to 1968. If the riots 
started earlier (1965) or ended later (1969), the timing would not quite fit the 
clearance rate changes we are seeking to explain. The best available quantitative 
evidence suggests that the riots began in 1964 and extended through 1971, 
peaking in 1968.559 Not only does that time frame not fit the 1966-to-1968 drop, 
but it also fails to fit the fact that clearance rates failed to rebound after 1971. 
Feeney also overstates the scope of the riots, at least when compared to the 
vast size of the American criminal justice system. Feeney presents what might 
be described as the gee-whiz statistic that the riots around the country involved 
37,000 arrests—not mentioning that, during 1967 to 1969, American police 
made more than 2,700,000 arrests for index crimes in cities and millions more 
arrests for other crimes.560 Riot arrests were a proverbial drop in the bucket of 
American law enforcement efforts and, as Barry Latzer has pointed out, “the 
overwhelming majority of American cities had no disorders.”561 
Feeney concludes his alternate causality argument by despairing of any 
possibility of analyzing his conclusion. He contends that “[i]t is difficult to 
estimate how long the [riots’] effects on the police lasted.”562 And he maintains 
that “[a]bsent a massive, and possibly now impossible, study, it would be 
difficult to prove that the 1966-68 race riots and disturbances had a greater 
impact on police work in this period than the Miranda decision.”563 Feeney goes 
on to argue: 
[B]efore any study could realistically claim that the Miranda decision was 
a decisive factor in any major police change in the 1966-68 period it would 
have to compare the Miranda effects with the massive amount of attention 
that the 1960s riots and disturbances demanded from police managers at all 
levels, the huge workload demands, and the impact on citizen cooperation 
and the environment in which the ordinary work of fighting crime took 
place during this period.564 
Because Feeney is claiming that it is essentially impossible to disprove his 
argument, one can wonder if it qualifies as a serious social science effort.565 But 
 
559 See LATZER, supra note 159, at 126 tbl.3.7 (citing William J. Collins & Robert A. 
Margo, The Economic Aftermath of the 1960s Riots in American Cities: Evidence from 
Property Values, 67 J. ECON. HIST. 849, 853 tbl.1 (2007)).  
560 See UCR-1969, supra note 79, at 108-09, 116-17 (data for total city arrests); UCR-
1968, supra note 79, at 108-09, 116-17 (same); UCR-1967, supra note 79, at 108-09, 116-17 
(same).  
561 LATZER, supra note 159, at 125.  
562 Feeney, supra note 8, at 81. 
563 Id. 
564 Id. 
565 See KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE 39 (1962) (identifying the possibility of falsification as the hallmark of a serious 
scientific hypothesis). Note also that Feeney described four different time periods in which 
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we are not so skeptical about the possibility of investigating, at least at a general 
level, how much effect the race riots had on American policing. Indeed, 
Feeney’s article itself points to one possible approach. Feeney identifies as the 
first race riot the August 1965 Watts Riot.566 Feeney explains that “Watts 
exploded in August 1965, shocking the nation and making [racial] tension 
manifest for the first time in a major way. Hundreds were injured, 34 killed, and 
over 4,000 arrested.”567 The Watts Riot was generally considered to be “the 
worst in the United States since the Detroit riot of 1943.”568 So what effect did 
the Watts Riot have on Los Angeles clearance rates in 1965? 
Inconveniently for Feeney’s riots-reduce-clearances thesis, after falling for 
three straight years (1962-1964), Los Angles robbery clearance rates rose in the 
year of the Watts Riot (1965)—from 32.0% to 32.8%, as shown in Figure 12 
earlier.569 One would think that if riots were to have the decisive effect on 
ordinary policing across the country that Feeney ascribes to them, the Watts Riot 
would have at least had a noticeable effect on clearance rates in the specific city 
where it occurred in 1965. 
It is possible to drill down more deeply into the Los Angeles data to see what 
sort of effect the Watts Riot had on day-to-day policing in Lose Angeles in 1965. 
As Feeney mentions, the LAPD made several thousand arrests during the 
riots.570 Not surprisingly, these arrests show up as a spike in the LAPD statistics 
for 1965, which are reported on a monthly basis.571 The Watts Riot took place 
 
the race riots occurred—“1965-68,” “1967-69,” “1966-68,” and “the 1960s.” 
566 Feeney, supra note 8, at 78 (calling the Watts Riot “just a prelude . . . to 1966”). 
567 Id. 
568 See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 20 (1968). 
569 Compare L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1965, supra note 349, at 10 (stating that 32.0% of 
robberies were cleared in 1964), with L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1966, supra note 349, at 11 
(stating that 32.8% of robberies were cleared in 1965). We focus on robbery clearance rates, 
see supra Figure 12 (depicting clearance rates for the 1960s), because those are the rates cited 
and discussed by Feeney, see Feeney, supra note 8, at 35-38. 
570 Feeney, supra note 8, at 78. A few arrests were also made by the Los Angeles Sheriff’s 
Office, the Compton Police Department, the Long Beach Police Department, and the 
California Highway Patrol. See BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE 
OF CAL., WATTS RIOT ARRESTS: LOS ANGELES AUGUST 1965, at 10 tbl.1 (1966) [hereinafter 
WATTS ARRESTS ACCOUNTING]. 
571 Clearance rates in Los Angeles are not reported on a monthly basis, and thus we focus 
our discussion on arrests as a partial substitute for these purposes. We look at total number of 
arrests, rather than arrest rates, because our interest here is whether police were able to 
continue making burglary arrests after the riots, not their overall “batting average” in solving 
burglaries. Because the number of burglaries was increasing during this time period, if we did 
look at arrest rates, we would likely see a long-term downward trend. But our interest here 
(on this particular subject) is not in longer-term trends but rather on any noticeable immediate 
effect from the riots. If the riots had no immediate effect on law enforcement, it is hard to 
understand how they could have had an effect at even more remote times.  
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from August 11 to 17, 1965.572 Most of the arrests were for burglary or for 
theft.573 The increase in arrests during the riots is reflected in the LAPD 
Statistical Digest for burglary arrests,574 which reports that burglary arrests by 
LAPD spiked up dramatically in August—from 579 in July, to 2543 in August—
before returning to 546 in September, 555 in October, and 587 in November.575 
The number of arrests the LAPD made each month for burglary from one year 
before the riots to one year after can be seen in Figure 15. 
As is readily apparent, burglary dramatically spiked in August 1965—the 
month of the Watts Riot. But, as is equally apparent, at least as far as burglary 
arrests in Los Angeles are concerned, things quickly return to normal. There 
does not appear to have been any long-term effect on burglary arrests from the 
Watts Riot. Indeed, researchers interested in LAPD work reported that, as of 
January 1966, investigations had clearly returned to normal.576 
 
572 See GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOT, REPORT: VIOLENCE IN THE 
CITY—AN END OR A BEGINNING? 1 (1965) [hereinafter the “MCCONE COMM’N REPORT”].  
573 See id. at 24 (noting 3438 adult arrests, 71% for burglary and theft; 514 juvenile arrests, 
81% for burglary and theft).  
574 We saw no apparent increase in arrests in August 1965 for any of the other major crime 
categories, not even for larceny, which was identified as an area of increased arrests during 
the riots. Accordingly, we focus our discussion on burglary here.  
575 L.A. STATISTICAL DIGEST 1965, supra note 349, at 30-31 (showing number of “adult 
arrests” in each month of 1965). 
576 Isaacs, supra note 392, at 88 (stating that “[t]he month of January 1966 was chosen” in 
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To confirm this visual conclusion more rigorously, we ran the monthly 
burglary arrest data through the strucchange algorithm used earlier in this 
Article.577 We found no structural break in the burglary arrest series between 
1964 and 1966.578 In short, based on arrest data, it seems difficult to argue that 
the Watts Riot was the dominant event for Los Angeles policing in 1965, let 
alone for other years and other locations. 
This lack of an obvious effect makes intuitive sense. Riots invariably take 
place in a limited space over a limited time. For example, the Watts Riot spanned 
“144 hours in August 1965.”579 The riot was also confined to a relatively small 
part of the city, South Central Los Angeles.580 While such a terrible event would 
be quite significant for the affected community, as an explanation for widespread 
changes in clearance rates detectable throughout California and beyond,581 it is 
hard to understand the logic of the argument. Moreover, if this was the 
explanation for declining clearance rates in 1966 and 1967, that fact escaped the 
notice of the authors of the FBI’s UCR for those years, who attributed the 
declines to restrictive court decisions and other factors apart from riots.582 
In an effort to explain how a riot could have exerted a long-term downward 
tug at crime clearance rates, Feeney offers as the explanation that “[d]uring the 
riot periods themselves, the police could do little else but attend to the riots.”583 
But in Los Angeles, for example, the riot period (144 hours) was a tiny fraction 
of the entire year. Feeney also explains that “[a]ttempting to prosecute the 
[rioters] imposed significant ongoing ‘clean-up’ costs.”584 But those costs would 
have been largely borne by the prosecuting authorities, not the police; and, in 
any event, even those costs would seem to be relatively short-lived. In Los 
 
part because “sufficient time would have elapsed after the August 1965 riots so that the data 
would reflect a return to normalcy”). 
577 See supra note 306 and accompanying text (explaining the strucchange algorithm). 
578 We also collected monthly burglary arrest data through 1969. Running the series from 
1964 through 1969, we saw no structural breaks.  
579 MCCONE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 572, at 10.  
580 One measure of the geographic limitation comes from the statistic that a curfew was 
imposed over a 46.5-square-mile area. James Queally, Watts Riots: Traffic Stop Was the Spark 
That Ignited Day of Destruction in L.A., L.A. TIMES (July 29, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-watts-riots-explainer-20150715-
htmlstory.html. Presumably, this area significantly exceeded the area of actual rioting, but 
this large area is still only a small percentage of the total area of Los Angeles.  
581 See supra Section II.B.1. 
582 See UCR-1967, supra note 79, at 30 (listing the same factors as well as “an almost 
static ratio of police to population not commensurate with the sharp rise in crime”); UCR-
1966, supra note 79, at 29 (“There are a number of factors influencing the decline in the police 
solution rate. These include court decisions which have resulted in restrictions on police 
investigative and enforcement practices, sharply increasing police workloads not limited to 
crime increases, and constantly increasing criminal mobility.”). 
583 Feeney, supra note 8, at 80.  
584 Id.  
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Angeles, for example, prosecution of the rioters had largely been accomplished 
just three months later.585 Most of those arrested either had the charges dropped 
or received probation or minor jail sentences.586 
Feeney also speculates that a riot might have exacerbated preexisting distrust 
between the black community and police. But as Feeney’s speculation inherently 
acknowledges, distrust long predated the Watts Riot587 (and, indeed, may have 
been one of the central causes of the riot588) and certainly continued after. This 
point was emphasized in 1992, for example, when a six-day riot followed the 
acquittal of four police officers accused of beating Rodney King.589 The 
exacerbated-lack-of-trust hypothesis also seems unlikely to work for some 
crimes. For example, vehicle theft is a crime that is generally and consistently 
reported to the police because of insurance requirements.590 Our MIRANDA 
effect on vehicle clearance accordingly seems unlikely to have been caused by 
declining citizen cooperation in black communities (or elsewhere). 
For all these reasons, we do not think that riots in Watts and other areas 
explain the pattern of clearance rate declines that we see. But what would be 
ideal for comparing our views with Feeney’s would be to conduct a cross-
sectional analysis, comparing jurisdictions affected by riots with those which 
were not to see if there were declines in clearance rates. While it is not possible 
to do such cross-sectional analysis on the nationally imposed Miranda rules,591 
 
585 For example, the McCone Commission Report indicated that, as of November 1965, 
just three months after the arrests, most of the riot-related criminal cases had already been 
disposed of. MCCONE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 572, at 25. Virtually all cases had been 
resolved by the following year. See WATTS ARRESTS ACCOUNTING, supra note 570, at 6-7 
(stating that as of June 1966, of an initial total of about 4000 arrests, only 106 adult cases 
“were still pending” and that “[f]or the most part” these were simply cases in which the 
defendant had “absconded” and a bench warrant was pending).  
586 See WATTS ARRESTS ACCOUNTING, supra note 570, at 11-12, 15 tbl.2. 
587 See ERROL WAYNE STEVENS, RADICAL L.A.: FROM COXEY’S ARMY TO THE WATTS 
RIOTS, 1894-1965, at 315 (2009) (discussing minority-community concerns about police 
brutality in 1961).  
588 See MCCONE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 572, at 12-13.  
589 See INDEP. COMM’N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT, at vii (1991). 
590 See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: MOTOR VEHICLE 
THEFT 4 tbl.10 (1988) (stating that 87% of completed vehicle thefts were reported to the 
police, as were 36% of attempted thefts and 68% of completed and attempted thefts 
combined); Dale O. Cloninger & Lester C. Sartorius, Crime Rates, Clearance Rates and 
Enforcement Effort: The Case of Houston, Texas, 38 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 389, 392 (1979) 
(“[A]uto theft . . . showed no appreciable reporting errors in national surveys.”); Samuel 
Nunn, Computers in the Cop Car: Impact of the Mobile Digital Terminal Technology on 
Motor Vehicle Theft Clearance and Recovery Rates in a Texas City, 17 EVALUATION REV. 
182, 187 (1993) (“[U]nlike burglary, robbery, and assaults, for example, that are subject to 
both the uncertainty of reporting and nonreporting by victims and changes in the definition of 
the crimes, motor vehicle thefts are generally reported and are not particularly subject to 
changes in definition.”). 
591 See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. 
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the riots are a different story. As Feeney himself appears to acknowledge,592 the 
late 1960s riots affected America’s largest cities, “including all but one of the 
50 largest cities and all but nine of the 100 largest cities.”593 But the late 1960s 
riots were an urban phenomenon that did not occur in, for example, rural 
areas.594 So if Feeney’s theory is correct, the MIRANDA effect should appear in 
urban areas but not rural areas. And yet, as discussed earlier, our MIRANDA 
effect appears not only in the clearance rates of large cities but also in, for 
example, the nation’s small cities (populations between 10,000 and 20,000), 
very small cities (populations below 10,000), suburban areas, and even rural 
areas.595 Feeney’s riot theory is, obviously, an extremely poor candidate for 
explaining simultaneous clearance rate declines in 1966 to 1968 among 
hundreds of rural law enforcement agencies. 
2. Increasing Heroin Use 
Apart from the riots, the other factor that Feeney cites as a potential 
confounding alternate causality is increasing use of heroin, which he 
characterizes as the “late 1960s heroin epidemic.”596 Feeney argues that heroin 
users often finance their drug habits, in part, through various crimes and that a 
surge in heroin-induced crimes could have caused the declining clearance rates 
that we observed.597 
In our earlier article, we considered the possibility that Feeney raises. We 
explained that if drug use increased dramatically uniquely around the time of 
Miranda, and if this led to a significant increase in crimes, and if drug-related 
crimes are harder to clear, then perhaps drug usage could have caused the 
clearance rate drops.598 But we thought each of these links was questionable. 
The timing of increased illegal drug usage does not quite fit the 1966-to-1968 
drop, because the use of illegal drugs appears to have increased from the early 
 
592 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 77. 
593 Id. (citing JANE A. BASKIN ET AL., LEMBERG CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF VIOLENCE, RACE 
RELATED CIVIL DISORDERS: 1967-1969, at 3, 9, 20 (1971)). 
594 See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 568, at 1 (reporting on 
“racial disorders” in “American cities”); id. at 66 (quantifying city size where disorders 
occurred).  
595 See supra notes 318-28 and accompanying text. 
596 Feeney, supra note 8, at 81.  
597 See id. at 81-82 (“There is . . . wide acceptance of the idea that heroin users often 
finance their own habits through the sale of drugs to others and by thefts, including robberies 
and burglaries.”). 
598 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1114. 
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1960s599 (if not earlier600) through at least the 1970s and 1980s.601 The available 
Department of Justice data show sharply increasing arrests from 1965 (the first 
year for which comparable data are available) to 1974, then a leveling off, then 
another sharp rise from 1980 to 1989.602 The data thus do not suggest a unique, 
sharp 1966-to-1968 change in drug usage that would explain the clearance rate 
change during the same time. 
In response to these points, Feeney quibbles that our national data “focus on 
drugs in general rather than on heroin—the drug with the closest connection to,” 
he argues, the crimes in question (such as larceny and burglary).603 This might 
be an effective argument if Feeney had data showing a different pattern in heroin 
arrests than from overall drug arrests, from which one might ascribe a different 
pattern to the heroin epidemic. But Feeney presents no such data. Data about the 
extent to which a particular drug is used is notoriously hard to obtain, and “even 
from an historical perspective it is difficult to identify with precision when the 
sharp upward trend [in hard narcotics] began.”604 Some scholars have even 
claimed that there was no heroin “epidemic” around that time.605 And, of course, 
increases in illegal drug usage were hardly confined to the late 1960s, as the 
crack cocaine “epidemic” of the late 1980s attests.606 
 
599 See RICHARD ASHLEY, HEROIN: THE MYTHS AND THE FACTS 43 (1972) (quoting Myles 
J. Ambrose of Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement as saying that heroin/drug use 
exploded beginning “around 1962-63”).  
600 See GEOFFREY PEARSON, THE NEW HEROIN USERS 1 (1987) (“North American cities 
such as Chicago and New York experienced their initial heroin epidemics . . . in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s . . . .”). 
601 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1114 (citing STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, 
AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 100-02 
(1993)) (“Use of illegal drugs appears to have increased from the early 1960s through the 
1970s and 1980s.”); see also Robert L. DuPont, Profile of a Heroin-Addiction Epidemic, 285 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 320, 320 (1971) (observing that the heroin-addiction epidemic in 
Washington, D.C. appeared to be accelerating in 1970); Janet Reno, Attorney Gen., Keynote 
Address at the Drug Enforcement Administration National Heroin Conference 6-7 (Feb. 5, 
1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/1997/0205_ag.dea.html 
[https://perma.cc/C7CF-9M4P] (discussing increased heroin addiction in 1997). 
602 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1114 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra 
note 554, at 413 tbl.4.33 (reprinting an FBI compilation of 1993 UCR data)). 
603 Feeney, supra note 8, at 82-83. 
604 WILSON, supra note 545, at 33-34.  
605 See CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 175-76 (1978) 
(“[T]he ‘alarming trend’ of increased addiction . . . was the product of a politically induced 
change in the statistical procedures used by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs (BNDD) to estimate the number of addicts, not of any sudden jump in heroin use.”). 
See generally EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR: OPIATES AND POLITICAL POWER IN 
AMERICA (1977) (discussing “the inner workings of the ‘war on heroin’”). 
606 LATZER, supra note 159, at 175-82. 
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In an effort to provide some statistical support for his argument, Feeney drops 
a footnote asserting that “[t]here was a tremendous surge in California in 1966-
68 in opiate arrests.”607 Feeney then asserts that “opiate arrests” in California 
increased 5% (1965 to 1966), 31% (1966 to 1967), and 33% (1967 to 1968)—
but he fails to provide any source supporting his asserted figures.608 In 
attempting to verify his assertion, we could find no such reported California data 
for those years. We did find that the annual crime reports for California during 
that time do not report a separate category of offense for “opiate arrests” but 
rather only aggregate data for “[d]rug law violations”609—the much broader 
category of arrests that Feeney criticized us for using. Perhaps more important, 
the California data for all drug law violations confirms our argument that there 
was no unique surge in drug arrests during the 1966-to-1968 period that would 
match the timing of our clearance rate decline.610 
The only specific California data about heroin arrests during that time that we 
have been able to locate appear in California’s 1972 and 1973 annual crime 
reports. But contrary to Feeney’s suggestion that California heroin usage surged 
in 1966 to 1968, the surge seems to have occurred later. California’s 1972 Crime 
and Delinquency report says that “[o]ne of the more sobering changes seen in 
drug arrests is the nearly two-thirds increase in arrests for heroin offenses over 
the five years” 1968 to 1972.611 A line graph accompanying that assertion shows 
an approximate annual percentage increase from 1968 to 1969 of 3%, from 1969 
to 1970 of 12%, from 1970 to 1971 of 13%, and from 1971 to 1972 of 26%.612 
The fact that heroin arrests continued rising well after the 1966-to-1968 
clearance rate declines, even in the one state Feeney has hand-selected for 
special analysis, undercuts his argument substantially. 
In addition, even if there had been a sharp surge in drug usage during this 
limited period, the connection between drug use and crime is unclear.613 
 
607 Feeney, supra note 8, at 83 n.265. 
608 Id.  
609 BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CAL., CRIME AND 
DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA: 1968, at 71 tbl.III-1 (1969). The table for misdemeanors 
likewise does not break out separate drug categories. Id. at 82 tbl.III-8. 
610 According to the annual reports from Crime and Delinquency in California, adult 
felony drug arrests rose sharply from (at least) 1964 to 1972. Specifically, from 1960 to 1965 
adult drug arrests fell slightly from 14,152 to 12,874, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, supra 
note 335, at 221; in 1966 and 1967 the number of arrests spiked to 19,403 and then 33,360, 
BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, supra note 609, at 71 tbl.III-1; and from 1968 to 1973 the 
number of arrests rose further from 49,274 to 96,733. 
611 BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF CAL., CRIME AND 
DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 30 (1972).  
612 Id. at 30; see also id. at 33 tbl.6.  
613 See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 57 (1983) 
(stating that experts cannot “relate the contribution of heroin addiction to the total volume of 
property crime in the United States—except to say that it is far less than the popular literature 
has portrayed”); cf. Trevor Bennett, Katy Holloway & David Farrington, The Statistical 
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Feeney’s argument rests on the assumption that heroin-induced crimes increased 
at exactly the same time as the Court decided Miranda. But even if we assume 
that such crimes grew, Feeney’s argument still needs to develop a unique heroin 
link to the particular clearance rate changes we are trying to explain. Our 
equations find MIRANDA-induced declines in clearance rates for, in particular, 
the crimes of robbery, larceny, vehicle theft, and perhaps burglary.614 But the 
conventional argument that we have seen in the literature suggests a connection 
between heroin use and the specific crimes of drug dealing or larceny.615 One of 
our property crime categories where Miranda has a particularly strong effect is 
vehicle theft. We have not seen any special connection suggested between heroin 
use and vehicle theft. 
Turning to the declining clearance rates for robbery that are of special interest 
to us and Feeney—and on which Miranda may have had a particularly strong 
impact—there is considerable reason for doubting a strong connection between 
heroin addiction and robbery in the 1960s.616 One observational study from 
around that time found that only a tiny fraction of heroin users’ income came 
from robberies or other violent encounters with others.617 Even adjusting for the 
fact that certain criminal heroin users were less likely to be detected in an 
observational study, violent crimes were a relatively small percentage of the way 
in which heroin users financed their habit.618 Another study found that violent 
felonies were only a tiny fraction of heroin addicts’ criminal histories, both pre-
addiction and post-addiction; only two percent of the criminal charges faced by 
addicts in the year before entering methadone treatment were violent crimes.619 
Feeney’s blame-it-on-heroin argument suffers still further difficulties. As we 
noted in our earlier article, our regression equations already control for the 
 
Association Between Drug Misuse and Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 13 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT 
BEHAV. 107, 117 (2008) (collecting available empirical evidence on linkage between all forms 
of drug misuse and various forms of crime and finding “that the odds of offending were 
between 2.8 and 3.8 times greater for drug users than non-drug users”). 
614 See supra Section II.D (describing effects of the MIRANDA variable). 
615 See, e.g., Michael Alexander & Catherine McCaslin, Criminality in Heroin Addicts 
Before, During, and After Methadone Treatment, 64 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 51, 52 (1974) 
(finding heroin addicts most often had criminal records of minor crimes, property felonies, 
drug felonies, and thefts); cf. Max Singer, The Vitality of Mythical Numbers, 23 PUB. INT. 3, 
6 (1971) (discussing inflated estimates of alleged property crimes committed by heroin users).  
616 See Robert Nash Parker & Kathleen Auerhahn, Alcohol, Drugs, and Violence, 24 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 291, 295 (1998) (“Evidence to support a link between heroin and violence is 
virtually nonexistent.”). 
617 MARK HARRISON MOORE, BUY AND BUST: THE EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF AN ILLICIT 
MARKET IN HEROIN 88 tbl.2-9 (1977) (finding that 1.1% of heroin users’ income came from 
“[t]hefts [i]nvolving [e]ncounters with [i]ndividuals,” including “robbery, mugging, and 
preying on dealers”). 
618 Id. at 89 tbl.2-10 (finding that seven percent of heroin users’ income came from 
“[t]hefts [i]nvolving [v]iolent [e]ncounters with [o]thers”). 
619 Alexander & McCaslin, supra note 615, at 53 fig.1. 
  
816  BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:685 
 
number of crimes committed.620 Thus, for drug usage to be the confounding 
omitted variable, drug-related crimes would need not only to have increased 
around the time of Miranda, but also to have been uniquely hard to clear. Yet 
Feeney offers no reason to suspect that, for example, a heroin-induced robbery 
would be harder to solve than other robberies. Instead, Feeney attempts to flip 
the burden of proof around, arguing that we are the ones who claim “without the 
benefit of any facts, that heroin-induced robberies are as easy to clear as all other 
kinds of robberies.”621 As we explained above, during the pivotal 1966-to-1968 
period, the contemporaneous law enforcement assessment of reasons for 
declining clearance rates included restrictive court decisions and other factors 
accounted for by our equations—not any rise in heroin consumption. Given that 
contemporaneous assessment, the burden of persuasion can properly be assigned 
to someone who, like Feeney, is now proposing—decades later—a heretofore 
unrecognized explanation for the declining clearance rates in 1966 to 1968. 
In any event, looking at the available empirical evidence, good reason exists 
for thinking that heroin-induced crimes are no more difficult to solve than other 
crimes. Contrary to Feeney’s underlying premise that heroin use causes crime, 
in fact causality may well run the other way.622 This point has been most 
carefully articulated by John Kaplan—a source cited by Feeney for the argument 
that there is “wide acceptance of the idea that heroin users often finance their 
own habits through the sale of drugs to others and by thefts, including robberies 
and burglaries.”623 But as Kaplan makes clear in his book, things are not so 
simple: 
On the other hand, . . . one can make a strong argument that heroin use is 
not a major factor in turning addicts into criminals. The alternative 
explanation is that criminality causes heroin addiction instead of the other 
way around, or, more precisely, that both heroin addiction and criminality 
are caused by the same thing.624 
Kaplan goes on to explain that “[v]irtually every study of the onset of 
addiction shows that, on the average, the addict’s first arrest precedes his first 
use of heroin by about one-and-a-half years.”625 In other words, heroin use is 
 
620 Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1114. 
621 Feeney, supra note 8, at 83.  
622 See, e.g., Bruce L. Benson et al., Is Property Crime Caused by Drug Use or by Drug 
Enforcement Policy?, 24 APPLIED ECON. 679, 690 (1992) (concluding after empirical study 
that “even for those drug users who do commit property crimes, causation could easily be 
running from crime to drugs”).  
623 Feeney, supra note 8, at 81-82 (first citing KAPLAN, supra note 613, at 51-58; then 
citing MOORE, supra note 617, at 67-115). 
624 KAPLAN, supra note 613, at 54. 
625 Id. at 54-55 (citing C. Jack Friedman & Alfred S. Friedman, Drug Abuse and 
Delinquency, in 1 DRUG USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE, app., 398, 409 (1973)). 
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often something of a status symbol for criminals—not something that drives 
them to criminality.626 
Many studies support Kaplan’s argument that criminality often precedes 
heroin use.627 After beginning drug use, an addict is likely to commit fewer 
violent crimes and more property crimes.628 The most common type of crime 
committed by heroin addicts is theft, with the second most common crime being 
the selling of drugs.629 
[A] clear majority of the crimes by male heroin users [are] crimes without 
victims: Almost 60 percent of the criminal behavior reported . . . [are] drug 
sales, prostitution, gambling, and alcohol offenses, with an additional 8.1 
percent of criminal activity involving the buying, selling, or receiving of 
stolen goods—a secondary level of criminality resulting, in most instances, 
from the users’ initial involvement in property crimes.630 
The finding that criminal activity rapidly increases when drug users become 
dependent can be explained other than by the drugs-cause-crime model.631 
 
626 See Theodore Dalrymple, Myths and Realities of Drug Addiction, Consumption, and 
Crime, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (July 31, 2015), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2015/07/31/myths-
and-realities-of-drug-addiction-consumption-and-crime/ [https://perma.cc/XB8V-BT5H] 
(“Whatever the connection between crime and addiction, it is not that addiction causes 
crime.”). 
627 See John C. Ball et al., The Criminality of Heroin Addicts: When Addicted and When 
Off Opiates, in THE DRUGS-CRIME CONNECTION 39, 40 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1981) 
(analyzing the sequence of crime and heroin use, and discussing a study finding that “71 
percent of heroin users . . . had a delinquency record prior to onset of their opiate use”); James 
A. Inciardi, Heroin Use and Street Crime, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 335, 335-36 (1979) (“Some 
researchers have found that the criminal histories of their sample cases considerably preceded 
any evidence of drug use . . . .”); William H. McGlothlin, M. Douglas Anglin & Bruce D. 
Wilson, Narcotic Addiction and Crime, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 293, 294 (1978) (“[N]umerous 
studies have found that the majority of addicts are involved in crime prior to addiction . . . .”); 
Scott Menard, Sharon Mihalic & David Huizinga, Drugs and Crime Revisited, 18 JUST. Q. 
269, 269, 274 (2001) (“[R]esearch results indicate that initiation of crime typically precedes 
initiation of drug use . . . .”). 
628 See Duane C. McBride, Drugs and Violence, in THE DRUGS-CRIME CONNECTION, supra 
note 627, at 105, 119-20 (“[T]he relationship between drug use and property crime occurs 
because of the monetary cost of drug use and the need to commit property crimes that produce 
the funds necessary to obtain drugs.”).  
629 Ball et al., supra note 627, at 51 (studying the criminal actions of Baltimore opiate 
addicts). 
630 Inciardi, supra note 627, at 341; see also James A. Inciardi & Carl D. Chambers, 
Unreported Criminal Involvement of Narcotic Addicts, J. DRUG ISSUES, Spring 1972, at 57, 
59, 60 tbl.1 (describing the “predominance of direct acquisitive property crime as 
characteristic of [addicts’] criminal behavior” and self-reports reflecting that ninety-three 
percent of crimes were property crimes).  
631 See Toby Seddon, Explaining the Drug-Crime Link: Theoretical, Policy and Research 
Issues, 29 J. SOC. POL’Y 95, 97 (2000). 
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“[L]evels of drug use are often . . . determined week-to-week by success in 
crime (and the resulting money available) rather than [the addict’s] physical 
need.”632 That is to say, “periods of criminal success are accompanied by a more 
extravagant lifestyle in which increased drug consumption is one part.”633 As a 
result, “day-to-day, crime [may be] a better explanation of drug use than drug 
use [is] of crime.”634 If all this is true, it offers little reason for thinking that 
heroin-induced crimes are uniquely hard to solve. 
One last and fatal problem with Feeney’s blame-it-on-heroin thesis is the fact 
that clearance rate declines in 1966 to 1968 were experienced not only in major 
urban areas, but also suburban and rural areas.635 Yet heroin abuse in the 1960s 
was commonly understood to be a predominantly urban problem, particularly in 
the largest cities such as New York.636 For example, Barry Latzer recently 
looked back at crime trends in the 1960s and reported that “[w]hile the 
authorities were unsuccessful in controlling heroin, sale and use was localized 
in a few big cities within poor black and Hispanic neighborhoods.”637 We have 
not seen any evidence of a suddenly developing heroin “epidemic” in, for 
example, suburban and rural America in 1966 to 1968. And yet we find evidence 
of MIRANDA effects in these very areas638—something for which Feeney’s 
argument cannot account. 
For all these reasons, Feeney’s argument about heroin as an alternative 
causality is unpersuasive. And a larger point should be made about that 
unpersuasiveness. Feeney has obviously labored long and hard to canvas all of 
the criminal justice literature to find an explanation for the late 1960s clearance 
rate declines. Because his leading suspects (riots and heroin) so clearly fail, the 
correlative case for our suspect (Miranda) strengthens considerably. 
C. Other Supreme Court Decisions Apart from Miranda 
Because we are looking for something that caused a nationwide decline in 
crime clearance rates, it is also worth considering the possibility that other 
Supreme Court decisions apart from Miranda are responsible. Although police 
 
632 Id. (citation omitted).  
633 Id.  
634 Id. (quoting Richard Hammersley et al., The Relationship Between Crime and Opioid 
Use, 84 BRITISH J. ADDICTION 1029, 1040 (1989)). 
635 See supra Table 11 (showing effect of the MIRANDA variable on suburban and rural 
areas). 
636 See ASHLEY, supra note 599, at 47-48 (noting that it was “commonly asserted that one-
half of the heroin users in America live in New York City,” although questioning the factual 
grounding for this assertion); MOORE, supra note 617, at 67 (“New York City accounts for a 
reasonably large fraction of the total volume of heroin distributed in the United States.”).  
637 LATZER, supra note 159, at 91. 
638 See supra Table 11 (showing the MIRANDA variable’s effect on suburban and rural 
areas). 
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contemporaneously identified Miranda as a major obstacle,639 defenders of 
Miranda might argue that it is impossible to single out Miranda as the most 
harmful decision among the Warren Court’s various rulings.640 This argument 
suggests that the MIRANDA variable is more properly denominated a “Warren 
Court” variable, given the various Warren Court restrictions on the police.641 
Even if this assertion were true, our findings would still be of some importance, 
as legal academics have generally denied that the Warren Court decisions 
impeded law enforcement.642 Nonetheless, there are strong reasons for believing 
that Miranda was the Warren Court decision primarily—although perhaps not 
exclusively—responsible for declining clearance rates in 1966 to 1968. 
Other Court decisions from the same time seem unlikely to have had as much 
effect on clearance rates.643 Isaac Ehrlich and George Brower have cataloged the 
“significant” Warren Court decisions that possibly affected law enforcement.644 
In the critical 1966-to-1968 period, they identify, in addition to Miranda, two 
other Court decisions. The first, United States v. Wade,645 is one of several 
“lineup” cases decided by the Court in 1967 that suggested that the right to 
counsel extended to such proceedings.646 But lineups are probably implicated in 
a small percentage of cases overall, certainly a much smaller percentage than 
interrogation. Police also had fairly simple ways of circumventing the lineup 
rulings.647 Moreover, the Court cut back on the applicability of the doctrine in 
1972,648 with the result that it is now “largely ineffectual.”649 Therefore, if the 
 
639 See supra Section VI.A (describing law enforcement’s response to the Miranda 
decision). 
640 See Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda, supra note 125, at 369-70 (suggesting that other 
Warren Court rulings should be taken into account).  
641 See generally Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 723 (2011).  
642 See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 164, at 245-57 (denying that the Warren Court decisions 
were responsible for sinking clearance rates in the 1960s). 
643 Cf. Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century 
Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1995) (questioning whether the Warren Court generally 
shifted rules in favor of the defense); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So 
Defense-Minded?), the Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police 
Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 
62, 63 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (same). 
644 See Ehrlich & Brower, supra note 97, at 103 tbl.2. 
645 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
646 See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 
272 (1967); Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37. 
647 See Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1, 39 (2001). 
648 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91 (1972) (refusing to extend counsel 
requirements to lineup cases where “a person has not been formally charged with a criminal 
offense”). 
649 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
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lineup decisions were responsible for the drop in clearance rates, those rates 
should have later rebounded. Such a rebound does not exist.650 The other 
significant case identified by Ehrlich and Brower is Katz v. United States,651 
which involved the unusual investigative technique of placing an electronic 
listening device on a telephone booth used frequently by a suspect.652 Although 
the decision is doctrinally important because of its famous suggestion that “the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,”653 its effect on day-to-day 
police operations was probably relatively small; the Court specifically 
concluded that the law enforcement agents could have done exactly the same 
thing, provided they obtained a warrant first.654 Other potentially important 
cases during the 1966-to-1968 time period did not restrict police investigations, 
but rather court adjudicatory processes—which begin only after a crime has been 
cleared.655 None of these others decisions (far less famous and presumably less 
impactful than Miranda, in any event) could have had much effect on police 
clearance rates. 
Nor do earlier decisions seem likely to have affected clearance rates during 
the 1966-to-1968 period.656 Stephen Schulhofer has cited the Court’s decisions 
in Mapp v. Ohio657 and Gideon v. Wainwright658 as possible competing 
impediments to law enforcement.659 But the timing of these rulings makes them 
implausible candidates to explain the immediate post-Miranda clearance rate 
drop. Mapp was decided in 1961 and Gideon in 1963. It seems improbable that 
they could explain, for example, the sudden changes in robbery clearance rates 
that appeared in 1966 to 1968, but not earlier.660 Mapp’s main effects, if any,661 
 
§ 26.02[B][2] (6th ed. 2013). 
650 See supra Figures 2-7 (displaying no noticeable rise in clearance rates in 1973 and 
1974). 
651 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
652 Id. at 348. 
653 Id. at 351. 
654 See id. at 354. 
655 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12, 59 (1967) (applying due process requirements to 
determine “the constitutional validity of” juvenile delinquency proceeding); Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1967) (finding a constitutional violation when the prosecutor 
commented on the defendant’s assertion of right to silence). 
656 But cf. Kamisar, supra note 164, at 242 n.5 (concluding that the Warren Court decisions 
“caused relatively little furor until applied to the ‘police practice’ phases of the criminal 
process in the late 1960’s”). 
657 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961) (excluding evidence in a state criminal trial that was the 
result of an illegal search). 
658 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (establishing a right to counsel for indigent defendants). 
659 See Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 512-13. 
660 Note that robbery clearance rates changed little from 1962 to 1965, even rising slightly 
from 1964 to 1965. See supra Figure 5. 
661 See Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 585, 592-617 (2011) (raising questions about whether the exclusionary rule affects 
  
2017] STILL HANDCUFFING THE COPS? 821 
 
were probably felt in the early 1960s.662 It is hard to understand why Mapp 
would cause clearance rates to begin falling at an accelerated pace some five to 
seven years after the decision. Also, Gideon is a particularly poor candidate to 
influence clearance rates because it dealt not with police investigations but with 
later court adjudications. 
Nor are the Court’s decisions on vagrancy and related issues plausible 
candidates for explaining 1966-to-1968 changes in clearance rates. William 
Stuntz has explained how police once had rather substantial authority to stop and 
arrest persons on loitering, vagrancy, and related grounds663 —authority that is 
now restricted.664 Although this declining authority to arrest might result in 
declining opportunities for interrogation and hence confessions, the timing does 
not fit the drop we are interested in explaining. The leading case striking down 
vagrancy laws is Papachristou v. Jacksonville,665 decided in 1972. Also, arrest 
rates for vagrancy, “suspicion,” disorderly conduct, and drunkenness declined 
over a much longer time period, from well before Miranda to well after,666 
without sharp changes in the late 1960s.667 Finally, restrictions on police arrests 
 
police behavior); Oaks, supra note 127, at 755 (arguing that “the exclusionary rule is a failure” 
in terms of “deterring illegal searches and seizures by the police”); cf. Paul G. Cassell, The 
Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: 
The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 751, 842-46 (collecting evidence that state 
exclusionary rules are unlikely to have an incremental deterrent effect beyond the federal 
rules). The Court’s later decision in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-25 (1984), may 
also have had a minimal effect on police practices, see CRAIG D. UCHIDA ET AL., THE EFFECTS 
OF UNITED STATES V. LEON ON POLICE SEARCH WARRANT PRACTICES, 1984-1985 (1987). 
662 See Atkins & Rubin, supra note 134, at 166 (finding Mapp had an effect on crime rates 
starting in 1961); Stuart S. Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 
1965 WIS. L. REV. 283, 285-88 (finding changes in police search and seizure practices due to 
the exclusionary rule from 1960 to 1963); cf. Bradley C. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in 
Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 
681, 711-16 (1974) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s refinement of the exclusionary rule in 
its 1969 decision Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), produced an increase in use of 
search warrants from 1968 to 1973). 
663 See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 559 (1992) (stating that, prior to the late 1960s, “the police 
could, and did, keep public areas ‘clean’ by stopping or arresting whomever they wished”).  
664 See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of 
Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1209-14 (1996) 
(detailing court decisions in the 1960s and 1970s that struck down regulations permitting 
arrest for minor forms of public disobedience). 
665 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972). 
666 RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND 
THE MAKING OF THE 1960S, 186-88 (2016) (noting vagrancy laws actually continued past the 
1960s). 
667 See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1113 & n.273. For example, arrest rates for 
vagrancy per 100,000 inhabitants went from 140.8 in 1960, to 89.8 in 1965, to 66.7 in 1970, 
and to 33.1 in 1975. See id. 
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for vagrancy would only indirectly affect clearance for index crimes, such as 
robbery. 
In sum, Miranda appears to be the Supreme Court decision most likely to 
have caused declining clearance rates in 1966 to 1968. 
D. The Implausibility of Declining Coercion as an Explanation 
Readers who agree with us that Miranda caused clearance rate declines might 
be tempted at this point to respond along the lines of: “Of course—Miranda 
stopped the police from beating suspects up to get confession, so naturally 
clearance rates declined.” On this view, declining clearance rates measure not 
the social cost of criminals unfairly escaping, but rather the social benefit of 
police abandoning impermissible questioning techniques. Note that this 
argument would implicitly concede that clearance rates did fall because of 
Miranda. However, this explanation of why Miranda produced the drop is far-
fetched for several reasons. 
First, genuinely coerced confessions were statistically rare at the time of 
Miranda.668 Of course, one cannot consult an FBI tally of the number of coerced 
confessions each year. Yet it appears to be common ground that, as the result of 
increasing judicial oversight and police professionalization, coercive 
questioning methods began to decline in the 1930s and 1940s.669 By the 1950s, 
coercive questioning had “diminished considerably,”670 because police viewed 
such techniques as unnecessary and harmful to their image.671 By the time of 
Miranda, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice reported that “today the third degree is almost 
nonexistent” and referred to “its virtual abandonment by the police.”672 Thus, 
the Supreme Court’s decision curtailing police interrogation techniques 
addressed a problem “that was already fading into the past.”673 Chief Justice 
Warren’s majority opinion in Miranda, though noting historical police abuses, 
acknowledged that such abuses are “undoubtedly the exception now” and that 
“the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than 
 
668 To be clear, we strongly condemn even isolated instances of coerced confessions. 
669 Cassell, supra note 16, at 473-75; Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The 
Changing Nature of Police Interrogation in America, 18 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 35, 47-53 
(1992). 
670 Leo, supra note 669, at 51. 
671 GEORGE C. THOMAS III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE TO 
MIRANDA AND BEYOND 139 (2012). 
672 PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME 
IN A FREE SOCIETY 93 (1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nIj/42.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J6JE-77EH] (discussing pre-Miranda data).  
673 FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 22 (1969). 
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physically oriented.”674 Furthermore, empirical surveys675 provide good support 
for Gerald Rosenberg’s assessment: “Evidence is hard to come by but what 
evidence there is suggests that any reductions that have been achieved in police 
brutality are independent of the Court and started before Miranda.”676 
Unfairly coercive police questioning is not only limited to physical brutality, 
but also includes other techniques. It seems unlikely, however, that such forms 
of coercion were so widespread that their elimination would have greatly 
changed clearance rates.677 In addition, statistics on motions to suppress 
confessions confirm that coercive techniques were infrequently used at the time 
of Miranda. We should find frequent challenges to the voluntariness of 
confessions before Miranda if coerced confessions were in fact frequent.678 Such 
motions, however, appear to have been rare around the time of Miranda.679 
Besides the relative scarcity of coercion, there is another reason for believing 
that clearance rate reductions were not caused by fewer coerced confessions: the 
nature of the Miranda rules themselves. Miranda was not particularly well 
designed as a shield against coercion. As Justice Harlan pointed out in his 
Miranda dissent, “Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them in court 
are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers.”680 
In other words, police who used coercive tactics to obtain involuntary 
confessions would not necessarily have felt compelled after Miranda to change 
their already-improper methods.681 And even if they did so, it was unlikely to 
have been so rapid a change as to produce a quick decrease in confession rates. 
 
674 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1965); see also id. at 499-500 (Clark, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he examples of police brutality mentioned by the Court are rare exceptions 
to the thousands of cases that appear every year in the law reports.” (footnotes omitted)). 
However, the majority continued on to state that police abuses “are [still] sufficiently 
widespread to be the object of concern.” Id. at 447-48. 
675 For a discussion of this empirical evidence, see Cassell, supra note 16, at 474-75. 
676 ROSENBERG, supra note 80, at 326. 
677 Wayne LaFave reported the year before the Miranda decision that “[i]n the great 
majority of in-custody interrogations observed, the possibility of coercion appeared slight.” 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 386 (1965); 
see also Barrett, supra note 49, at 42 (reporting California data in 1960 that most 
interrogations lasted under two hours). Similarly, the student observers in New Haven in 
1966, assessing all forms of police “tactics,” found a “low level of coerciveness in most 
questioning.” Wald et al., supra note 51, at 1558. 
678 Cassell, supra note 16, at 476. Such challenges are rarely made today and even more 
rarely granted. See id. at 392-93 (collecting the studies on this point). 
679 See id. at 476 (citing studies showing few rejections of defendants’ statements by 
prosecutors or by judges at preliminary hearings). 
680 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
681 See Evelle J. Younger, Prosecution Problems, 53 A.B.A. J. 695, 698 (1967) (“Miranda 
will not affect the brutal or perjurious policeman—he will continue to extract confessions 
without reference to the intonations of the Supreme Court; and when he testifies, he will 
simply conform his perjury to the latest ground rules.”). 
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Considering the low coerciveness of questioning even before Miranda and the 
ineffectiveness of the Miranda requirements in preventing coercion after,682 it is 
unlikely that the 1966-to-1968 clearance rate drop is a manifestation of a change 
from a coercive to a noncoercive system.683 
E. The Logic of Miranda as a Cause 
Having carefully reviewed possible causes for the confession rate decline, we 
believe Miranda’s unprecedented restriction on police questioning is the most 
likely cause. But because we have been focusing on a host of specific and narrow 
issues, it might be useful to step back for a moment to look at the big picture: Is 
it logical to view Miranda as an important causal factor? 
The conclusion that Miranda caused a significant part of the 1966-to-1968 
decline in clearance rates is supported by a wide range of information. To begin 
with, there is an obvious, sharp drop in clearance rates between 1966 and 1968, 
at exactly the time when the drop should have occurred if Miranda harmed law 
enforcement.684 Next, the regression equations indicate that the drop for violent 
crimes and property crimes, as well as the individual crimes of robbery, vehicle 
theft, and larceny, cannot be explained by major criminal justice or 
socioeconomic variables.685 In addition, both the FBI and the police on the street 
contemporaneously identified Miranda as a hindrance to clearing crimes.686 
These law enforcement reports are corroborated by declining confession rates 
reported in the before-and-after studies of Miranda’s impact687 and lower 
confession rates reported in this country in the years after Miranda.688 
And what do Miranda’s defenders have to say about, in particular, the 
declining clearance rates as evidence of Miranda’s harm? Recall that exploring 
clearance rates to measure Miranda’s effect was not our idea—but that of 
Miranda’s defenders. The initial position (adopted by such prominent defenders 
of Miranda as Schulhofer, Kamisar, and others) was that clearance rates were a 
valid measure of whether Miranda harmed law enforcement and that the rates 
did not show a permanent decline after Miranda.689 This position collapsed, of 
 
682 Isolated cases of police brutality continued, of course, well after Miranda. See Susan 
Bandes, Tracing the Pattern of No Pattern: Stories of Police Brutality, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
665, 666 (2001). 
683 Note that we are only arguing that the clearance rate decline found from 1966 to 1968 
is not explained by a sudden, contemporaneous reduction in coerciveness. “One could believe 
that police interrogation has generally become less coercive over the last several decades and 
still accept this claim.” Cassell, supra note 16, at 478 n.533. 
684 See supra notes 100-24 and accompanying text. 
685 See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text. 
686 See supra notes 533-42. 
687 See supra notes 16-47 and accompanying text. 
688 See supra Section I.B.1. 
689 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
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course, in the face of FBI data to the contrary.690 Rather than concede (consistent 
with their earlier position) that these declining rates showed Miranda’s harmful 
effects, Miranda’s defenders instead shifted their position and told us that one 
“need only turn to trends in levels of crime and police resources during the [post-
1965] period” to understand the clearance rate decline.691 However, empirical 
evidence demonstrated that the 1966-to-1968 drop in clearance rates did not 
follow the pattern of rising crime rates throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.692 
Subsequently, Miranda’s defenders took the view that, while “[m]any forces 
contributed to clearance rate trends . . . there is no reason to think that one 
particular factor—Miranda—was among the factors playing a causal role.”693 In 
addition to rising crime rates and reduced law enforcement resources, 
Schulhofer (for example) pointed to the limited “capacity” of the criminal justice 
system, urbanization, the proportion of crimes in small cities, and other less 
easily quantifiable factors.694 To the extent that such claims are empirically 
testable, they have been disproven: our regression analysis suggests that, even 
controlling for all the quantifiable factors, Miranda had a significant depressing 
effect on clearance rates, an effect found more consistently than for these 
suggested competing causes.695 
Following publication of our regression results in 1998, John Donohue 
offered a competing specification of the equations, which diminished (but did 
not eliminate) our findings.696 This Article shows that, even using his 
specifications, with newly available data (through 2012) our MIRANDA effect 
is substantially confirmed.697 
And yet another scholar, Floyd Feeney, thought that California clearance rate 
data undercut our conclusions.698 Instead, properly understood, the California 
data fully confirms our theory.699 And Feeney thought that the inclusion of 
 
690 See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text. 
691 Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 280 (“[S]oaring rates of violent crime and stagnant levels 
of police resources easily explain the observed clearance-rate trends.”); Schulhofer, supra 
note 29, at 24 (“[T]here is no reason—none—to blame Miranda, rather than precipitously 
shrinking resources, for the decline in clearance rates during the late 1960s.”). 
692 See Cassell, supra note 16, at 307, 308 fig.2 (“[C]rime rates were increasing well before 
Miranda was handed down and continued to climb afterwards.”). 
693 See Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda, supra note 125, at 357-58. 
694 See id. at 365-67; Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 291-93. 
695 See, e.g., supra Tables 2-4 (finding a statistically significant MIRANDA effect on 
violent and property crimes, but no statistically significant effect from crime rate, police 
variables, capacity variables, or crime in small cities—urbanization was significant only for 
violent crimes). 
696 See Donahue, supra note 7, at 1159-69 (discussing the specifications used in Donahue’s 
1998 model). 
697 See supra notes 224-74 and accompanying text. 
698 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 18-41 (arguing that the California clearance data do not 
support a conclusion of a sharp fall in the clearance rate from 1966 to 1968). 
699 See supra notes 329-65 and accompanying text. 
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arguably flawed data from New York City and few other big cities could explain 
away the confession rate drop we are concerned about.700 But our MIRANDA 
effect shows up in the FBI data for suburban and rural areas, as well as small- 
and mid-sized cities.701 
We believe that the fact that we have been able to use quantitative methods to 
disprove so many of the counterarguments advanced against our position should 
itself be evidence in favor of our handcuffing-the-cops theory. But additional 
empirical evidence has recently developed that strongly supports our hypothesis. 
In an important empirical study, Stephen Rushin and Griffin Edwards 
considered the issue of whether legal regulation of police behavior could 
inadvertently reduce officer aggressiveness, thereby increasing crime. To test 
this issue, they compared all police departments that have been subject to 
federally mandated reform under consent decrees with those who have not. They 
found that the introduction of such external reforms “was associated with a 
statistically significant uptick in some crime rates, relative to unaffected 
municipalities.”702 They concluded that this effect was due to “de-policing”—
i.e., police becoming less aggressive, and thereby less effective in fighting 
crime.703 Rushin and Edwards thought it was “likely that external regulation of 
law enforcement comes with growing pains. Frontline officers may find the 
imposition of external mandates to be procedurally unjust.”704 While Rushin and 
Edwards researched the impact of consent decrees, the same logic about the 
harmful effects of “external regulation” can be easily applied to the Miranda 
decision. 
Finally, one last important fact remains to be considered: common sense. Our 
conclusion is simply that when the Supreme Court imposed unprecedented 
restrictions on an important police investigative technique,705 the police became 
less effective. This was exactly what the dissenters predicted in Miranda,706 a 
 
700 See Feeney, supra note 8, at 63. 
701 See supra notes 318-28 and accompanying text. 
702 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 127 (manuscript at 1).  
703 Id. (manuscript at 5).  
704 Id. (manuscript at 55). 
705 See id. (manuscript at 6 n.15) (observing that Miranda was a “transformational 
regulation[] of American law enforcement” agencies); Schulhofer, supra note 21, at 552 n.214 
(noting Miranda was a “radical departure” from the assumption of the times); cf. FRYDL & 
SKOGAN, supra note 41, at 255 (“Miranda is no doubt the best-known criminal procedure 
decision in the United States.”); Amos N. Guiora, Relearning Lessons of History: Miranda 
and Counterterrorism, 71 LA. L. REV. 1147, 1152 (2011) (identifying Miranda as “the 
cornerstone of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution”); Frederick Schauer, The 
Miranda Warning, 88 WASH. L. REV. 155, 155 (2013) (describing Miranda as “the most 
famous appellate case in the world”). See generally THOMAS & LEO, supra note 671, at 141 
(discussing the Miranda “volcano”); AMOS N. GUIORA, EARL WARREN, ERNESTO MIRANDA 
AND TERRORISM (forthcoming 2017) (describing the importance of the Miranda decision).  
706 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 516 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“There can 
be little doubt that the Court’s new code would markedly decrease the number of 
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claim that the majority did not bother to refute.707 In short, we are not asserting 
anything unusual; instead, we are merely suggesting the obvious. The 
proposition that Miranda harmed law enforcement should be uncontroversial. 
Instead, it is the contrary academic wisdom that should receive our skepticism.  
VII. REFORMING MIRANDA 
So far we have argued that strong evidence (the combination of confession 
rate and clearance rate data) supports the view that Miranda has made it 
noticeably more difficult for police officers to obtain confessions. Assuming that 
Miranda has harmed law enforcement, the question would remain what to do 
with that information. Of course, one possible conclusion is that Miranda should 
simply be overruled, as some commentators have suggested.708 In wrapping up 
this Article, we make a more limiting argument and suggest the Court might take 
a somewhat different course. The empirical evidence concerning Miranda’s 
harm reveals ways Miranda could be reformed to reduce those harms while 
securing the goals that Miranda hopes to achieve. 
In discussing reforming Miranda, it is important to emphasize one difference 
between the decision and other seemingly similar Supreme Court decisions. In 
arguing that Miranda has “handcuffed” the cops, we are not complaining about 
the fact that constitutional rights pose obstacles for law enforcement. 
Commenting on the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, for example, Dallin 
Oaks concluded that “[t]he whole argument about the exclusionary rule 
‘handcuffing’ the police should be abandoned. If this is a negative effect, then it 
is an effect of the constitutional rules, not an effect of the exclusionary rule as 
the means chosen for their enforcement.”709 
Miranda stands on different footing. Despite what some commentators have 
argued (including Donald Dripps in this Symposium710), the Miranda decision 
is clearly unlike other constitutional decisions in explicitly inviting alternative 
approaches to regulating police interrogation. The decision itself stated it had no 
 
confessions.”); id. at 541 (White, J., dissenting) (discussing clearance rates and concluding 
that “[t]he rule announced today will measurably weaken the ability of the criminal law to 
perform these tasks”). 
707 See id. at 481 (claiming that the decision “should not constitute an undue interference 
with a proper system of law enforcement”). 
708 See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 199-222 (1993); U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF 
PRETRIAL INTERROGATION (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437 (1989). But cf. 
Alschuler, supra note 40, at 890 (predicting that the chance the Supreme Court will overrule 
its Miranda decision is “nonexistent”); William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Taking 
Miranda’s Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REV. 813, 849 (2005) (predicting that, in the long term, the 
Court will eventually either overrule Miranda or recast it substantially). 
709 Oaks, supra note 127, at 754.  
710 See Dripps, supra note 521, at 894-95 (arguing that formal critiques of Miranda are 
inconsistent with conventional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, among other bodies of 
law).  
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intention of “creat[ing] a constitutional straitjacket,”711 and specifically 
“encourage[d] Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for 
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while 
promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.”712 While the Court’s 
later decision in Dickerson gave a narrow reading of this language, it certainly 
did not retreat from the proposition that Miranda could be replaced with an 
alternative.713 
In this Section, we briefly sketch what a reasonable and constitutional 
alternative to Miranda could look like.714 In crafting this alternative, we use the 
quantitative information about Miranda’s harms we have gathered to propose 
removing the decision’s most harmful features. The alternative we propose only 
serves to highlight the fact that Miranda has, indeed, handcuffed the cops, 
because Miranda’s harmful effects are incurred unnecessarily. Specifically, the 
alternative we propose continues delivering warnings to suspects but adjusts 
them so they do not promise suspects that they can immediately stop 
questioning. We would also require police to record police interrogation. And 
we would encourage more careful scrutiny of voluntariness issues. These 
modifications would remove Miranda’s handcuffs from the cops while 
protecting suspects’ legitimate interests against being coerced into giving 
involuntary confessions. 
A. Eliminating Miranda’s Waiver Requirement and Questioning Cut-Off 
Rules 
In this Article’s previous Sections, we reviewed the available empirical 
evidence in an attempt to establish that Miranda had harmful effects on crime 
clearance rates and, ultimately, on confession and conviction rates as well. 
Assuming Miranda created such harms, what features of Miranda are 
responsible? 
One argument might be that the famous Miranda warnings inhibited suspects 
from talking. For reasons we articulate in the next subsection, we think that 
 
711 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
712 Id. For the origins of this language in the opinion, see Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving 
Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 123-25 (1998). 
713 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435-40 (2000) (holding that Miranda 
was a constitutionally based decision and, consequently, cannot be modified by Congress, but 
observing that Congress retained the power to create alternative, effective approaches); see 
also Smith v. State, 974 A.2d 991, 999 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (“While the Dickerson 
Court put an end to this campaign to dismantle Miranda via the federal statute from 1968, the 
Court reiterated that the specific Miranda warnings themselves are not mandated by the 
Constitution, and implied that new laws, passed by either Congress or state legislatures, which 
more adequately safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege, might be acceptable.” (quoting 
ANDREW JEZIC, FRANK MOLONY & WILLIAM NOLAN, MARYLAND LAW OF CONFESSIONS 192-
93 (2005))), aff’d, 995 A.2d 685 (Md. 2010).  
714 Cf. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 5, at 1129-32 (discussing possible alternatives to 
Miranda).  
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unlikely. Instead, the features of Miranda that cause harm are the rules that block 
police questioning of suspects, specifically the requirements that police obtain a 
“waiver” from a suspect before proceeding with questioning and that police must 
stop questioning when a suspect invokes his rights.715 These rules harm law 
enforcement almost by definition. As Joseph Grano has explained, “By giving 
the suspect power to prevent questioning even before it begins, . . . Miranda 
gave the law of confessions a ‘single focus—protection of the suspect.’”716 
While the Miranda rules seem to envision suspects consulting with counsel and 
then answering questions, as a practical matter that does not occur. As Alschuler 
has nicely put it in this Symposium, Miranda’s promise of a right to counsel 
during questioning is not really a right to counsel; rather “[i]t is an incantation 
that suspects can use to shut down questioning.”717 
Generally, academic commentators have been unperturbed about Miranda’s 
questioning cut-off features. The standard argument is that most suspects waive 
their rights and so Miranda has little effect. Indeed, the argument is typically 
accompanied by a citation to empirical research conducted by Cassell suggesting 
that only 20% of suspects invoke their Miranda rights.718 But if the glass is 80% 
 
715 See David Garthe, The Investigation of Robbery, in IV THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL 
OF ROBBERY 93, 112 (Floyd Feeney & Adrianne Weir eds., 1973) (noting views of one officer 
that “since Miranda robbery suspects have ‘clammed up’” and placing emphasis on the fourth 
warning).  
716 GRANO, supra note 708, at 219 (quoting Gerald M. Caplan, Miranda Revisited, 93 YALE 
L.J. 1375, 1469 (1984)). 
717 See Alschuler, supra note 40, at 874.  
718 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 859 (reporting that 83.7% of suspects given their 
Miranda rights waived them and concluding that “[t]he evidence, although generally quite 
dated, suggests that about 20% of all suspects invoke their Miranda rights”); see also Cassell, 
supra note 16, at 495-96 & n.623 (collecting other information on waiver rates); Saul M. 
Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices 
and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 389 (2007) (estimating that 81% of adult suspects 
waive); Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 260 (reporting that 78% of custodial suspects waived their Miranda 
rights); George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1972 (2004) 
(finding a 68% waiver rate in reported and litigated cases). An even higher waiver rate of 93% 
was reported in one study. Anthony J. Domanico, Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrenece T. White, 
Overcoming Miranda: A Content Analysis of the Miranda Portion of Police Interrogations, 
49 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 13 (2012). But the study rested on an unrepresentative sample of cases 
in which a videotape was made of the interrogation, the suspect was charged, and the public 
defender’s office agreed to provide the tape for further analysis, id. at 11-13, rendering the 
findings of little use in estimating an overall waiver rate.  
Research on juveniles also finds high waiver rates. See Feld, supra note 11, at 429 
(reporting a 92.8% juvenile waiver rate); Feld, supra note 65, at 255 (reporting 80% waiver 
rate by juveniles); Viljoen, Klaver & Roesch, supra note 64, at 261 (reporting that in a 
retrospective study of delinquents held in detention, only 13.15% “reported that they asserted 
the right to silence”). It seems unlikely that this juvenile data are directly applicable to adult 
interrogations. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting that juveniles are more likely 
  
830  BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:685 
 
full, it is likewise 20% empty. Twenty percent is a very large number in this 
context, since it suggests that 20% of all criminal suspects in this country—one 
out of every five—are essentially immune from police questioning.719 
What makes these numbers even more troubling is that it turns out that there 
is good evidence that the suspects who are most likely to invoke their rights are 
disproportionately the suspects whom police would most like to question. 
Suspects with criminal records are generally more likely to invoke their Miranda 
rights than those without one.720 There is also experimental evidence suggesting 
that innocent persons are more likely to waive their Miranda rights than guilty 
persons.721 All this suggests that Miranda may be backwards public policy 
because it confers protection disproportionately on those who are least entitled 
to it. As Stephanos Bibas has cogently argued, Miranda’s rules have “shielded 
some savvy, guilty recidivists while doing little to protect juveniles, the mentally 
retarded, and other innocent defendants most likely to confess.”722 
Miranda’s waiver and questioning cut-off rules likely have additional harms 
beyond blocking questioning of suspects who refuse to waive. Police may decide 
not to even attempt to interrogate a suspect because of the need to obtain a 
waiver, something the statistics regarding invocations of rights will fail to 
 
to confess compared to adults). 
719 In theory, if a suspect invokes his Miranda rights, the police could simply ignore that 
invocation and continue to question the suspect for investigative purposes. There is little 
research on the extent to which police follow such practices, but the research that exists 
suggest that police do not generally employ this practice. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 
58, at 861 (“[I]n none of our cases did the police continue questioning a suspect after an 
invocation of Miranda rights.”); cf. Thomas, supra note 718, at 1978 (finding conflicting 
evidence in a sample of mostly appellate cases about whether police stop questioning after 
invocations); Weisselberg, supra note 45, at 1552-54 (discussing California training materials 
discouraging “two step” questioning approaches).  
720 See Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 57, at 286 (finding suspects with 
felony records four times more likely to invoke Miranda rights than those without records); 
William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 993 (2001) (describing affluent 
suspects and recidivists as those most likely “to know that talking to the police is a tactical 
error”); see also Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 895-96 & tbl.9 (finding suspects with 
prior records more likely to invoke rights, but result was not statistically significant); Feld, 
supra note 65, at 255-56 (juveniles with one or more prior felony arrests waived their Miranda 
rights 68% of the time, compared to 89% for juveniles with fewer or less serious police 
contacts); Feld, Questioning Gender, supra note 68, at 1095-96 (finding both boys and girls 
with prior criminals records are significantly more likely to invoke their rights). But cf. Leo, 
Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 57, at 291 (noting that “class” had no effect on the 
success rate of police interrogation). 
721 Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The 
Power of Innocence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 213 (2004). The extent to which laboratory 
studies can be applied to real world police questioning remains uncertain. See Slobogin, supra 
note 47, at 1183.  
722 Weisselberg & Bibas, supra note 43, at 77.  
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capture.723 In addition, to avoid the need to obtain Miranda waivers, police may 
decide to proceed with noncustodial questioning rather than custodial 
questioning, as Alschuler and Dripps both point out in their contributions to this 
Symposium.724 While police appear to have received some training on this 
noncustodial maneuver,725 the extent to which it is available is uncertain. And, 
in fact, police generally question suspects in custody rather than outside of it. 
The one study to investigate this issue quantitatively (the Cassell/Hayman study) 
found that 69.9% of 173 police interviews were custodial while 30.1% were 
noncustodial.726 The concern is that the same study also found that noncustodial 
questioning was substantially less effective in obtaining incriminating 
statements (56.9% success for custodial questioning vs. 30.0% success for 
noncustodial questioning), a difference that was statistically significant.727 This 
lower success rate is consistent with reports from the leading police interrogation 
manual that custodial interrogation is often needed to obtain a confession.728 
It is also possible for police to avoid Miranda’s requirements by engaging in 
“public safety” questioning.729 But while some commentators have suggested 
that this recognized exception “carv[ed] a gaping hole” in Miranda’s 
requirements,730 its impact on day-to-day law enforcement appears to be almost 
nonexistent.731 
The bottom line from the available empirical evidence is that in many cases, 
Miranda’s waiver requirement will prevent police officers from questioning 
suspects at all732 (or, lead officers to questioning them in less-likely-to-be-
productive noncustodial settings). To be sure, even if officers had been able to 
 
723 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 855-58. 
724 See Alschuler, supra note 40, at 869-72; Dripps, supra note 521, at 918. 
725 See Weisselberg, supra note 45, at 1546-47. 
726 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 882-83; cf. Brian C. Jayne, Empirical Experiences 
of Required Electronic Recordings of Interviews and Interrogations on Investigator’s 
Practices and Case Outcomes, 4 LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE F. 103, 106 tbl.2 (2004) 
(finding that, of police investigators surveyed following the imposition of mandatory 
recording during custodial interrogation, 8% significantly increased noncustodial 
interrogations and 26% somewhat increased such interrogations). 
727 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 883 (discussing the effect of custodial status on 
acquiring incriminating statements). 
728 See INBAU ET AL., supra note 82, at xiii (“Criminal offenders, except those caught in the 
commission of their crimes, ordinarily will not admit their guilt unless questioned under 
conditions of privacy and for a period of perhaps several hours.”).  
729 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984).  
730 Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of 
Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 82 (1989).  
731 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 885 (finding only one case out of 173 suspects 
that even arguably fell within the public safety exception); Thomas, supra note 718, at 1970-
72 (reporting that in a sample of 211 litigated cases, only 2.8% (6/211) involved public safety 
questioning).  
732 See Stuntz, supra note 720, at 984-85. 
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question all these suspects, not all of them would have confessed or even given 
incriminating statements. But “guilty suspects need not confess for interrogation 
to be useful; in general, if the suspect says much of anything the police benefit, 
and benefit substantially.”733 
Miranda’s waiver requirement does not rest on firm constitutional 
foundations.734 It is something of an odd duck, because the waiver requirement 
“is plainly at odds with the rest of the opinion.”735 After explaining that custodial 
police interrogation was an inherently compelling environment, the Miranda 
Court allowed suspects to waive their Miranda rights in that same 
environment.736 And what that waiver means is not immediately clear, because 
“no sane person would knowingly relinquish a right to be free of compulsion.”737 
In any event, like other features of the Miranda regime, the waiver 
requirement is simply a prophylactic rule that can be replaced by a reasonable 
alternative. And it should be. Police do nothing wrong when they simply ask a 
suspect, in custody, whether he has anything to say about an alleged crime. In 
suggesting otherwise, Miranda “runs counter to our ordinary standards of 
morality.”738 
An otherwise-excellent recent article by Tonya Jacobi glosses over this point. 
Jacobi proposes steps to “discourage waiver”739 on the grounds that Miranda, as 
currently structured, “is not doing its job in properly informing suspects and 
girding them in facing the inherently coercive atmosphere of the 
stationhouse.”740 But “girding” suspects to face police questioning is exactly 
what causes social harm—the trade-off is unavoidable. And why we would want 
to “gird” suspects to resist police efforts to have them confess to their crimes is 
unexplained. 
Rather than strengthening the waiver requirement, we propose abolishing it. 
In our view, police officers should be free to give suspects their warnings and, 
after ascertaining that suspects understand those warnings, proceed to 
questioning them. Recent decisions suggest that the Court might be receptive to 
steps in that direction. While the Miranda decision suggested the prosecution 
 
733 Id. at 995. 
734 See Susan R. Klein, Transparency and Truth During Custodial Interrogations and 
Beyond, 97 B.U. L. REV. 993, 994 (2017). 
735 Tracey Maclin, A Comprehensive Analysis of the History of Interrogation Law, with 
Some Shots Directed at Miranda v. Arizona, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1387, 1411 (2015) (quoting 
THOMAS & LEO, supra note 23, at 172).  
736 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1965) (“The defendant may waive effectuation 
of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”). 
737 Alschuler, supra note 40, at 853. 
738 Id. at 63-64 (quoting WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 59 (1967)); see 
also Charles T. McCormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 218, 222 
(1956) (“[O]rdinary morality . . . sees nothing wrong in asking a man, for adequate reason, 
about particular misdeeds of which he has been suspected and charged.”). 
739 Jacobi, supra note 44, at 78. 
740 Id.  
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would face a “heavy burden” in establishing waiver,741 more recent Court 
decisions have undercut that holding. In an important decision handed down in 
June 2010, Berghuis v. Thompkins,742 the Supreme Court held that a suspect 
could implicitly waive his Miranda rights by talking to police and that 
affirmative waiver of rights from a suspect is not required.743 The constitutional 
permissibility of abolishing the waiver requirement follows straightforwardly 
from the Berghuis holding. 
Because Berghuis allows the police to dispense with a waiver, some 
commentators have criticized it in apocalyptic terms. Some have suggested that 
it almost marks the end of the Miranda regime.744 Others have argued that it has 
“enormous practical implications” for policing.745 Their contention is that 
Berghuis offers law enforcement agencies the opportunity to eliminate from 
their standard Miranda warning procedure the explicit request for a waiver of 
rights746—precisely the step we propose here. But the extent to which American 
law enforcement agencies have generally taken up that invitation is unclear. 
Barry Feld’s study of interrogations of juveniles in Minnesota found no 
examples of implied waivers, but it rested on interrogations conducted between 
2003 and 2006, before Berghuis was handed down.747 Since Berghuis was 
decided, some law enforcement officers have apparently been trained to avoid 
asking for explicit waivers, particularly in California, where training materials 
appear to be particularly aggressive in how to avoid Miranda’s costs.748 But 
 
741 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (“If the interrogation continues without the presence of an 
attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that 
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and 
his right to retained or appointed counsel.”). 
742 560 U.S. 370 (2010). 
743 Id. at 384. For an insightful debate about the merits of Berghuis, see Weisselberg & 
Bibas, supra note 43. 
744 See, e.g., Richard L. Budden, Comment, All in All, Miranda Loses Another Brick from 
Its Wall: The U.S. Supreme Court Swings Its Hammer in Berghuis v. Thompkins, Dealing A 
Crushing Blow to the Right to Remain Silent, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 483, 496-509 (2011); Illan 
M. Romano, Note, Is Miranda on the Verge of Extinction? The Supreme Court Loosens 
Miranda's Grip in Favor of Law Enforcement, 35 NOVA L. REV. 525, 526 (2011); cf. Maclin, 
supra note 735, at 1406 n.107 (agreeing that “Thompkins ‘is perhaps the most significant 
Miranda case yet decided’” (quoting THOMAS & LEO, supra note 671, at 192)). 
745 Weisselberg & Bibas, supra note 43, at 75; see also THOMAS & LEO, supra note 671, 
at 192 (“[I]n removing the last residue of the ‘heavy burden’ waiver language from Miranda 
doctrine, Thompkins is perhaps the most significant Miranda case yet decided.”).  
746 See, e.g., Kinports, supra note 45, at 406 (arguing that Berghuis and related decisions 
“allow law enforcement officials to do a complete end run around Miranda, reducing the 
Warren Court’s decision to a formalistic requirement that warnings be read and otherwise 
reinstating the voluntariness due process test”). 
747 See Feld, supra note 11, at 419 n.125, 428. 
748 See TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 308 n.54 (2013) (discussing the practice of “questioning suspects 
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recent California appellate decisions on Miranda issues do not show a clear 
pattern of California police officers dispensing with the formal waiver 
requirement.749 
Based on our empirical evidence of harm to law enforcement from Miranda, 
officers should take steps to move in the direction Berghuis allows. Asking 
suspects directly for a waiver obviously creates the chance suspects will 
refuse—preventing any questioning whatsoever. Moving away from explicit 
waivers will likely lead to additional confessions (and crime clearances) and is 
consistent with current Miranda doctrine as explicated in Berghuis. 
Closely related to the concept of waiver are the questioning cutoff rules, 
which prevent police from moving forward with questioning if a suspect 
“lawyers up.”750 Here, too, we believe that these rules create social costs by 
preventing legitimate police questioning. And here too, we believe reasonable 
alternatives exist, as the Department of Justice (for example) outlined in its 
report on Miranda.751 Along with the formal waiver requirement, the 
questioning cutoff rules should be abolished and replaced with a videotaping 
regime—a regime we explain below. 
B. Modifying Miranda’s Warnings 
If jettisoning Miranda’s waiver and questioning cut-off requirements reduces 
social harm, should the famous warnings also be jettisoned? Here the available 
empirical evidence suggests that we can have our cake and eat it too—i.e., we 
can give warnings to suspects without having them interfere with police efforts. 
It is possible to wonder whether Miranda warnings do any good. The 
available evidence suggests that the warnings are not generally understood by 
suspects.752 And in this Symposium, there did not seem to be much enthusiasm 
that the warnings are doing any real good.753 But perhaps requiring police to 
 
‘outside of Miranda’”); Weisselberg, supra note 712, at 132-39 (discussing earlier California 
training practices); Weisselberg, supra note 45, at 1577 (same). 
749 Compare People v. Mejia, No. E064637, 2016 WL 4655781, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Sept. 7, 2016) (“The officer first read defendant his Miranda rights from a card, concluding 
with two questions: ‘Do you understand the rights I read to you? Having these rights in mind, 
do you want to talk to me about the rifle?’”), with In re Art T., 234 Cal. App. 4th 335, 340 
(2015) (describing how an officer “made no attempt to secure an express waiver of rights” 
from a suspect but simply continued to talk to him after reading of rights). 
750 See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 
675, 687-88 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981). 
751 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 708, at 39-40 (“[W]e 
see no reason why a reasonable effort should not be made to persuade an uncooperative 
suspect to make a statement or answer questions.”).  
752 Richard Rodgers et al., General Knowledge and Misknowledge of Miranda Rights: Are 
Effective Miranda Advisements Still Necessary?, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 432, 432 
(2013).  
753 See Alschuler, supra note 40, at 890 (“Fifty years’ experience has confirmed the 
fourfold failure of the fourfold warnings.”); Dripps, supra note 521, at 932-33 (arguing for a 
  
2017] STILL HANDCUFFING THE COPS? 835 
 
deliver warnings to suspects in custody can be justified on the grounds that it 
signals our society’s commitment to the rule of law, even during police 
interrogation.754 
In any event, given that the Miranda decision required warnings, the simplest 
path for reform would be to leave them largely in place. Fortunately, from a 
social harm perspective, the available literature suggests the warnings 
themselves are not the cause of lost confessions and clearances.755 The best 
evidence of this fact comes from the experience of law enforcement agencies 
following the Supreme Court’s 1964 Escobedo decision, after which many 
police agencies began giving various warnings without substantial effects on 
confessions.756 At the annual meeting of the National Association of Attorneys 
General, held in May 1966 (after Escobedo but shortly before Miranda), the 
“clear consensus” was that Escobedo had had little effect on the rate of 
confessions and that confession rates remained constant even in those states 
where courts had extended Escobedo to require the police to warn suspects of 
their rights.757 A related indication that warnings per se were not responsible for 
the change in the rates comes from the practice of the FBI, which gave warnings 
on the right to remain silent without apparent adverse effect.758 
The available empirical evidence also confirms that warnings have 
comparatively little effect on confession rates. In Detroit, there was, at most, a 
2.8% drop in the confession rate after police began warning suspects of a right 
to remain silent after Escobedo—from 60.8% of all cases in 1961 to 58% of all 
 
consistent approach to both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & 
Richard A. Leo, The Miranda App: Metaphor and Machine, 97 B.U. L. REV. 935, 937 (2017) 
(“Strikingly, the core problem that gave rise to Miranda—namely, the coercive pressure of 
custodial interrogation—has remained largely unchanged.”); Eve Brensike Primus, 
Disentangling Miranda and Massiah: How to Revive the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
as a Tool for Regulating Confession Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2017) (“Many scholars 
have mourned this dilution of suspects’ Miranda rights.”); Slobogin, supra note 47, at 1158-
59. But see Thomas, supra note 6, at 1215. 
754 See Schulhofer, supra note 101, at 451. 
755 See Cassell, supra note 16, at 493-94 (arguing that the simple recitation of the rights 
does not appear to be the cause of the decline in the confession rates). 
756 See Cyril D. Robinson, Police and Prosecutor Practices and Attitudes Relating to 
Interrogation as Revealed by Pre- and Post-Miranda Questionnaires: A Construct of Police 
Capacity to Comply, 1968 DUKE L.J. 425, 482 (reporting that after Escobedo but before 
Miranda ninety percent of police and prosecutors said they advised suspects of their right to 
silence). 
757 Sidney E. Zion, Prosecutors Say Confession Rule Has Not Harmed Enforcement, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 1966, at 27. 
758 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483 (1966). The Miranda majority went on to equate 
the limited FBI practice of warning of rights with the Miranda requirements—an equation 
that was clearly wrong. See GRAHAM, supra note 673, at 181-82 (noting that “important 
differences” made Miranda “far more generous”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL 
POLICY, supra note 708, at 39-40 (calling FBI practice “basically different”). 
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cases in 1965.759 In Pittsburgh, a substantial decline occurred in the confession 
rate after Miranda, even though it was the pre-Miranda practice of the detectives 
to warn suspects of their right to remain silent and to, at some point, advise 
suspects that they would receive counsel.760 In New Haven, the Yale Law 
Journal reported no support in its data for the claim that warnings of rights 
caused a decline in police success at obtaining confessions.761 Finally, in 
Philadelphia, an estimated 90% of arrested suspects made statements before 
Escobedo, 80% (estimated) after Escobedo when police gave limited warnings, 
68.3% when police gave more extended warnings as required by the Third 
Circuit, and 40.7% when police followed Miranda.762 Thus, the biggest drop 
followed not the imposition of warning requirement itself, but rather the 
imposition of the Miranda warnings-and-waiver regime. 
While warnings themselves do not substantially interfere with law 
enforcement efforts to obtain convictions, if Miranda’s waiver requirement and 
cut-off rules are abolished, that will necessitate some corollary modification of 
the Miranda warnings. As currently structured, the warnings promise a suspect 
a lawyer before questioning occurs—implicitly creating the questioning cut-off 
rule discussed in the previous Section. A modification to limit Miranda’s harms 
would need to change that promise. One way of redrafting the Miranda rules 
along these lines would be as follows: 
(1) You have the right to remain silent. 
(2) Anything you say may be used as evidence. 
(3) You have a right to an attorney when we bring you before a judge. 
(4) If you cannot afford an attorney, the judge will appoint one for you 
without charge. 
(5) We are required to bring you before a judge without unnecessary 
delay.763 
These warnings modify the third and fourth Miranda warnings, which 
promise suspects an attorney during questioning as part of Miranda’s 
prophylactic protections.764 As a practical matter, police never provide suspects 
 
759 See Souris, supra note 50, at 255; see also Cassell, supra note 16, at 428 (discussing 
the study at greater length).  
760 See Seeburger & Wettick, supra note 87, at 8. 
761 Wald et al., supra note 51, at 1569. 
762 See Controlling Crime Hearings, supra note 292, at 200-01; Cassell, supra note 16, at 
402-04. 
763 See Cassell, supra note 16, at 496. 
764 The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel does not generally apply during custodial 
interrogation following an arrest. It is possible to craft an argument for expanding the right to 
counsel during questioning, as Eve Primus does capably in this Symposium. See Primus, 
supra note 753, at 1089 (arguing for a more “robust” protection for criminal suspects under 
the Sixth Amendment during questioning). However, Primus one-sidedly assesses the 
concerns of suspects, and her proposals would clearly increase the harms to law enforcement 
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with an attorney if they ask for one.765 Moreover, the Court has already approved 
a warning that contains similar language to these.766 As Tonja Jacobi has pointed 
out, “Both prior to and subsequent to Dickerson, the Court has displayed a 
willingness to tolerate legislative tinkering with Miranda, by varying the 
Miranda warnings, rather than substituting them altogether.”767 The proposal 
also adds a fifth warning, advising suspects of the constitutional requirement of 
prompt appearance before a judge. This kind of warning has been suggested by 
other commentators,768 and it does not seem likely to interfere with confessions. 
It is also possible to wonder about broader changes to the Miranda warnings. 
For example, some commentators have suggested that police officers might be 
required to have a “dialogue” with suspects to ensure that they understand their 
rights.769 Still others have discussed ways in which the Miranda warnings might 
be delivered in order to make them more “effective.”770 The concerns about 
these types of modifications is that they would likely increase the number of 
suspects who refused to waive their rights, thereby exacerbating the harms we 
have tried to explicate in this Article. Perhaps such broader changes can be 
justified through a cost-benefit analysis. But without more careful consideration 
of the serious costs that follow from lost confessions, it is hard to say. 
One modification of the warnings that would not harm law enforcement—and 
could significantly increase the number of confessions—would be to modify the 
warnings so that they track the warning police currently deliver in England and 
Wales.771 Suspects there are advised it “may harm your defense if you do not 
mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court.”772 Craig 
Bradley has made the case for changing Miranda warnings along these lines at 
length.773 And Chris Slobogin has pointed out that this language was added to 
 
discussed in this Article by preventing police from questioning an even larger percentage of 
suspects than Miranda prevents.  
765 See Alschuler, supra note 40, at 873 (discussing the “right to counsel that wasn’t”).  
766 Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989).  
767 Jacobi, supra note 44, at 22 (first citing Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 202-03; then citing 
Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 62 (2010)). 
768 See, e.g., id at 28-30. 
769 See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Dialogue Approach to Miranda Warnings and 
Waiver, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1437 (2012).  
770 See, e.g., Ferguson & Leo, supra note 753, at 948-49. 
771 See generally Chris Blair, Miranda and the Right to Silence in England, 11 TULSA J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2003); Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial 
Evidence: A Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1 
(1986).  
772 Craig M. Bradley, Interrogation and Silence: A Comparative Study, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
271, 285 (2009).  
773 Id. at 297 (“[T]he ‘English warning’ as to the use of silence is a sensible rule that would 
advance the search for truth.”); see also Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (2009). But cf. Geoffrey S. Corn, The Missing Miranda Warning: 
Why What You Don’t Know Really Can Hurt You, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 761, 762 (urging an 
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the English/Welsh warnings to respond to lower confession rates produced by 
Miranda-style changes in interrogation law—with the apparent effect of 
increasing confession rates.774 Such a change runs up against current precedent, 
not only in Miranda but arguably also the decision from a year earlier, Griffin v. 
California.775 But as Alschuler has argued in this Symposium, it might be 
possible to convince the Court to reconsider Griffin and Miranda and allow 
adverse inferences because it might permit other approaches to questioning 
suspects.776 Our research suggests that changes in this direction might help to 
undo some of Miranda’s harmful effects on confession and clearance rates. 
C. Recording of Custodial Interrogations 
So far we have discussed ways in which Miranda’s rules should be curtailed 
to avoid harming law enforcement. But we are obviously aware that there are 
competing concerns during police interrogation. At the top of the list of concerns 
is avoiding physical coercion or threats to obtain a confession. But Miranda is 
poorly constructed to block physical coercion, a point first made by the Miranda 
dissenters.777 Recording of interrogations promises to be far more effective in 
preventing mistreatment than the requirement that an officer read some warnings 
off of a card.778 As part of any Miranda reform, adding videotaping seems like 
it could be an important step. 
Although not required by Miranda or any federal constitutional provision,779 
videotaping appears to be increasingly common around the country. According 
to a recent survey, “[s]ince 2003, the number of states requiring law enforcement 
officers to electronically record some or all interviews conducted with suspects 
 
additional warning that advises suspects that no adverse inference would will result from 
invoking the right to silence).  
774 Christopher Slobogin, Comparative Empiricism and Police Investigative Practices, 37 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 321, 337 (2011).  
775 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that the Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment 
by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is 
evidence of guilt”).  
776 Alschuler, supra note 40, at 860 (“With a forthright, moderate incentive for cooperation 
in place, perhaps the deceptive stratagems could be abandoned.”); see also Donald Dripps, 
Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699 (1988).  
777 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Those who use 
third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully 
about warnings and waiver.”).  
778 See Cassell, supra note 22, at 1120-22; cf. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 
540, 558-63 (S.D.N.Y.) (requiring a trial program of body cameras as a response to concerns 
about stop and frisk polices of the NYPD), on appeal, 736 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (requiring 
reassignment), and vacated in part, remanded in part, 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014) (vacated 
in part and remanded for purpose of exploring settlement).  
779 See Slobogin, supra note 47, at 1188-93 (noting that a recording is not required by 
Miranda but making arguments for how it could be).  
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in their custody has grown from two to at least twenty-two.”780 In addition to 
specific requirements that police record interviews, a growing number of police 
departments are requiring their officers to wear uniform-mounted body-
cameras.781 “Recent surveys suggest that about 25% of the nation’s 17,000 
police agencies [are using video recording devices], with fully 80% of agencies 
evaluating the technology.”782 As of August 2016, of the sixty-eight “major city” 
police departments in the United States, about forty-three have some type of 
body worn-camera programs in place.783 The Department of Justice recently 
awarded $23 million in funding for a body-worn camera pilot program that will 
provide seventy-three police agencies in thirty-two states funding for purchase 
of body cameras and technical assistance.784 
While the trend at the state level is very much in the direction of recording 
policing questioning at the federal level, the Department of Justice for many 
years resisted this trend and rarely recorded custodial interviews.785 Then, on 
May 12, 2014, the Department of Justice announced a change to its interview 
policy.786 The new policy establishes a presumption that statements made by 
 
780 Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Dep’t of Justice, New Department Policy Concerning 
Electronic Recording of Statements, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1552, 1552 (2015); see also Jim 
Dwyer, Unmet Pledge: Interrogations Are Not Filmed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2016, at A24 
(noting twenty-two states and the District of Columbia record some interrogations, but New 
York City has not yet met its pledge to do so). A convenient resource for tracking 
developments in this area is a website maintained by the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers. See Recording Interrogations, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW., 
https://www.nacdl.org/recordinginterrogations [https://perma.cc/J46B-2UUU] (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2017). 
781 See generally Kami Chavis Simmons, Body-Mounted Police Cameras: A Primer on 
Police Accountability vs. Privacy, 58 HOWARD L.J. 881 (2015). 
782 Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies in Place, A Win for 
All, Version 2.0, ACLU (Mar. 2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras-v2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ADU2-HP4V]; see also Research on Body-Worn Cameras and Law 
Enforcement, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-
enforcement/technology/pages/body-worn-cameras.aspx [https://perma.cc/NYK6-Z6LV] 
(noting that the number of police departments not using body cameras is around seventy-five 
percent).  
783 Police Body Worn Cameras: A Policy Scorecard, LEADERSHIP CONF. (Aug. 2016), 
https://www.bwcscorecard.org/ [https://perma.cc/L89W-JHMV]. 
784 Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Awards over $23 Million in Funding for 
Body Worn Camera Pilot Program to Support Law Enforcement Agencies in 32 States, DEP’T 
JUST. (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-awards-over-23-
million-funding-body-worn-camera-pilot-program-support-law [https://perma.cc/2ST5-
X2SB]. 
785 See Thomas P. Sullivan, The Department of Justice’s Misguided Resistance to 
Electronic Recording of Custodial Interviews, 59 FED. LAW. 62, 63 (2012).  
786 See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Assoc. Att’y Gen. et al. (May 12, 2014), 
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individuals during custodial interviews will be electronically recorded.787 The 
policy also encourages agents and prosecutors to consider electronic recording 
in investigative or other circumstances where the presumption does not apply.788 
Although the policy contains exceptions,789 this new Department of Justice 
policy means that recording is coming to the federal level as well.790 
One reason why the Department of Justice was concerned about recording 
interrogations may have been the possibility that doing so might reduce 
confession rates. Just as there is little data in this country on confession rates, 
we have surprisingly little data on the effect of recording on confession rates. 
One of the present authors (Cassell) collected the available data on this point in 
a 1996 article, concluding that it did not generally appear to harm law 
enforcement efforts.791 Since then, there has been some, largely anecdotal, 
empirical evidence collected on the issue.792 One question that arises from this 
evidence is whether the recording equipment should be made visible to the 
suspect. A study of officer’s experiences with recording found that visible 
recording equipment reduced the confession rate,793 and the most widely used 
interrogation manual accordingly recommends against making the recording 
device visible.794 Nonetheless, given the fact that law enforcement agencies and 
supporters seem to have acquiesced in (at least hidden) recording, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that practice will not significantly harm interrogation 
efforts.795 
Video recording also offers one undoubted advantage over Miranda: It helps 




787 Id. at 1, 2 (clarifying that “electronic recording” encourages the use of video recording 
to satisfy the presumption, but allowing the use of audio recording when video is unavailable).  
788 Id.  
789 See Harvard Law Review Ass’n, supra note 780, at 1552 (noting that the new policy 
fails to provide enforcement and accountability measures). 
790 Id.  
791 Cassell, supra note 16, at 489.  
792 See, e.g., THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, NW. U. SCH. OF L. CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, 
POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 24 (2004) (reporting that 
officers who recorded interrogations were generally pleased with the results).  
793 See Jayne, supra note 726, at 105-08 (finding that of investigators surveyed following 
the imposition of mandatory recording requirements during custodial interrogation, 74% 
believed it had not affected the number of confessions, while 22% thought it had reduced the 
number of confessions, and 4% thought it had increased the number of confessions). 
Interestingly, Jayne reported that confession rates declined when the recording equipment was 
visible—from 82% when recording equipment was never visible to 43% when it was always 
visible. Id. 
794 INBAU ET AL., supra note 82, at 51. 
795 See Jacobi, supra note 44, at 44-45; Kassin et al., supra note 718, at 393 (reporting that 
81% of police officers surveyed favored recording interrogations).  
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false confession problem has sometimes been overblown,796 there is no doubt 
that police on rare occasions obtain a false confession.797 We have not discussed 
the problem elsewhere in this Article because, in terms of aggregate national 
crime statistics, the false confession problem is almost certainly so small as to 
be completely undetectable.798 But the important point for present purposes is 
that Miranda does nothing to prevent false confessions and, indeed, may place 
the innocent at greater risk by blocking voluntary confessions that could help 
exonerate them.799 A system of recording interrogations would certainly do far 
more than Miranda to protect the innocent.800 We add videotaping as part of our 
Miranda reform because it appears to offer a true “win-win”—more protection 
for suspects against involuntary confessions while not reducing law 
enforcement’s ability to obtain voluntary confessions. 
D. Renewed Focus on the Voluntariness Test 
Our tentative proposal necessarily places greater emphasis on voluntariness 
issues. By eliminating the waiver requirement and questioning cut-off rules (and 
making associated changes in the warnings), courts will necessarily have to pay 
more attention to whether a defendant gave not merely a “Mirandized” 
confession but also a “voluntary” confession. 
 
796 See Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases 
of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523 (1999).  
797 See generally Julia Carrano & Marvin Zalman, An Introduction to Innocence Reform, 
in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 11 (Marvin 
Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014).  
798 One back-of-the-envelope calculation to support this assertion is that the National 
Registry of Exonerations reports that from 1989 to 2012 it has identified about 130 cases of 
wrongful conviction due to false confessions. REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN THE U.S., 1989-2012, at 40 (2012). During that same 
twenty-three-year period, police arrested about 46 million people (assuming 2 million 
arrests/year for index crimes, see, e.g., UCR-2010 tbl.29 (reporting 2,195,000 arrests in 
2010)). Assuming the exonerations all involved truly innocent persons (a debatable 
assumption), wrongful convictions due to false confession occur about once for every 35,000 
arrests. To be sure, reported wrongful convictions are only a fraction of actual wrongful 
convictions. But our limited point is that it seems unlikely that false convictions leading to 
wrongful convictions is a regular phenomenon in day-to-day law enforcement. Of course, for 
those who disagree with this assertion, the point remains that those false confessions occur 
under the Miranda regime—and, indeed may be occurring more frequently because of the 
Miranda regime. See generally Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False 
Confessions and Lost Confessions—and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497 
(1998). We also agree that every wrongful conviction is itself a substantial cost that society 
should attempt to avoid. 
799 Id. at 538-52.  
800 See Paul G. Cassell, Can We Protect the Innocent Without Freeing the Guilty? 
Thoughts on Innocence Reforms that Avoid Harmful Tradeoffs, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
AND THE DNA REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INNOCENCE EXONERATIONS 16-19 
(forthcoming 2017); Cassell, supra note 16, at 488-89.  
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And that is good thing. One of the clear problems with Miranda is that it has, 
in essence “become a substitute for serious voluntariness scrutiny,”801 as others 
in this Symposium have pointed out.802 Under the current regime, as a practical 
matter, courts simply adjudicate whether police have complied with Miranda’s 
warnings-and-waiver regime. If so, they readily admit the confession without 
much serious additional scrutiny. In this sense, Miranda has “practically 
displaced voluntariness determinations”803 because once a suspect has waived 
his Miranda rights, “the routinized Miranda ritual lulls judges into admitting 
confessions with little inquiry into voluntariness.”804 
Our reform proposal would effectively revitalize the voluntariness test, 
simply by forcing courts to pay more attention to such issues. Because police 
questioning would not be covered by explicit waiver and questioning cut-off 
rules, courts would be forced to make a more searching inquiry into police 
conduct during interrogations whether that ultimately produced an involuntary 
confession. 
Sometimes it is argued that courts lack the capacity to make such 
voluntariness determinations.805 But the simple fact of the matter is that courts 
routinely have to make voluntariness determinations even under the existing 
Miranda regime. Whether or not a statement was “voluntary” dictates, for 
example, whether a non-Mirandized statement can be used for impeachment 
purposes806 or whether the fruits of such a statement can be admitted into 
evidence.807 
Focusing admissibility hearings on voluntariness issues would lead defense 
attorneys and courts to focus on substantive issues surrounding confessions 
rather than on procedural ones. As Bill Stuntz has powerfully written, Miranda 
was part of a Warren Court trend that “proceduralized criminal litigation, 
siphoning the time of attorneys and judges away from the question of the 
defendant’s guilt or innocence and toward the process by which the defendant 
was arrested, tried, and convicted.”808 Focusing more on voluntariness 
 
801 Weisselberg & Bibas, supra note 43, at 80.  
802 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 40, at 856. 
803 Weisselberg, supra note 45, at 1595; see also Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: 
Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 
601 (2006). See generally GRANO, supra note 708, at 135-38 (discussing the historical 
meaning of the voluntariness test). 
804 George C. Thomas III, The End of the Road for Miranda v. Arizona?: On the History 
and the Future of the Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 18 (2000). 
805 It is also sometimes argued that the very concept of “voluntariness” is essentially 
incoherent, as a powerful article by Ron Allen contends. See Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s 
Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71, 72 (2006).  
806 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
807 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004).  
808 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 228 (2011). 
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questions—and less on Miranda’s daunting number of procedural issues—is a 
step that should be applauded, not criticized. 
Greater focus on voluntariness would allow more consideration of what sorts 
of psychological techniques police officers can use during questioning.809 One 
of the great mysteries of the Miranda decision is how it could so strongly 
condemn psychological tactics and, at the same time, do so little about them. 
The point was perhaps most nicely made by Liva Baker, who wrote: 
The last laugh in the Miranda episode was not had by its author, Earl 
Warren . . . , but by Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid, the authors of the 
interrogation manual that he quoted frequently and with 
disapproval . . . . Warren exposed the techniques taught in that manual and 
others, which enable the police to bring psychological pressures to bear on 
the suspect to “persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his 
constitutional rights.” With this to recommend it, the manual became a best 
seller among police and a second edition had to be printed. “All but a few 
of the interrogation tactics and techniques presented in our earlier 
publication are still valid,” the authors purred in their post-Miranda edition, 
adding that all that is required to is give the warnings, get a waiver, and 
proceed.810 
Greater scrutiny of the tactics used during interrogations would be a good 
thing—and would not harm law enforcement efforts. The police seem likely to 
win the vast majority of those court challenges,811 because “[i]n the great 
majority of in-custody interrogations observed, the possibility of coercion 
appear[s] slight.”812 One quantifiable measure of this fact is that police 
questioning is generally very limited. Leo’s Bay Area study in 1993 found that 
most interrogations lasted less than an hour.813 Cassell and Hayman’s study 
found that, of 86 interrogations, only 11 extended beyond 30 minutes and only 
1 extended beyond an hour.814 To the extent that courts give greater scrutiny of 
very long interrogations, as some have advocated,815 that scrutiny will fall on a 
tiny percentage of cases—and precisely the tiny percentage of cases where most 
judicial time and energy should be devoted. 
At the same time, however, we have concerns about broad interpretations of 
voluntariness rules that would dramatically change existing practices. For 
 
809 See Slobogin, supra note 47, at 1164-67. 
810 GRAHAM, supra note 673, at 315-16.  
811 THOMAS & LEO, supra note 671, at 210 (citing WELSH WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING 
PROTECTIONS 122 n.40 (2001) (noting only nine cases of involuntary postwaiver interrogation 
out of 2000 cases)); Thomas, supra note 731, at 1977 (noting that the state wins ninety-six 
percent of voluntariness issues). 
812 LAFAVE, supra note 677, at 386.  
813 Leo, supra note 57, at 279 tbl.6.  
814 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 58, at 892.  
815 See Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the 
Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1, 46-48 (2015).  
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example, some observers have suggested that police officers should be forbidden 
from engaging in deceptive practices.816 A firm basis for such proposals is 
lacking because, while such practices may (like any other technique) produce 
false confessions, they also produce vastly larger numbers of truthful 
confessions.817 Moreover, the fundamental problem with such suggestions is that 
they would require restricting hundreds of thousands of police interrogations 
every year in ways that seem likely to harm police efforts.818 
Similarly problematic are proposals that would forbid admissibility of 
confessions that do not “fit” the crime.819 The problem with this approach is that, 
as Thomas has explained, “even ‘true’ confessions are often riddled with half-
truths because suspects want to paint the most favorable picture possible.”820 
The false confessions literature demonstrates numerous reasons why suspects 
might give otherwise truthful confessions that deviate (or apparently deviate) 
from the crime scene’s facts.821 To be sure, research on false confessions has 
established that in most cases where a suspect gives a false confession, that 
confession will often be contradicted by crime scene or other evidence.822 But 
the same can be said of a vastly larger number of cases where a suspect gives a 
true confession. Without taking into account the relative frequency or 
infrequency of false confessions to truthful confessions, it is impossible to 
deduce that an inconsistency in a confession is evidence of a truth or falsity. 
Indeed, if anything, the available evidence suggests that it is far more likely 
that any confession containing inconsistencies will turn out to be a true 
confession rather than a false confession. To establish this point, it is only 
necessary to have some rough measure of the relative proportion of false 
confessions to true confessions. While precise quantification is impossible, the 
empirical literature suggests (unsurprisingly) that the great majority of 
confessions and incriminating statements are true.823 And, as discussed above, a 
 
816 For good overviews of this issue, see generally Jacobi, supra note 661; Slobogin, supra 
note 47, at 1167-68. 
817 See Lawrence Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: Miranda Is Not Prophylactic and the 
Constitution Is Not Perfect, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 579, 616 (2007). 
818 See Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1275, 1289-90 
(2007); Slobogin, supra note 47, at 1161. 
819 See, e.g., Primus, supra note 815, at 50-51; Julie Tanaka Siegel, Note, Confessions in 
an International Age: Re-Examining Admissibility Through the Lens of Foreign 
Interrogations, 115 MICH. L. REV. 277, 302-05 (2016). 
820 George C. Thomas III, Telling Half-Truths, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1996, at 20. 
821 Cassell, supra note 796, at 594-95.  
822 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1051, 1087 (2010).  
823 See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 798, at 507-13; Marvin Zalman, Qualitatively Estimating 
the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 221 (2012) (surveying available 
empirical literature on wrongful convictions and estimating an overall trial error rate for all 
causes at between 0.5% and 1.0% for felony offenses).  
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majority of these confessions and false statements will have inconsistencies in 
them. 
E. Fewer Costs, More Benefits Than Miranda 
These tentative ideas we have sketched out suggest it would be possible to 
craft a superior alternative to Miranda, one that minimizes the costs to society 
from restrictions on law enforcement while properly protecting suspects’ 
legitimate interests. In engaging in such cost-benefit analysis, we are doing 
nothing more than Miranda’s defenders have urged. As Kamisar wrote in 1987, 
striking a balance “is the way Miranda’s defenders—not its critics—have talked 
about the case for the past twenty years.”824 Indeed, that is still the way Miranda 
is defended.825 
The reforms that we suggest here, particularly eliminating Miranda’s waiver 
and questioning cut-off rules (and perhaps, in addition, adding an adverse 
inference warning) would likely increase law enforcement’s ability to clear 
crimes and convict criminals through voluntary confessions. In considering how 
much of a benefit this is, the starting point must be that voluntary confessions 
remain an important part of law enforcement in America today. The Supreme 
Court has emphasized that “[a]dmissions of guilt are more than merely 
‘desirable’; they are essential to society’s compelling interest in finding, 
convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.”826 Thus, the “‘ready 
ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good.’ 
Without these confessions, crimes go unsolved and criminals unpunished. These 
are not negligible costs . . . .”827 
The data we review here suggest Miranda resulted in a loss of a substantial 
number of voluntary confessions, both as measured by the confession rate 
studies and by (as an understated second-best approach) FBI clearance rate data. 
While we have not attempted to fully map out the ultimate consequences of these 
lost confessions, there can be little doubt that they operated to produce the 
unsolved crimes and unpunished offenders that the Court has warned about, with 
significant harm to society. 
 
824 Yale Kamisar, The “Police Practice” Phases of the Criminal Process Revolution and 
the Three Phases of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS 143, 150 (Herman Schwartz 
ed., 1987).  
825 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The Miranda Case Fifty Years Later, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1293, 
1300 (suggesting that the balance of power with respect to Miranda has been “worked out”). 
826 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 
U.S. 181, 186 (1977)). 
827 Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 796 (2009) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 
U.S. 171, 181 (1991)); see also Ronald J. Allen, The Misguided Defenses of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 5 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 205, 214 (2007) (“We should not treat the serious matter 
of trying to limit criminality as a high school civics lesson in which the predominate issue is 
to see how we can get more and more people to obstruct legitimate police investigations. 
Rights are wonderful things, but so, too, is the ability—dare I say “right”?—to live one’s life 
free from the predations of individuals who have no respect for your rights.”).  
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Turning first to clearance rates, a decline in clearance rates “signals a decline 
in punishment certainty and threatens to undermine deterrence principles, a key 
foundation of our criminal justice system.”828 If a crime goes uncleared, the 
responsible criminal is never held accountable and, to the contrary, remains free 
to commit further crimes. Lower clearance rates thus indicate that “the state is 
ineffective at insulating citizens from violent offenders, which may contribute 
to negative social reactions such as loss of faith in public officials, an increased 
sense of fear and insecurity.”829 
Our interest in lower clearance rates, however, is only as a telltale of the 
resultant problem of lower confession rates. Lower clearance rates suggest lower 
confession rates. And confessions, in turn, are frequently needed to secure a 
conviction,830 even in this age of DNA testing and other advanced forensic 
science.831 When Miranda blocks the police from obtaining a voluntary 
confession, in many cases the result will be a criminal who goes free—free, it 
should be noted to continue his depredations against other crime victims. And 
sadly, we know who those victims will be. They will disproportionately be racial 
minorities, residents of inner cities, the poor, and others in society who are in 
the weakest position to defend against crimes.832 
While the focus of this Article is a quantitative one, it important to emphasize 
the limitations in the kind of data we explore. As Gerald Caplan has nicely 
explained, criminological studies “reduce crime to something remote and 
abstract, a string of numbers, an event that one reads about in the newspapers, 
something that happens in another part of town. There is no hint of rape as a 
nightmare come alive or robbery as a ruinous matter.”833 Too often the costs of 
these crimes are unduly minimized, even though efforts at quantification suggest 
crime victims (and their families) bear enormous burdens.834 
To be sure, in some of its post-Miranda decisions, the Supreme Court appears 
to have been cognizant of such costs. But there is little in the data reviewed here 
to support the Court’s claim that “[i]f anything, our subsequent cases have 
reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement.”835 The 
 
828 Ousey & Lee, supra note 85, at 142.  
829 Id.  
830 See Cassell, supra note 16, at 422-37.  
831 See supra notes 512-27 and accompanying text.  
832 See JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF MURDER IN AMERICA 8 (2015) 
(discussing “failure of the law to stand up for black people when they are hurt or killed by 
others”); JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E. MORGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION, 2015, at 9 tbl.7 (2016).  
833 Caplan, supra note 716, at 1384-85. 
834 See Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and 
a Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1033 (2004) (discussing 
TED R. MILLER, MARC A. COHEN & BRIAN WIERSEMA, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COSTS 
AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK (1996)).  
835 Berghius v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)).  
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Court’s decisions have generally nibbled around the edges of the doctrine (with 
the possible exception of the 2010 decision in Berghuis,836 which was decided 
so recently as to be largely outside of the trends our regression equations 
measured). The most harmful features of Miranda have not been modified—and 
the harms reflected in, for example, the FBI’s clearance rate data do not appear 
to have been mitigated.837 
And what, then, are Miranda’s offsetting benefits? If many of the articles in 
this Symposium are to be believed, Miranda’s benefits are few and far 
between.838 Alschuler writes that “Miranda is a doctrinal failure, an ethical 
failure, a jurisprudential failure, and an empirical failure.”839 Dripps adds that 
“whatever rules were right fifty years ago are unlikely—extremely unlikely—to 
be ideal rules today or for the future.”840 Klein agrees that “[t]he Miranda 
warnings have perverse results and ought to be retired and replaced.”841 David 
Rossman concludes that “[a]t this point in its history, . . . Miranda is bankrupt 
both intellectually and in terms of practical effect.”842 Slobogin explains that 
while “Miranda was an attempt at giving police clear guidelines about 
interrogation[,] . . . [o]ther than its warnings requirement, . . . it has not done 
so.”843 And Charles Weisselberg agrees that “Miranda does not provide 
meaningful protection for the Fifth Amendment privilege.”844 
But the ultimate question is not whether Miranda confers benefits in the 
abstract, but whether it is, on balance, more beneficial than other alternatives 
that the Court could reasonably implement. The ideas we have sketched here 
suggest it would be possible to craft a replacement for Miranda that would be a 
true win-win—a system in which fewer guilty criminals go free while suspects’ 
legitimate interests during police questioning are protected. Our reform proposal 
would deliver warnings to suspects of their right to remain silent, much as the 
current system does, and would provide even stronger protections against 
coercion by a system of videotaping. It would also focus the attention of defense 
attorneys and courts on the most troubling confessions—those in which there is 
a genuine issue of voluntariness. Such a system would not only better protect 
 
836 See supra notes 744-52 and accompanying text. 
837 One measure of this fact is that in 1969 violent crime clearance rates were 45.6% while 
in 2010 they were 45.3%—essentially unchanged. See supra Figure 2.  
838 Cf. LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & MARY L. PITMAN, THE MIRANDA RULING: ITS PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 172 (2010) (concluding Miranda’s “goals have not been achieved”).  
839 Alschuler, supra note 40, at 890. 
840 Dripps, supra note 521, at 895. 
841 Klein, supra note 734, at 1004. 
842 David Rossman, Resurrecting Miranda’s Right to Counsel, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1129, 
1131 (2017). 
843 Slobogin, supra note 47, at 1195. 
844 Charles D. Weisselberg, Exporting and Importing Miranda, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1235, 
1236 (2017). 
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society from dangerous criminals but also better protect suspects from abusive 
law enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
We began this Article by recalling that the dissenters in Miranda had warned 
that the decision would have social costs and that only time could tell how 
serious the costs would be. Has Miranda handcuffed the cops over the last fifty 
years? In this Article we have tried to assay all of the available empirical 
evidence on Miranda’s effects on law enforcement. Based on that evidence, we 
believe the best answer is ‘yes.’ 
This finding should not be particularly surprising. We have shown little more 
than that a landmark Supreme Court decision imposing unprecedented restraints 
on law enforcement made law enforcement less effective. But our conclusion is 
an important one because it runs contrary to conventional academic opinion. 
And whether Miranda handcuffed the cops continues to be important as courts 
and policy makers must consider how to interpret and respond to Miranda’s 
rules. 
Our conclusion rests on multiple bases, including showing substantial 
confession rate declines in Miranda’s wake as well as the FBI’s clearance rate 
data which we analyze at length. Throughout our Article, we have tried to make 
clear the caveats and limitations of our findings. We do not purport to have 
irrefutably proven that Miranda handcuffed the cops. But we believe we have 
demonstrated that the preponderance of empirical evidence points strongly in 
that direction. Our findings certainly call into question the general academic 
belief that Miranda has not hampered law enforcement. We hope that this 
Article will lead to more research on Miranda’s effects on law enforcement. 
Given the importance of the decision, we should not have to live in an empirical 
desert with little information about its real-world effects. 
But more broadly, if (as we suggest) Miranda has harmed law enforcement, 
extremely difficult questions arise for Miranda’s defenders. Miranda extends 
beyond the boundaries of the Fifth Amendment on the basis of cost-benefit 
prophylaxis. But how can one measure a victim’s pain when a criminal escapes 
justice against the benefit of giving that criminal the power to stop questioning? 
Miranda’s defenders have worked long and hard to maintain the conventional 
wisdom that Miranda did not handcuff the cops, presumably so that they would 
not have to confront explicitly the costly tradeoffs that inhere in the decision. As 
we now observe Miranda’s fiftieth birthday, it is time to have a full and fair 
debate about the decision—about its costs, its benefits, and its alternatives. 
Strong empirical evidence supports the conclusion that Miranda’s 
unprecedented restrictions on law enforcement has allowed numerous criminals 
to escape justice. No less than many other controversial social policies, Miranda 
is not cost free. Nor is Miranda the only way to regulate police questioning. It 
is time for Miranda’s defenders to acknowledge these facts and begin a frank 
discussion about how we can do better. 
 
